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ABSTRACT
Mixed-income rental housing in urban areas represents a unique op-
portunity to bring people of different economic and racial backgrounds to-
gether. At the intersection of distinct neighborhoods, mixed-income housing
can be expressive of the city's diversity; incorporating ground floor retail
space and community services, such projects can be integrated into their sur-
roundings. Carefully designed, mixed-income/mixed-use developments can
provide the spatial diversity conducive to interaction among residents and
neighbors. For people with market-rate incomes, for whom home ownership
is increasingly out of reach, such projects can offer the vitality and conven-
ience of city living at a good price. For people with low-to-moderate incomes,
mixed-income developments can be an attractive alternative to traditional
forms of subsidized housing.
In this thesis, an analysis of two recent mixed-income/mixed-use pro-
jects is intended to illuminate the factors essential to the success of such pro-
jects. Tent City in Boston and Fillmore Center in San Francisco represent two
very different approaches to mixed-income/mixed-use development. Histor-
ical background and an evaluation of project design, financing, and manage-
ment of these projects will serve as a framework through which broader les-
sons of equity, choice, and community-building can be drawn.
Mixed-income/mixed-use projects are most successful where they are
born out of a neighborhood context in which providing opportunity for
people of low-to-moderate income forms the basis of the community's val-
ues. However, impediments of mixed-use development, including the risks
of retail turnover, can jeopardize the goal of linking such projects to their sur-
roundings. In addition, a sense of community will not be fostered by simply
combining uses and income groups; there must also be a commitment to
affirmative marketing strategies, on-site services, and tenant responsibility in
management to ensure that these projects can be sustained. Economically
diverse and functionally complex, mixed-income/mixed-use developments
are tentative opportunities in which to demonstrate the promise of economic
and social integration.
Thesis Advisor: Philip B. Herr, Adjunct Professor of City Planning
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1.1 THE CITY IS THE FRONTIER
The cities are history, havens of interest and contrast....They
are the main forums of civil rights and the soils on which our
democratic principles will receive their most crucial tests.
Charles Abrams, The City is The Frontier1
Over fifty years ago, federal legislation established a goal to provide
decent housing for all Americans. The subsequent urban renewal mandate
called for both revitalizing our cities and serving the housing needs of low-
income residents. However, the lofty ideals of the mandate became ob-
scured as federal grants were used to clear large tracts of land for develop-
ment which frequently displaced the urban poor.
While a theory of income-mixing was unfolding in reaction to public
housing projects which had isolated the urban poor, a strategy of mixed-use
development evolved in response to demands for diversity and pressures to
optimize land value. Increasingly, political, economic, and social forces
have encouraged a merger between mixed-use and theories of income mix-
ing, both as a result of affordable housing mandates and as a deliberate
strategy. Blending mixed-income rental housing with mixed-use develop-
ment is an integrative approach to meeting the housing needs of diverse
groups while encouraging economic vitality.
In studying city planning, my intention has been to better understand
how to create opportunities in which the interests of low-to-moderate in-
come people can be served -- not peripherally in isolated projects, but
within the wider social fabric. Mixed-income housing which incorporates
non-residential functions such as retail space and community services rep-
resents an occasion in which physical planning and social planning con-
verge to meet the laudable goal of creating an economically and racially
integrated environment.
It is the premise of this thesis that together a mixed-income compo-
nent and mixed-use component can form a socially diverse environment
conducive to building a sense of community. The mixed-income compo-
nent, in its origins and implementation, imbues the development with a
special identity. The mixed-use component, in serving both residents and
neighbors, can be a vehicle by which the mixed-income community can be
integrated into the larger context. Combined, mixed-income and mixed-
use might do more than they can separately: they might create new oppor-
tunities for interaction among residents and among residents and neighbors.
In order to illustrate the actual motivations behind mixed-income/
mixed-use projects, how they have recently been developed, and what the
prospects are for their success, I have chosen two examples: Tent City in
Boston and Fillmore Center in San Francisco. The thesis is organized
around a presentation of the cases and an analysis of each by means of four
performance criteria: assessing MI and MU, project design, financing, and
management. This will serve as the framework through which the broader
issues of identity, integration, and interaction will be reviewed in the first
and last chapters. A synopsis:
CHAPTER I
The introductory section will begin with a discussion of the
issues of identity, integration, and interaction at the heart of
MI/MU development; then the definitions of both MI & MU
will be sharpened and the importance of their nexus explained;
strategies for development will be described and an overview
of design issues especially important to MI/MU development
will be presented;
CHAPTERS II - IV
The centerpiece of the thesis, an examination of the two
case studies, will begin with a description of the historical
context of these two projects; following the case histories
and project descriptions, four performance criteria will be
used to evaluate the prospects for the projects' success vis-
a-vis the ideals outlined in the introduction;
CHAPTER V
The concluding section will focus on broad lessons of MI/MU
drawn from the case studies; finally, given a candid assess-
ment of MI/MU development, the importance of community
in the struggle for equity and integration will be discussed..
The objective of this thesis is not to present a comparative study of
mixed-income/mixed-use (MI/MU) development. In terms of location,
scale, income and use mix, and project sponsor, Tent City and Fillmore
Center are very different. Rather, given the important similarities in
neighborhood history, the challenges of the design and development pro-
cess, and the nature of project management, these cases illustrate both the
problems and the promise of MI/MU development.
Defining the Ideal of Mixed-Income/Mixed-Use
In defining what MI/MU developments should be, I begin with the
proposition that they are rare opportunities for fostering a sense of com-
munity -- though not according to some nostalgic or utopian vision. Rath-
er, in certain strategic locations, such developments can serve the needs and
desires of diverse groups and, given their functional complexity, can be ve-
hicles to bridge, even bind, distinct neighborhoods. Throughout this thesis,
I will examine MI/MU in terms of Identity -- as a unique, socially diverse
environment conducive to the building of community; in terms of Inte-
gration -- whereby retail space and community services can serve to con-
nect the development to its surroundings; and in terms of Interaction --
the building of connections among residents and between residents and
neighbors.
Identity
There are special places in most cities where residential districts
overlap -- sometimes districts made up of distinctly different classes. Such
seams in the fabric of the city provide occasions where people of different
income groups might live together. Well-planned and thoughtfully de-
signed, mixed-income residential environments are unique opportunities
for economic and racial integration. Architecturally, mixed-income hous-
ing developments should harmonize with their surroundings; at the same
time, given their broad objective of bringing people of different back-
grounds together, these environments have a special identity in the urban
landscape which may or may not be expressed architecturally.
One of my predecessors in the Department of Urban Studies and
Planning, Buckley Yung, did his thesis on the subject of mixed-income/
mixed-race housing. On the basis of two case studies, he concluded that
among residents, developers, and state and local housing agencies, the pro-
jects were regarded as "very satisfactory". Residents generally did not
have a problem in living among people of different race. He did not find,
however, that residents necessarily felt there was a direct advantage to
them in living among people of different income.2
Similarly, one belief or expectation of MI/MU development which
should be dismissed at the outset is that mixed-income environments are
important because they can provide role models for low-income people.
The presumption here is that a) low-income people should subscribe to
middle-class ideals of success (ie: the house in the suburbs); or, alternately,
that b) low-income people should not expect more than a minimal accom-
modation in society until economically they are fully prepared to partici-
pate. The danger of these presumptions is that they equate monetary value
with personal or family values. Such paternalism is reminiscent of the
"just-be-grateful-you've-got-this-much" attitude that has surrounded public
housing for the past 30 years.
This is not to say that the presence of people making more money
within a development may not be beneficial to people of more modest
means. Indeed, to the extent that personal connections can lead to a good
job, such proximity can be very advantageous. But more importantly, the
mixing of income groups offers an opportunity for breaking down barriers
of fear and prejudice. Where they can help foster mutual understanding,
MI/MU projects meet the challenge of building communities across econo-
mic and racial lines.
Integration
At the same time, the incorporation of a mixed-use component can
do more than simply provide for the needs of the development's residents.
Ground floor retail/commercial space and room for community functions
can provide critical connections between the project and its surroundings.
The mixed-use component, in serving both residents and neighbors, can
integrate the development into the larger community.
Another of my predecessors, Susan Orbuch, did her thesis on the
subject of mixed-use development. On the basis of three case studies she
concluded that a mix of goods and services which appealed to both resi-
dents and neighbors could help a development blend into its surroundings.
In addition, she found that commercial turnover presents the greatest risk
to synergy between the residential and retail uses and that, in general,
residents of the developments rarely worked in one of the development's
businesses. 3
This last finding runs counter to the expectation that by including a
residential component, mixed-use development can become a self-sustain-
ing, "holistic" environment. Such a nostalgic notion may have some his-
toric precedent in the tightly-knit ethnic enclaves of our cities at the turn of
the century. But mostly it harkens back to the mythical American ideal of
the "small town", where people live and work together and forge a mutu-
ally-supportive community. The fact is that social contacts in American
society are more typically based on work, family, or common interests --
not on place. The result is a spatial dispersion across the city. The fact
that the catchment areas of our social services (such as schools) typically do
not fit neat neighborhood boundaries is evidence of this.4
At the same time, if neighborhoods are not precisely the building
blocks of cities as some planning theorists might believe, it does not mean
that they cannot function as unifiers. Rather than self-sustaining utopias,
modern neighborhoods in the American context have been "issue-oriented"
and "change-resistant". Threats such as urban renewal, school busing, and
highway expansion have served to galvanize local opposition in the cause of
self-defense. Furthermore, in providing cooperative day care, locally-
managed housing, and "incubator" space for business, for example, many
community-based groups focus on generating change rather that simply
resisting it.5
Interaction
While the ambitions of MI/MU may be lofty, the reasons people
choose to move into them are likely to be pragmatic. For those with good
incomes, such developments must offer what market-rate alternatives do --
and also be a good deal. People of low-to-moderate income might simply
want a decent, well-built apartment. But because living together in the
same development implies contact, tenant involvement in management and
carefully-designed semi-private space can enhance resident interaction,
fostering a sense of community.
Neither of my predecessors found that, alone, the mixed-income en-
vironment or the mixed-use environment was particularly conducive to
fostering a sense of community. In his study of mixed-income/mixed-race
housing, Yung concluded that the expectation of interaction might be too
ambitious -- or it might be simply too early in the history of the develop-
ments he studied to tell. Orbuch was convinced that the mixed-use envi-
ronment itself did not create interaction; rather, interaction was more a
factor of the nature of community already existing in the neighborhood
context and the extent to which the development could attract pedestrian
activity.
The premise of this thesis is that incorporating mixed-income hous-
ing with mixed-use development sets an important precedent. When well-
conceived and implemented, MI/MU development can provide more oppor-
tunities for people of low-to-moderate income and represents a significant
step toward creating an economically and racially integrated community.
The question is whether the ideals of MI/MU can be fulfilled on common
ground.
There are skeptics who would argue that affordable and for-profit
aims can never be reconciled on the same site. Some do not agree that
government should be involved in sponsoring or subsidizing housing in the
first place. Yet while they extol the virtues of personal initiative and the
free market, they may neglect the fact that the federally-sponsored mort-
gage programs, deductions for homeowners, and suburban highway ex-
pansion of the past amount to a far larger government housing subsidy for
the middle class than those proposed for people of low-to-moderate in-
come. The larger issue is whether government has an obligation to be
equally responsive as it struggles to reconcile economic development with
serving the broad public interest
Others are wary of the implications of involving the private sector in
a form of economic redistribution. They point to the checkered history of
urban renewal to explain that government incentives to spur private invest-
ment in affordable housing inevitably result in lofty goals being co-opted
by building and real estate interests. They may agree with government
leadership in the provision of affordable housing yet are concerned about
the risks involved in sustaining ground floor retail/commercial space.
With regard to income mixing, they might point to the debilitating effects
of the cycle of poverty -- the lack of education, drug abuse, crime, teen
pregnancy -- and conclude that the gulf between different groups in our
society is too great for an integrative environment to work.
Still there are others who see promise in a coordinated strategy to
arrest the cycle of poverty and provide more opportunities for disadvan-
taged people. They may be concerned, however, about the viability of
community-based non-profit organizations that shift from an advocacy role
to a development role. Furthermore, skepticism may surround not so
much the ideals of equity and integration, but rather the practical impedi-
ments to good development. Indeed, the risks of MI/MU development are
significant: design, construction, and legal issues of mixing residential and
retail functions can be daunting; mixing affordable housing with other
income-producing uses has sometimes proven financially precarious; and
government and non-profit sponsors of such development are hinging a
theory of social mainstreaming on market forces as people of low income
are encouraged to live among "market-rate" tenants.
The risks of MI/MU development are quite real. The case studies
presented in this thesis illustrate the impediments to such projects beginning
in the proposal stage and continuing through design, financing, construc-
tion, and ultimately, project management. Nevertheless, while imperfect,
these examples stand as evidence that such projects are being attempted.
As ambitious as MI/MU developments are, it is certainly true that
they are not appropriate everywhere, nor are they appropriate for just
anyone. And yet, with home ownership beyond the grasp not only of the
urban poor but a growing proportion of the middle class as well, such de-
velopments might become increasingly practical for many people. Design-
ed for an economically-mixed market, not only can the quality of MI/MU
developments attract people with good incomes, but they can also offer
choice to people of low-to-moderate income who have frequently been iso-
lated from the rest of society.
1 Abrams, Charles. The City is the Frontier (Harper & Row: New York, 1965), p. 361.
2 Yung, Buckley Ken. Housing Integration: State Efforts At Promoting Mixed-Income
and Mixed-Race Housing (MIT: MCP Thesis, 1989).
3 Orbuch, Susan R. Built Communities? A Social Evaluation of the Built Environment in
Three Small Scale Mixed-Use Developments in Suburban Town Locales (MIT:
MCP Thesis, 1989).
4 Lynch, Kevin. A Theory of Good City Form (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1981), p.246.
5 Lynch, p. 247.
1.2 MIXED-INCOME/MIXED-USE:
A PRECEDENT?
Many different developments could loosely be characterized as
mixed-income/mixed-use (MI/MU). The purpose of this chapter is to
narrow the definitions by identifying, within an historical context, the
subgroup of inner city cases such as Tent City and Fillmore Center. Typ-
ically involving some form of public sector participation, such develop-
ments represent a distinct branch of the mixed-use phenomenon of the past
two decades. Given the strength of the urban rental housing market,
coupled with an expected slump in commercial construction over the next
few years, such residentially-oriented projects may well become more
common in future mixed-use developments.
This section will first concentrate on describing the emergence of
income mixing theory. It will be defined in terms of the MI/MU tenancy
model of this thesis, a study of its effectiveness will be cited, and the tacit
link to racial integration will be addressed. Next, a brief overview of
mixed-use development will be presented. Finally, the importance of the
nexus between mixed-income and mixed-use will be explored.
Mixed-Income Background
For the purpose of this report, mixed-income housing shall be de-
fined according to four parameters: 1) a high-density urban tenancy en-
vironment (as distinct from home ownership) where rent is based upon a
sliding scale such that decent, secure housing requires no more that 30% of
one's annual income. (The sliding scale is relative to the statistical median
income of a metropolitan area or region.); 2) a physically and functionally
integrated environment -- one where units are not segregated according to
income classification and where opportunities for interaction are not pre-
cluded; 3) the project's income mix occurs within a building as opposed to
across the site or across the neighborhood; and 4) it has been developed ac-
cording to a coherent, overall plan (as opposed to an ad hoc, incremental
plan).
Begun in part as a reaction to the stigma of public housing, the
growth in mixed-income housing has been steady since the early 1970's.
Public and private resources have been used to produce new or rehabili-
tated mixed-income, multi-family rental housing across the country (in
addition to mixed-income home ownership programs). By 1987, the
Council of State Housing Finance Agencies reported that in that year some
25,000 units of mixed-income rental housing were produced nationally by
state housing finance agencies using tax exempt bonds.1
And yet, despite the growth in mixed-income housing, relatively little
has been written about it -- in fact, there are varying perceptions about just
what mixed-income housing is or is meant to achieve. At times, 1) income
mixing in housing has been considered a strategy to attract the middle class
back to the city, back into communities which had become economically
and racially isolated. Alternately, 2) income mixing in housing has been
thought of as a means to integrate people of low-to-moderate income into
residential communities often outside the center city. On occasion, such
"integration" has been regarded as a way of increasing the supply of hous-
ing affordable to people of low-to-moderate income by providing a "mid-
dle ground" between the dependency of publicly-assisted housing and the
market.
Some may argue that if integration is the aim, surely income mixing
in housing is not the only way to accomplish it. Improved educational and
employment opportunities for the urban poor would eventually enable
them to exercise their own discretion in the market place -- without land
write-downs and large public subsidies. Certainly changing economic and
political circumstances might eventually result in improvements in housing
opportunities; in the meantime, however, income mixing has developed as
a method of providing more alternatives to people of low-to-moderate in-
come. 2 As such, it is regarded as a palatable means of income redistribu-
tion.
The evolution of income mixing as a housing policy is well document-
ed by the architectural form many such developments have taken over the
past twenty years. In some cases, whether in townhouses or towers, the
units reserved for people of low-to-moderate income have been contained
in completely separate buildings on the opposite sides of a site. In other
cases, while the units reserved for people of low-to-moderate income are
still contained in separate buildings, these buildings are scattered among
those for market-rate tenants. Ultimately, of course, the mix of incomes
has occurred within the buildings themselves and it is in this category that
both Tent City and Fillmore Center belong.
As noted above, documentation of such developments has been scarce.
One early study by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA),
entitled All In Together, provided some encouraging findings as to the
success of such mixing -- measured as the degree of satisfaction felt by
low-, moderate-, and market-rate tenants. Founded in 1966 on the premise
of a clear public policy to promote economic integration, in six years the
agency had created over 30,000 units of mixed-income, multi-family hous-
ing.3
All In Together, published in 1974, is a detailed statistical analysis
from a cross-section of 16 of its developments representing a variety of
low, moderate, and market mixes. This "social audit" came to conclusions
which challenged conventional wisdom: income mix was found to be less a
determinant of satisfaction or dissatisfaction among all three groups of
tenants than issues of design, construction, and management of the devel-
opments. "...Contrary to expectations, measures of lifestyle, values, and
attitudes did not reveal any significant differences between income levels."4
Though this early report seem to confirm some of the Agency's belief in
the potential of income mixing, it was less satisfied with the slow progress
toward racial integration in its developments.5
If income mixing in housing might be considered a palatable means of
achieving economic integration, the implication that it also encourages ra-
cial integration has not always been well-received. While rarely is it stated
explicitly, economic barriers in our society are linked to racial barriers. A
National Academy of Sciences report of the 1970s described the sorry his-
tory of how housing, as a resource, has been distributed by race in this
country. 6 It is suggested that racial attitudes have not so much caused a
discriminatory housing market -- but that, in fact, such attitudes have been
derived from the market.
The chicken and egg dilemma posed by this argument would be diffi-
cult to verify. Nonetheless, the point is that race is inextricably bound up
in the issue of housing; in fact, "income" has often been used as a surrogate
for "race". While it is not the purpose of this thesis to address racial mix-
ing directly, it must be considered in the study of income mixing. To the
extent that perceptions of race -- or class -- affect people's choice of where
to live, it is a relevant issue. Furthermore, negative perceptions such as
fear have been a factor, especially at the local level, in resisting mixed-
income rental and home ownership proposals.
Like the MHFA study, the National Academy of Sciences report
concludes that good quality and value for money are the means of over-
coming resistance to racially-mixed housing. The report also points out
that because "redlining" practices had made it difficult for many people to
secure loans for purchasing a home, racial and income mixing in rental
housing, in particular in the middle price range, offer the most freedom of
choice and thus the best opportunity for successful integration.
Mixed-Use Background
For the purpose of this report, "mixed-use" development will be de-
fined according to the Urban Land Institute's (ULI) description that such
development is 1) characterized by three or more revenue-producing uses,
2) by significant functional and physical integration, and 3) by develop-
ment in conformance with a coherent overall plan (as opposed to an ad hoc,
incremental plan).7 In addition, other "non-residential" functions which do
not necessarily generate income (ie: community meeting rooms and ser-
vices provided by volunteers or outside providers) will be considered here
as also constituting part of the mixed-use component..
The concept of mixed-use is nothing new. Precedent extends back to
the ancient cities of Greece, the fortified medieval city, the delightful mix
of residential and commercial uses central to the vitality of cities like
London, Paris, and New York. But in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury two trends converged to undermine a predominant pattern of mixed-
use development: the implementation of zoning laws, originally intended to
create order and safeguard public health and safety (to say nothing of the
pernicious effects of segregating ethnic groups and economic classes); and
the rise of the automobile as the dominant mode of transport, which led to
horizontal, dispersed patterns of land use.8 -
Yet the convergence of these two trends did not spell the demise of
mixed-use development -- though it would take on a character and scale of
unprecedented proportions. Rockefeller Center established the standard
for large urban mega-projects, and later urban renewal legislation en-
couraged other private developers to follow this lead in the name of elim-
inating the blight in our cities. During the 1950's, commercial office
space was the driving development type within most mixed-use develop-
ments (MXDs). 9
As the mixed-use movement gained momentum, interest in incorpo-
rating residential uses took hold. Private developers, aware of the risks
involved in MXDs, would typically opt to build housing which would be
profitable in the marketplace: upper-income, and luxury housing. They
claimed changing demographics suggested household sizes were changing
and that more adult-oriented development was in demand. But by the
1960's, public sector site control and development incentives increasingly
resulted in portions of the residential use being reserved for people with
incomes below market-rate. In 1985 it was estimated that of all the rental
units included in MXDs across the country, 57% were for the middle-
income market, 22% were for the luxury market, and 17% were for the
subsidized rental housing market. 10
A 1985 Urban Land Institute (ULI) survey of MXDs across the coun-
try and Canada estimated there were three times as many such develop-
ments by 1985 as had existed ten years earlier. In fact, the survey found
that 58% had been built since 1980. Furthermore, throughout the decade
of the 1970s residential use was included in only 19% of MXDs, but 50%
of projects built after 1979 included residential use. By the mid-1980s,
58% of MXDs were located in the Central Business District, 15% in "Other
Central City", 16% in Suburban Central Business District, and 11% as
suburban "Freestanding" MXDs (ie: scattered site developments ). Nearly
two-thirds of the MXDs in the "Other Central City" category (of which
Tent City and Fillmore Center are a part) included residential uses with the
average number of units being 484. Finally, of all MXDs in the ULI sur-
vey, approximately half involved some form of public economic incentive,
investment, or ownership. 11
Yet despite the opportunities and advantages of MXDs, market reali-
ties can quickly dash the expectations of economic vitality. One of the most
common public sector pitfalls has been to include too much retail space --
where market support has not been substantiated ahead of time. 12 Recent
experience has resulted in a planning process where "paramount impor-
tance" is placed on ensuring that each major component of the mix is able
to substantially stand on its own. 13
The recent trend toward small-scale mixed-use development, in which
residential and commercial/retail uses are designed to subsist independent
of one another, is well represented in the cases of Tent City and Fillmore
Center. Whether new construction or incorporated into renovated struc-
tures or historic buildings, smaller MXDs can serve as an attractive transi-
tion between different land uses or districts, restoring the urban fabric. In
areas such as the South End of Boston and the Western Addition of San
Francisco, the image of the vibrant urban environment that is at the heart
of mixed-use is not something new but a resurrection of the diversity that
once existed there.
From rowhouse districts to dense MI/MU development:
reinterpreting a precedent
Integrating Mixed-Income and Mixed-Use
While the federal commitment to public housing was expanding in
the 1960's, evidence suggested that in their isolation, public housing pro-
jects had the effect of stigmatizing the poor. There was a growing aware-
ness that in addition to a carefully designed physical environment incorpo-
rating social services and retail space, an economically-integrated environ-
ment can provide significant opportunities for the poor to make the transi-
tion to independence. At the same time, one of the by-products of urban
renewal was a strategy of mixing complementary functions on the same site
in response to demands for diversity and pressures to optimize land value.
Typically, profitable private development on large parcels of cleared
land consisted of office buildings, hotels, and parking structures -- projects
which brought life to the city only by day. Planners advocated projects in-
corporating housing with other income-producing uses in order to provide
a stabilizing element to the city as well as to enhance its vitality. Initially
urban developers segregated luxury mixed-use development from afford-
able housing projects. But as urban land values escalated dramatically and
public officials adopted a new entrepreneurial style, low-income constitu-
encies began to demand more of a share in the wealth of the city.
Incorporating mixed-income rental housing into mixed-use projects
can be viewed as an integrative response on the part of city officials trying
to enhance the city's tax base while meeting the demand for affordable
housing. It can also be understood as a strategy by which community-based
non-profit organizations can provide affordable housing as well as a stabi-
lizing economic development influence in strategic locations. In addition
to serving residents, when community meeting rooms and ground floor re-
tail space serve area neighbors, a MI/MU development is more likely to
become a part of the neighborhood than one-dimensional apartment com-
plexes.
1 HST, "Mixed-Income Housing: Making It Work in Today's Climate", Symposium June
1990, Housing & Society Trust; Quincy, MA; Joseph Corcoran, founder.
2 Hawley, Amos, and Rock, Vincent - editors. Segregation in Residential Areas: Papers
on Racial & Socioeconomic Factors in the Choice of Housing, (National Academy
of Sciences: Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 148.
3 MHFA, All in Together: An Evaluation of Mixed-Income Multifamily Housing, (William
Ryan, Allan Sloan, Maria Seferi, Elaine Werby; January 24, 1974), p. 1.
4 MHFA, p. 24.
5 MHFA, p. 1.
6 Hawley, p.58.
7 ULI, Mixed-Use Development Handbook, (Urban Land Institute: Washington, D.C.,
1987), p.1).
8 ULI, p.1.
9 ULI, p.339.
10 ULI, p. 339.
11 ULI, p. 339.
12 ULI, p. 50.
13 ULI, p. 44.
1.3 STRATEGIES FOR MI/MU
DEVELOPMENT
Having explored the history and merging of income mixing and
mixed-use, it is important to consider the challenges facing developers of
such projects. This section of the chapter will focus on the sponsors
themselves -- typically a combination of public, private, or non-profit de-
velopers. Such complex public/private partnerships have become necessary
in large part because of the federal shift in the last dozen years away from the
provision of subsidized housing . This shift has resulted in a new variety of
incentives and financing mechanisms being created to entice private devel-
opers to participate in the development of subsidized housing. This section
will conclude with a look at the challenges of combining mixed-income
housing with mixed-use development.
The Players
An appreciation of the crisis millions of low-income Americans face as
they seek to secure affordable housing is essential to understanding the scope
of the challenge faced by public, private, and non-profit developers. As of
1987, 47% of low-income renters were spending over half of their incomes
for rent, compared to 34% percent of low-income renters in 1974. At the
same time, home ownership has become increasingly difficult: in 1978 a
typical homebuyer had to make a downpayment equal to one-third of house-
hold income, but by the mid-1980s this downpayment had risen to one-half of
household income.1
In the last two decades, the federal presence in the production of
affordable housing has dramatically declined. Federally-sponsored sub-
sidized housing constituted 29% of all housing starts in 1970 and averaged
14% of all housing starts throughout the decade. But by 1983, federally-
sponsored subsidized housing construction accounted for 7% of the total; by
1985, the proportion fell to 5% and continued to decline. 2 Into the growing
vacuum have stepped state and local governmental and non-profit entities.
Some of the better-able and more progressive states, notably Massachusetts
and California, responded to the federal cut-back with a variety of strategies
including: new appropriations for housing, new real estate taxes, fees on new
development, and community loan funds. At the same time, numerous
neighborhood-based community organizations have created development
arms to build or rehabilitate housing for low-to-moderate income people.
This is great news for conservatives who have advocated a federal
retreat from affordable housing production; it has also been well received by
the public sector increasingly strapped for cash -- and for leadership. There
is a common perception that community-originated proposals are less likely
to encounter community opposition and can, in fact, serve as a source of
pride and hope for area residents. Proposals for affordable housing coming
from community groups often include ancillary objectives such as neighbor-
hood economic development and providing a focus for community services.
As a result, the prospects for such projects succeeding are considered greater
than if the proposals were generated and developed by outsiders -- whether
public or private.
However, despite the efforts of state, city, and community groups, the
magnitude of the increasing demand for affordable housing is daunting.
State and local housing activity to date amount to only a fraction of what the
federal programs have traditionally provided. 3 Furthermore, the evolution
of other forms of project financing in the course of the 1980s has done little
to enhance the potential of non-federal developers. The deregulation of the
banking industry led to rampant speculation in residential real estate. The
effects of ill-conceived projects and outright graft are reflected in the failings
of numerous banks and saving and loan institutions in the late 1980s; the costs
of the speculative spirit of the decade will haunt us for many years to come.
Financing & Incentives
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has had a profound effect on affordable
housing development. Advocates of affordable rental housing, critical of the
targeting of pre-1986 federal bond issues, succeeded in expanding the afford-
ability range. Before 1986 (under terms of tax-exempt bonds and low-in-
come tax credits), 20% of new units had to be set aside for people with in-
comes less than 80% of area median; after 1986, 20% of the units had to be
reserved for persons below 50% of median, or 40% for persons below 60%
of median income. 4 In addition, new requirements called for verification of
low-income status occur on a continual basis (ie: yearly) -- and not just when
a prospective tenant initially applies. Moreover, limits were placed on the
rents that could be charged for low-income units; and use restrictions aimed
at protecting low-income units from market-rate conversion were extended
from 10 years to 15.5
And yet these stipulations themselves have done little to induce de-
elopment. New restrictions on tax-exempt financing greatly inhibit the
leveraging of investment from private individuals.6 Corporations and
insurance companies, while still allowed to take advantage of tax losses
associated with subsidized housing, have typically been drawn to the less
risky, higher quality apartment market aimed at young professionals. 7
In fact, critics charge that the 1986 Tax Reform Act actually targets
the wrong income group: only 19% of all current residents of federally
subsidized housing have incomes above 50% of their respective area me-
dian, yet the new law permits investors to develop housing for families whose
incomes are as high as 60% of median. 8 Furthermore, an incentive system
based upon a gain in project appreciation makes it unlikely that private devel-
opers would maintain a low-income use beyond the mandatory 15-year com-
pliance period.9
Meanwhile, the development of numerous inclusionary housing pro-
grams within the last 15 years signals a recognition that responsibility for the
provision of affordable housing must go beyond the city limits. Typically
inclusionary zoning is based upon either mandatory construction require-
ments or development incentives such as density bonuses and expedited
regulatory review procedures. In some cities, most notably San Francisco
and Boston, "linkage" programs have been designed to mitigate the adverse
impact of large scale development by requiring developers to directly pro-
vide affordable housing or an in lieu fee, and, more recently, job training and
community-services. 10 However, like their inclusionary zoning counter-
parts, the viability of linkage programs is tied directly to the cyclical nature
of the economy: there is little chance that these programs will result in more
affordable housing in down times.
Finally, the nature of public-private partnership has evolved over the
past two decades. In their least structured form, such partnerships involve
corporations or foundations which provide grants to help community-based
organizations secure options on a site or a building, complete a feasibility
study, co-sign a loan, or provide some professional expertise. The non-
profit Enterprise Foundation and the Ford Foundation's Local Initiative
Support Corporation (LISC) are two examples. More commonly, however,
public-private partnerships involve an intricate collaboration among lending
institutions, public agencies, local or regional non-profit organizations, and,
for the all-important equity, private individual or corporate investors.11
Risks of Combining MI & MU
Taken separately, mixed-income housing and mixed-use develop-
ments present their own problems. The prospect of mixing income groups
presents serious marketing concerns. Because people whose income can
support a market-rate rent have more options at their disposal, they can chose
to avoid the risks they may perceive in living among people with less income.
Furthermore, low-to-moderate income tenants may have to be drawn from
public housing waiting lists, thus limiting the developer's discretion in
selecting people best suited to an economically integrated development.
The risks of mixed-use are legion. Problems of design and construc-
tion commonly include the necessity to reconcile the conflicting structural
grids of residential construction with that of retail space and/or a below-
grade parking garage. Separation of space and utilities, issues of security,
liability, and future sale all present daunting legal issues as well. The com-
plications involved in mixing disparate functions have often been enough to
discourage some developers from attempting mixed use.
Incorporating different income groups into mixed-use developments
presents another set of challenges. In mixed-income rental housing, expe-
rience has shown that expecting the retail component to sustain the residen-
tial component is a dubious strategy. Due to the initially poor performance
of the ground floor retail of one early MI/MU project in Boston, the MHFA
in the early 1970s adopted a policy whereby each component would have to
be self-supporting. The rental subsidy -- whether a public stream or the
result of a cross subsidy provided by the market-rate units -- must remain
out-of-reach of a project's commercial component, and visa versa. Similar
experience elsewhere has caused such "wisdom" to be included today in
federal and state bond and tax-credit financing. 12
In a mixed-income environment, the mixed-use component faces dif-
ficulties of its own. Stores and services must appeal to a more economically
and racially diverse group of customers than in traditional one-dimensional
projects. In addition, the needs and desires of neighborhood residents must
be addressed if the mixed-use component is truly to serve to integrate the new
development to its surroundings. Furthermore, over the last 10 years public
financing terms have not been particularly favorable to the incorporation of
mixed-use into mixed-income developments. Before 1986, the terms of bond
and tax-exempt financing (both federal and state) stipulated that no more than
10% of publicly-backed mortgage revenue proceeds be devoted to non-resi-
dential functions; this was reduced to 5% after 1986.13
Typically, public agencies have required developers to provide letters
of credit, and in some cases personal guarantees, to insure there will be no
cross-dependency of the retail component on the residential income. Fine
print in the terms of bond issues have sometimes included exceptions to the
%-of-proceeds limits in instances where the retail/commercial space is "func-
tionally related" to the residential component and directly serves needs of the
residents. Occasionally, on a case-by-case basis, convenience stores, for
example, have qualified under this exception. 14 But the fact that the proceeds
legally available for non-residential uses is referred to by public officials and
developers as "bad money" is indicative of the wariness associated with pub-
lic expenditure on mixed-use.
Taken together, the funding limitations, new incentives, and the rela-
tive prevalence of community-based organizations have had the effect of en-
couraging the building of intricate partnerships, yet the risks are great. In
addition to the challenge of assembling a good development team among
these players, the scramble to assemble the necessary financing brings to the
foreground the motivations of each of the parties and this, in turn, has im-
portant ramifications for the nature of the MI/MU development itself.
The non-profit community group may, at heart, have only the laud-
able goal of providing affordable housing in an economically integrated (MI)
and stimulating (MU) environment. The public sector, increasingly limited
to the state and city, is typically trying to use its scarce dollars and regulatory
powers to leverage the involvement of the private sector. Public officials are
confined by the political realities of bond appropriation procedures (ie:
referenda) and by the fact that exercising too much regulatory control can
result in discouraging private development.
When the private developer does choose to enter into a partnership, or
the private investor joins by means of an equity syndication, the motivation
of profit extracts its own cost -- potentially undermining the lofty goals.
Tenant marketing and selection, and perhaps even the terms of affordability,
are subject to the stipulations (or the interpretation) of the private developer.
This is not to say that including the private sector is in itself a bad idea.
Indeed, not only is it unrealistic to expect that the demand for affordable
housing can be met by the public or non-profit sector alone, but the market
orientation of MI/MU would be compromised without the inclusion of the
private sector. Predicated on economic integration and a strong retail/
commercial component, MI/MU requires the expertise of the private sector
in design, marketing, and management. Furthermore, without the partici-
pation of private entrepreneurs in this type of development, the prospects for
broader application are in doubt. The challenge of MI/MU development goes
beyond the objective of successfully building a project: in a larger sense, it is
a means by which people with different motivations can work to achieve a
common objective.
I Stegman, Michael, and Holden, J. David. Nonfederal Housing Programs: How States
& Localities are Responding to Federal Cutbacks in Low-Income Housing, (Urban
Land Institute: Washington, D.C., 1987), p. 8.
2 Stegman & Holden, p. 9.
3 Stegman & Holden, p. 4.
4 Stegman & Holden pp. 77-88.
5 Stegman & Holden, p. 91.
6 Stegman & Holden, p. 80.
7 "Emerging Trends In Real Estate: 1990", (Equitable Real Estate Investment Manage-
ment, Inc.: Chicago, October 1989), p. 33.
8 Stegman, Michael. "Creative Financing Is A Dirty Word" (unpublished article, revised
April 15, 1990), p. 6.
9 Stegman, p. 17.
10 Stegman & Holden, pp. 50-59.
11 Stegman & Holden, pp. 97-136.
12 Creedon, Francis F., Operations/Budget Officer, MHFA, (interview 3/91).
13 Firehock, Bob, Agency Counsel, SFRA, (interview 3/91).
14 Frawley, Brian M., Senior Policy Coordinator, MHFA, (interview 4/91).
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1.4 AN EVOLUTION OF FORM
IN URBAN MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING
MI/MU is defined here in terms of the physical and functional inte-
gration of the residential and non-residential components. The residential
form must appeal to people of varying income groups -- offering the qual-
ity of market-rate housing and avoiding the stigma of anonymity typical of
monolithic public housing projects. Non-residential components and a
physical design that is sensitive to context can serve to integrate MI/MU
developments into a neighborhood. The nexus of MI/MU is the functional
interdependency between the residential and mixed-use components. And
finally, such projects can offer a broad range of spatial opportunities for
social interaction -- at a very public scale on its active sidewalks, in semi-
public areas such as courtyards or community meeting rooms, in semi-
private space such as common areas within the residential buildings them-
selves.
This section will explore these issues of identity, integration, and
interaction in multi-family housing. The importance of scale, symbolism,
diversity, and hierarchy of space will be described using four recently
completed mixed-income developments as examples.
Establishing a Sense of Identity
Modern conceptualizations of the city, dating back more than a cen-
tury, have typically been concerned with understanding the whole as a sum
of its parts. In grappling with the complexity of modern society and the
ill-effects of rapid industrialization, planners have tried to organize the
urban environment around a comprehensive sense of order. In his urban
design schemes, perhaps most vividly illustrated by "The Radiant City", Le
Corbusier espoused a rigorously ordered environment as a direct reaction
to the congestion and squalor that characterized the residential quarters of
many cities. The meandering patterns of narrow streets, considered pic-
turesque by some, were diagnosed as "diseased" by modernists who regard-
ed the new discipline of town planning as a science.1
Viewed as an inanimate object (ie: a machine), the city could be
understood analytically, abstractly. Theories of regularity and efficiency
were eminently quantifiable. In hypothetical schemes, Le Corbusier advo-
cated a rigid hierarchy of dense office highrises, blocks with set-backs for
luxury housing, and box-like residential blocks for ordinary citizens. The
broad boulevards along these blocks would be "workshops" with ground
floor retail catering to domestic needs, while the internal cores of such
blocks would be devoted to vast open spaces for recreation. Le Corbusier
contended man's quest for individual liberty could be secured by creating
an external order.
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"Statistics are the Pegasus of the town planner"
Le Corbusier
As abstract as such theoretical notions of the city may seem, their
consequences at the hands of real-life planners after the Second World War
were profound, epitomized by the grim multi-family projects common to
many of our cities. In her book The Death and Life of Great American
Cities, Jane Jacobs is outspoken about the false allure of "order". Duplica-
tion and regimented regularity do not represent order. Aerial perspectives
of the well-ordered city lost sight of the "bits and pieces" of our urban
fabric: the differentiation of form and material, meandering streets, and a
spatial sequence of very public to very private space. Abstract metaphors
resulted in designs of a scale foreign to human understanding and denied
the qualitative aspects of the city.2
Recently, carefully-crafted designs for mixed-income housing illus-
trate the importance of context and detail in imbuing multi-family housing
with a sense of identity. Terraced on the southwest side of Boston's Mis-
sion Hill, for example, the Back of the Hill development consists of two-
and three-story apartments. By means of careful massing and the use of
bay windows and bowfronts to recall the townhouse vernacular popular
throughout the city, the architect has ensured that the development does not
appear monolithic. The street edge plays an important role here as shallow
setbacks and the articulation of the facades allow for small front yards,
walk-up stoops with iron railings, and individual entry alcoves.
Sponsored by the Bricklayers and Laborers Non-Profit Housing
Company, the buildings feature a rich display of authentic brickwork. This
is not a brick veneer glued on a frame, but a cleverly-detailed, textural
solution. The facades feature accents of brick banding and rain-shedding
bullnose coursing at the buildings' base. As the houses climb the hill, the
brick color changes -- dark red with black trim at the bottom, orange with
red trim in the center, and buff with yellow trim at the top -- further
"individualizing" the housing.3
Part of the city fabric and also unique as a mixed-income development
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The street edge considered as a public space
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Quality design and construction: no stigma
Integration by Means of Diversity
The Frank G. Mar Community Housing project in Oakland's China-
town demonstrates the ability of mixed-use to integrate a mixed-income
housing development to its surroundings. Here the architect faced the chal-
lenge of designing housing into an area between the busy, but low-rise
Chinatown district and the higher-density central business district. On the
one hand, the peaked roofs and square windows can be seen as symbolic
references to "house", reminiscent of the drawings of children. But in this
location (more intensely urban than Back of the Hill), the building is held
tight to the sidewalk; street-facing, semi-private space is relegated to
balconies scooped out of the facade.
MI/MU attracts people on many levels -- E F ..
Storefronts designed to embrace the sidewalk
This allows the ground floor space to step right up the sidewalk --
appropriating it, in a sense. Along three sides, retail/commercial space at-
tracts business not only from residents within the project but from area
neighbors and office workers. The continuity of this retail component,
critical for small businesses dependent on pedestrian traffic, is interrupted
only once to access the public parking garage built beneath the project.
The garage and the street-level businesses provide the vehicle by which the
Mar Community Housing development is linked to its surroundings. What
is more, storefronts as small as 400 square feet are available as "incubator
space" for start-up businesses -- an important goal of the community-based
non-profit group that sponsored the project.5
Form Fostering Interaction
Organic metaphors for the city have been based on the premise.that
while cities may be functionally interdependent, in their congestion they
preclude a healthy environment. The early "Garden City" ideal called for
decentralizing the functions of the city -- business, industry, administration,
education, and public space -- and reconfiguring them in healthier, ex-
urban environments. While such ideals would eventually degenerate into a
suburban prototype lacking genuine functional diversity, within the city,
concern for health and safety often became pretexts for the destruction of
space that actually gave the city life.
Efforts to clarify the complexity of the city often meant cauterizing
the very features of spatial diversity that provides the urban dweller with a
range of public to private space from which to choose. Functional interde-
pendency need not occur at a scale so divorced from human interaction that
it renders the urban environment anonymous. The projects cited earlier
point out the value of qualitative attributes of scale, material, and detailing
that lend a sense of individuality in a large environment. Such attributes
also play an important role in fitting a project into its surroundings. In
addition, the form of buildings and the space between them are equally
critical in making functional diversity more than just qualitative -- but also
experiential.
The rehabilitation of a notorious public housing project offers a use-
ful example of how, completely misunderstood, spatial diversity can result
in a stultified, disorienting environment. Realigned hierarchically, diverse
spatial "episodes" can provide a sequence from very public to very private
space. Opened in 1954 on the 53-acre Boston harbor peninsula, Columbia
Point was a 1,200-unit project comprised of 30 monochromatic, flat-roofed
mid- and high-rise housing blocks. By the early 1980's it was so crime-
ridden that only 350 households remained.
The plan called for tearing down some of the existing housing
blocks, renovating others, and erecting many new multi-family town-
houses. Three teams of architects were employed to encourage a varied
architectural response in breaking down the monolithic, institutional ap-
pearance. New townhouses were clad in either brick or clapboards in
keeping with the city's vernacular. Details such as peaked roofs, individual
walk-up entrances, and the elimination of double-loaded corridors in the
low-rise buildings have given the development a new image. Other aspects
of the transformation were symbolic: the name was changed to Harbor
Point and the detested yellow-brick pallor of the former project was re-
stained a robust red.
Previously, a series of roads had rimmed the project with no sense of
order or sequence. The uniformity of spatial experience, housing form,
and material imbued the development with anonymity. Large parking lots
at the periphery meant residents had to walk through a maze where out-
door space created by building setbacks at the street edge was no different
from open space behind the buildings. The rehabilitation of Columbia
Point began with selective demolition focused on replacing the stagnant
towers-on-the-green site plan with a sophisticated spatial hierarchy.
New site plan:
Original site plan: Static spatial design
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Hierarchy of space established
Architects of the renovation began by creating a broad, tree-lined
mall to form the "spine" of the new neighborhood. Streets featuring paral-
lel parking, lampposts, and crosswalks, front yards and front stoops, bind
together the development's various housing types. Residents are offered a
full range of public to private space: the public zone of the mall, the side-
walk in front of one's apartment, the front-yard set back and front stoop
comprising a semi-private zone, and finally the entry alcove to one's apart-
ment. Careful site planning called for clustering the various buildings
around semi-private courts, giving families a proprietary sense of the space
in front of their apartments. What was once useless space between build-
ings now takes on the quality of a community "yard" where children can
play and neighbors can visit.6
Sequence of space from public boulevard to private courtyard
Conclusion
Earlier multi-family housing designed for people of low income
often lacked all three of these qualities of identity, integration, and interac-
tion. Because MI/MU projects must also appeal to people with market-rate
incomes, they must be of a certain quality, offering the convenience and
many of the amenities of the market-rate competition. At the same time,
the All in Together study showed that people of modest means are no less
attracted to safe, well-built housing -- and, in fact, are more likely to take
pride in their apartment when it is well designed. As the examples here
have shown, carefully-scaled details, functional diversity, and spatial dif-
ferentiation are critically important to the successful integration of such
projects into the larger community.
Of course, this is no less true of market-rate development. Even
luxury apartment housing can appear anonymous or isolated from its sur-
roundings. But as the case studies will demonstrate, there are practical
reasons why designers of MI/MU projects must be particularly sensitive to
these qualities of identity, integration, and interaction. The complexity of
project financing makes lenders especially attuned to good design in order
to ensure acceptance in the marketplace. Moreover, careful design can go
a long way to overcoming community opposition sometimes caused by
mixed-income housing proposals. 7
The background material to Tent City and Fillmore Center which
follows will highlight the importance of local history and physical context
in fostering a sense of identity as a neighborhood; in describing the setting
in which these projects intend to integrate; and in explaining the nature of
community interaction prior to the development of these projects. The case
descriptions and analyses will shed light on how this identity, integration,
and interaction -- or lack of it -- has important implications for the success
of a MI/MU development.
1 Le Corbusier. The City of To-Morrow and Its Planning (Dover Publications, Inc.:
New York, 1987; translated from Urbanisme, 1929), p. 280.
2 Jacobs, Jane. The Death & Life of Great American Cities (Random House: New York,
1961), p. 376.
3 Canty, Donald J., "Return of the Row: Union-sponsored Affordable Housing Reflects
Boston's Rowhouse Tradition", Architectural Record, July 1990, pp. 80-81.
5 MacDonald, Donald, FAIA, "Village In The City: Mixed-Use" (unpublished article,
1990), MacDonald is the architect of Frank G. Mar Community Housing, Oakland.
6 Leccese, Michael, "On The Waterfront: Harborside Towers Are Transformed into a
Mixed-Income Enclave", Architecture, July 1990.
7 Rawn, William; Architect of Back of the Hill Development and other award-winning
mixed-income housing developments in the Boston area; (interview April, 1991).
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2.1 NEIGHBORHOOD HISTORIES:
THE SOUTH END
AND WESTERN ADDITION
...thus the history of the negro in Northern cities is the history
of the rise of a small group growing by accretions from without,
but at the same time periodically overwhelmed by them and com-
pelled to start over again when once the new material had been
assimilated.
W.E.B. DuBoisi
Boston's South End
Founded on an awkward hilly peninsula, the city of Boston spread out
by cutting down its hills and filling in many bay inlets and tidal marshes.
In the 1860's a burgeoning middle class gave rise to widespread real estate
speculation throughout the "hub" region. The Boston Common is what re-
mains today of the hill that was used to transform a large marshy cove on
the Charles River shore into the distinctive Back Bay neighborhood. Soon
real estate speculation of a similar variety had spread to the Fenway, South
Boston, and the South End. In just over 30 years 570 acres were filled in
the South End, making way for developers set upon attracting middle and
upper middle income families. 2
Charming brick and brownstone homes featured bay windows or bow
fronts, brooding cornices, lighthearted Victorian detail, and ornamental
wrought iron fences. Floor plans as well as a pattern of crescent shaped
streets with landscaped islands were inspired by the fashionable London
townhouse rows of the period. Yet despite the ambitions and attention to
detail, the development of the South End into an upper income enclave was
largely a financial failure. As was the case with South Boston and the Fen-
way, the wealthy preferred the more genteel Back Bay.3
By the latter quarter of the 19th century new industrial developments
on the southern and eastern end of the South End drew a large working
class population to the district. Gradually the comfortable single family
row houses were converted to rooming houses and apartments. Land ori-
ginally intended for rear gardens and service alleys now was developed
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into new -- and far smaller -- housing. The large Irish Catholic population
gave way to a succession of other ethnic groups including Jewish, Syrian,
Greek, Italian, Portuguese, West Indian, and American Blacks. 4
Blacks were in Boston as early as 1873 and over the next 2 centuries
others followed -- as slaves, fugitive slaves, sailors, indentured servants,
and ambitious free men. The achievements of Lewis Hayden, Frederick
Douglass, William Monroe Trotter, and others have added profound dis-
tinction to Boston's epithet, "The Cradle of Liberty". By the early 20th-
century, however, the legacy of Black accomplishment in Boston had dim-
med. The educated, comfortable elite of the Black community became
known as the "Black Brahmins". They refrained from Trotter's strident
tone, preferring evenings at the Symphony and vacations at Newport or
Cape Cod. Many still lived on Beacon Hill or in some of the charming
brick homes of the South End.5
Meanwhile, other less privileged Blacks of the South End competed
for work with Irish immigrants. The Black population of Boston had
grown from just over 2000 when the Civil War broke out to 14,000 by
1910. The Boston and Albany Railroad yards and the hotels of Copley
Square provided steady employment for newcomers. Many railroad
porters, waiters, and other service workers lived between the railroad
tracks of Back Bay Station and Columbus Avenue (the eventual site of
Tent City).
After the First World War many Blacks came to Boston from the
West Indies, from Barbados and Jamaica in particular. The Black com-
munity was by this point a heterogeneous mix of native Bostonians (in-
cluding the "Black Brahmin"), Southerners, and those from the Carib-
bean.6 Various other ethnic groups were crowded into the South End as
well, and though working class and somewhat poor, a cohesiveness was
apparent.
Mel King, community activist, former State legislator, and Boston
Mayoral Candidate in 1983, is a key figure in the history of Tent City. A
native of the South End, he remembers growing up as a Black male in the
1930s. The row houses were crowded and not always in the best shape but
his memories are overwhelmed by the sense of community everyone en-
joyed. Families of many colors lived in the old apartments over store-
fronts. Irish, Lebanese, Italian, Yankee, and Jewish merchants along
Washington Street ,Tremont Street, and Columbus Avenue provided the
district with produce markets, clothing shops, bakeries and delicatessens.
King recalls when a Syrian merchant's daughter was married. The mer-
chant could not afford to rent a hall so he had the celebration in the street
and invited all the neighbors to share in the ethnic celebration.7
Yet the South End was not without its problems. The area became
increasingly crowded and by the turn of the century had become the largest
rooming house district in the country. Over the years the large number of
saloons, liquor stores, and pool rooms made portions of the neighborhood
the city's Skid Row district. After the Second World War, the South End
deteriorated physically and was widely perceived by outsiders as an area of
alcoholics, prostitutes, and drug addicts -- the focus of the city's economic
and social problems.8 As many of the area's working class moved out,
they left behind an older and poorer population. In addition to the large
lodging house population (predominantly elderly white males), the South
End's diverse racial and ethnic groups were in precarious positions.
In his Pulitzer prize-winning book Common Ground, J. Anthony
Lukas studies the decade following the upheaval of 1968 focusing on the
school integration crisis that tore at Boston's social fabric. He contends
that the heterogeneous Black community in Boston was not necessarily
unified -- that the Black Brahmins, the Southerners, and the Caribbeans
sought to protect their individual "prerogatives " and regarded each other
with "ill-disguised suspicion". Furthermore, the dispersion of the Black
population exacerbated this "chronic fragmentation". 9 .While by 1960
Blacks accounted for 40% of the South End population, over the course of
the previous decade one in five neighborhood Blacks had moved out --
many to neighboring Roxbury and Dorchester. 10
This dispersion, coupled with an Irish grip on local politics, prevent-
ed Boston Blacks from advocating political and social change until the mid-
1960s. In the South End prior to that time, the array of interest groups,
while not always content with one another, was linked more by class than
by race. Together resident landlords and concerned tenants of the area
were intent upon fighting off the crime, liquor, and deterioration which
increasingly plagued the neighborhood. The Urban Renewal period would
prove to be a unique opportunity to focus the area's diverse interests.11
San Francisco's Western Addition
Within a decade of the 1948 Gold Rush the sleepy village of Yerba
Buena ballooned from a population of a few hundred to more than
56,000.12 California was admitted into the union as the 31st state, and the
burgeoning village was renamed San Francisco. In the 1860's and '70's a
growing middle class expanded steadily westward from the waterfront and
business activity to lower Russian Hill, Polk Gulch, and beyond Van Ness
Avenue to the Haight-Ashbury, and the Western Addition.13
As in the South End, builders and real estate speculators soon began to
fill in the vast grid which boldly rolled over any inconvenient topography
on its way to the Pacific. In the valley of the Western addition, a stock of
cheery wood-framed Victorian-style homes quickly emerged, characterized
by gingerbread ornamentation, bay windows, and false-front cornice lines.
The new neighborhood became a distinctive, self-sufficient enclave cen-
tered around the bustle of commercial activity on Fillmore Street.
As a result of the 1906 earthquake and fire a quarter of a million
people, or three-fifths of San Francisco's population, lost their homes.
Despite the great devastation, the people of the city began to dig out and
rebuild. While the wreckage was cleared downtown, thousands set up
make shift living arrangements out at Golden Gate Park. The fire had been
stopped at Van Ness Avenue on the edge of the Western Addition and
almost immediately the major merchants of downtown began to set up shop
along Fillmore Street, which would serve as San Francisco's principle
business thoroughfare for several years. 14
Since its inception the Western Addition had been a magnet for the
city's growing middle class. But after 1906, significant numbers of ethnic
groups and new immigrants began to come from Rincon Hill and other
areas south of Market Street destroyed by the quake and fire. The city's
Japanese colony concentrated in a few blocks around Post and Sutter east of
Fillmore Street. Italian, French, Irish, and Russian immigrants gathered in
the valley of the Western Addition as did several black families.1 5
In the 1920s and '30s the Western Addition was a bustling community
stretched out along Fillmore Street, crowded with apparel and jewelry
stores, bakeries and kosher delicatessens. Gas lamps lined the sidewalks and
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sweeping metal arches studded with electric lights rose from the comer
of each intersection making Fillmore Street, in the words of the local Im-
provement Association "the most brilliantly illuminated street in
America" 16
Jerry Flamm, in his book Good Life in Hard Times reminisces about
the excitement of the "Fillmore District", as it came to be known. On
Saturday nights the stores would be opened after sundown when the 24-
hour Jewish Sabbath ended. During Jewish High Holidays such as Rosh
Hashanah and Yom Kippur everyone in the neighborhood would come out.
Even non-believers "felt a need to identify themselves as Jews on the spe-
cial days and 'be counted'". 17 No one seemed at a loss for entertainment
with the cluster of vaudeville and motion picture theaters in the neighbor-
hood.
While the area suffered hardship during the Depression, it was during
the Second World War that the Western Addition would face its most ser-
ious challenges to date and undergo a complete transformation. Up until
World War II the history of Black San Francisco had been a footnote. By
1860 San Francisco Blacks numbered more than 1000, or roughly 2% of
the total population. As the region grew, the reliance on cheap Chinese
labor to build the railroads and the existence of powerful white labor
unions prevented Blacks from winning stable jobs and migration from the
south was discouraged. 18 By 1900 the Black population had declined to
.5% of the city's total. With a sizeable number of the city's Blacks from
Jamaica, at the turn of the century, only New York had as large a percen-
tage of foreign-born Blacks.1 9 Those that came to San Francisco, mostly
adult males, had little choice but to take service jobs.
In his book Pioneer Urbanites: A Social and Cultural History of Black
San Francisco, Douglas Henry Daniels describes how by the First World
War the Bay Area's residential patterns had "crystallized". The East Bay
became a mecca for Blacks partly due to the fact that Oakland was the
terminus of the railroad, an important source of employment for new-
comers. But with most employment opportunities barred from Blacks in
San Francisco and with discrimination commonplace among the real estate
industry, the city's higher rents and shoddier accommodations made the
East Bay an acceptable alternative. 20 By 1940 San Francisco Blacks num-
bered 4,846 -- still less than 1 % of the city's population. And though two-
thirds of the city's Blacks lived in the Western Addition, they accounted for
6% of the neighborhood's population. 21
With the outbreak of war in December of 1941, San Francisco's stra-
tegic location and the Bay Area's industrial potential was clear. What was
missing was cheap labor -- and a lot of it. Executive Order 8802 prompted
industrialists like shipbuilder Henry Kaiser to hire Blacks. For a time,
Kaiser was bringing 1 to 3 trainloads of workers from the south every day.
Most of the newcomers came from the western region of the south, from
Texas, Arkansas, and especially Louisiana. In three years the Bay Area's
Black population more than tripled.22
At the same time, another federal policy of the period had a pernicious
effect on other Americans. Issued in 1942, Executive Order 9066 forced
thousands of Japanese-Americans from the Western Addition into "reloca-
tion centers" dispersed throughout the west. While numbering about 5000
in 1940 (roughly equivalent to the city's Black population), Americans of
Japanese ancestry had been an important part of the Western Addition since
1906. Their cultural heart was in the area around Post and Sutter Streets
east of Fillmore Street and became known as "Nihon Machi" or commonly
as "Japantown". Into the vacuum of this hastily evacuated area came the
the newly-arrived Blacks, many with large families. 23
In Pioneer Urbanites, Daniels observes that these newcomers would
not be the first to suffer from a tradition of California racism: "the same
antipathies that excluded Chinese immigrants and placed Japanese Ameri-
cans in concentration camps operated to contain Afro-Americans in urban
ghettos." Some have charged that a concerted effort was being made by
neighborhood groups, merchant associations, and improvement clubs to
confine Negro families to the Fillmore District. Yet in spite of this, during
the war the Western Addition, with its numerous black bookstores, jazz
clubs, art galleries, and churches, became a vibrant Black cultural center
compared by contemporaries to New York Harlem. 24
After the war, the situation quickly changed. War-time migration had
caused a ten-fold increase in the Black population of San Francisco. By
1943 half of the new families lived in 3 rooms or less and paid up to 43%
more for their housing than native Blacks. After occupying crowded, di-
lapidated or temporary shelters during the war, many were not able to
maintain their WWII-era gains in industry and make the transition to
roomier, more stable housing.25 The Fillmore District became the heart of
Black San Francisco, and by 1950 the numbers of Blacks had "fatally rup-
tured the area's previous ethnic structure, leading to massive and self-rein-
forcing 'white flight"'. 26
In two respects, the experience of Black migration to San Francisco
was distinct from eastern cities. First, a huge portion of the population
arrived over a very recent span of time; similar immigration to the indus-
trialized northeast had taken place a generation earlier. What is more, in
San Francisco, there was no predominantly Black district before the Second
World War. In fact it was widely dispersed and incredibly heterogeneous.
Immediately after the war, economic conditions plummeted for Blacks
in the Bay Area. Non-discriminatory hiring practices and on-the-job train-
ing had meant good work in skilled jobs for the newcomers to the Bay
Area during the war. Partly because there were so few Blacks in the Bay
Area before 1940, by the end of the war there were five times as many
skilled workers as the national average for Blacks. Yet it was ironic that
the unskilled service jobs which most San Francisco Blacks held before the
war proved to be more secure. 27
Southern Blacks who had migrated to San Francisco did not find the
poor, tenement-ridden scene of New York and Chicago. Yet after World
War H, the loss of employment, overcrowding, deteriorating housing, and
discriminatory real estate practices served to create such a scene in San
Francisco's Western Addition. A U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1948
broke racial covenants in real estate which had prevented minorities from
settling in many areas of San Francisco, it was not until 1960 that a Black
middle class had developed in the city. By this point, the core of the
Western Addition was "solidly black", while many of the previously in-
terned Japanese-Americans returned to their area north of Geary Boule-
vard.28
In the course of the next decade, life did not improve for the Black
community of the Western Addition. Property values continued to fall as
property owners were either unwilling or unable (due to discriminatory
lending practices) to maintain the buildings into which poor families
crowded. As early as 1948, the Fillmore District was designated as blight-
ed by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors preparing the way for later
redevelopment projects.
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2.2 THE RECORD OF URBAN RENEWAL
IN THE SOUTH END
AND WESTERN ADDITION
Urban Renewal in The South End
For many years the various interest groups of the South End had
maintained a certain equilibrium. In addition to tenants and property own-
ers, lodging house residents, and poor newcomers from the rural south and
Puerto Rico, middle- to high-income white professionals began to buy and
rehabilitate some of the district's charming bowfronts. Among these dis-
parate interests, along with several church groups, established settlement
houses, and other social welfare institutions in the area, there was broad
consensus by the early 1960s that the South End was in need of renewal.1
At this time the district had the worst housing stock in the city: 56%
of its housing was classified as "deteriorated" while 11 % was considered
"dilapidated". By comparison, the Boston average in renewal areas was
24% "deteriorated" and 6.2% dilapidated. 2 In addition to poor housing,
the area's public facilities, streets, and sidewalks were in terrible shape.
"Compounding these problems was the fact that banks generally refused to
issue mortgages in the area." With both the city and local residents lacking
the resources, the federal program of urban renewal was the only alterna-
tive.3
Fundamentally the process of conceiving and approving a plan for the
neighborhood's rehabilitation centered around the issue of whether, on the
one hand, the South End would remain Boston's "prime repository of the
old, the poor, and the problem ridden", or, on the other hand, the South
End would simply become a frontier for white urbanites and real estate
speculators, in effect a charming "museum piece".4 Between these two ex-
tremes lay a lofty goal of creating "an economically, socially, and racially
integrated community." 5 To the extent that the renewal process of the
South End served to identify common interests and forge a unifying vision
of the neighborhood, it was a critical step in laying the foundation for Tent
City.
This is not to say that the implementation of the plan was necessarily
well received by everyone in the neighborhood. The Boston Redevelop-
ment Authority (BRA) has explained that its planning goals were to reha-
bilitate the South End's housing and physical infrastructure while "main-
taining the heterogeneous nature of the population". After 13 years and
over $90 million spent on implementing the South End Urban Renewal
Plan, the BRA concluded that it was these twin goals which generated "con-
flict and polarization" within the community. 5 In opposing demolition and
displacement and by putting pressure on the BRA, however, community
groups would keep the focus on the lofty goal between the two extreme
visions for the neighborhood.
To more fully appreciate the nature of the community's debate --
epitomized in the Tent City struggle -- it is helpful to go back to the early
record of urban renewal in Boston. In the 1950's, the BRA, in an act
destined to become "an archetype of what urban renewal should not be",
fixed on the city's West End as a blighted area. A large, low-income ethnic
neighborhood along the Charles River, the West End was completely
cleared to make way for 2,400 units of luxury high-rise apartments and
open space. Following the "public health" rubric of urban renewal, some
3,600 dwelling dwelling units were demolished and 7,500 people were
forced to leave the area. It has been reported that only 15% of these
people were helped by the relocation program. 7
With the unfortunate experience of the West End Project in mind,
later neighborhood renewal programs focused more upon rehabilitation
than upon demolition and new construction. This strategy of replacing
run-down low-income housing with rehabilitated middle-income housing in
hopes of attracted the middle class back into the inner city was consistent
with those of other renewal authorities of the day.
In The Rehabilitation Planning Game, Langley Keyes points out that
the community participation in the urban renewal process became increas-
ingly important as the strategy for renewal shifted from demolition for
spot projects to rehabilitation and "the expansion of the size of the area
considered optimum for renewal treatment". A well-managed process in
which the broad spectrum of local interest groups was included could have
the effect of bringing together disparate groups around notions of com-
munity and identity as a neighborhood.8
As the initiator, manager, and coordinator of the renewal process, the
BRA would be a dominant player in the planning process. In the course of
his six-year term as Development Administrator for the BRA, Ed Logue
centralized the city's planning and redevelopment bodies into an enormous-
ly powerful agency. If success in terms of urban renewal consisted of get-
ting federal money, stimulating private investment, and organizing a highly
professional agency, Ed Logue was very successful in Boston. Critics have
countered, however, that Logue's accomplishments were achieved at heavy
cost to the city's poor, particularly Blacks. 9
Logue made it no secret of the fact that he considered the return of the
middle and upper classes from suburbia critical to preventing the inner city
from becoming a ghetto of the poor. The alternative to rehabilitation was
to lock the urban poor into the central city in public housing. By 1966,
city-wide renewal plans called for some 7,700 families to be displaced.
According to the BRA's ten-year plan, of the approximately 37,000 new
housing units proposed only 5,000 were slated for people of low income,
the vast majority for elderly people (who at this point in Boston were
predominantly white).10
The BRA had no way of implementing civil rights housing legislation
and the overwhelmingly white Boston suburbs had demonstrated little wil-
lingness to welcome inner city residents. At the same time, the BRA's
record on relocation was suspect after experience had illustrated many dis-
placees from one project were simply moved into substandard units in
other slums. BRA critics charged that throughout the Logue era, the par-
ticipation required by HUD was always carefully managed so as to insure
the middle class homeowner was the most influential player in the planning
process -- often at the expense of low-income people.11
Initially, BRA plans for the South End were based on the idea that
physically the area could be divided between the family-oriented, stable
population and the poverty-stricken elderly tenants of the lodging houses
and Skid Row. This was widely opposed by various interest groups largely
because of the proposed clearance and the general sensitivity to the fine-
grain social mix of the neighborhood. A subsequent concept recognized
these concerns and focused instead on the separation of the broad residen-
tial community from institutional and industrial uses in the southern por-
tion of the neighborhood. Composed in the course of 3 years and reviewed
in over 150 community meetings, "the final South End plan was a series of
neighborhood designs soldered together into a proposal for the area as a
whole. Concern for design criteria or over-all concept went by the boards
in the drive to gain the approval of individual organizations." 12
But if the planning process served to identify and involve disparate in-
terest groups in the rehabilitation of the neighborhood, many of the same
groups accorded a voice in the planning process made their objections
heard in the subsequent implementation of the plan. The South End Urban
Renewal Plan called for relocation of 3,550 households -- of which nearly
two-thirds would be eligible for public housing. This relocation effort was
to take place over 7 years. The Plan's aim to provide 1,500 low-income
units in a combination of public housing, rehabilitated and new Section
221(d)(3) moderate-income housing left many people skeptical. The mod-
erate-income program depended on a Congressional sanction which had
recently restricted the use of funds and the rehabilitation units required that
a non-profit corporation be founded -- easier said than done. Even if all
the 1,500 units could be built, up to 35% of the displaced households would
not be able to remain in the area. 13
Meanwhile, throughout the city, life for low-income Blacks was not
improving. The Black population would increase 21 % during the decade
such that by 1980 Blacks accounted for 22.4% of the city's population.
The poverty rate among blacks was double that among whites by 1980.
Teenage unemployment in the Black community averaged 40%. By 1983
one in five Black children in Boston was born to teenagers -- amounting to
nearly half of all teenage births in the city. Among the city's Black fami-
lies, 46.7% were headed by female householders. 14
As Table 1 documents, the Black population of the South End began to
decline during the decade of the 1970s, explained in part by the growing
gentrification of the area. At the same time, measured in terms of the
percentage of Black families below the poverty level by 1980, there was a
general improvement for Blacks still living in the South End. The need for
affordable housing, however, was as acute as had been the case ten years
earlier. There were more Black families by 1980, a greater percentage of
Black renters, and while vacancy rates had declined, many more existing
units were in need of major repair.
Table 1 Census Year
THE SOUTH END 1970 1980
* City-wide Population 641,071 562,994
. -- % of city population Black 16% 22%
cZ - Census Tract Population * 23,762 31,009
-- % census tract population Black 48% 42%
- Number of Families in Census Tracts 4,287 5,589
-- % of census tract Black families 34% 39%
Census Tract: Rental Housing as % of Total 75% 77%
-- % of Black renters in census tract 39% 48%
- Census Tract: Residence 5 Years Previous
-- % of Black population in same house 46% 56%
-- % of Black pop. in same center city SMSA 29% 34%0
- Vacancy Rate Among Rental Units 16% 9%
Substandard Units: lacking full plumbing 2% 6%
* City-wide: Median Family Income $9,133 $16,062E
o Census Tract: Med. Black Family Income $5,083 $10,163
-- % Black families below poverty level 34% 28%
-- % Black female hsholds below pov. level 24% 21%
Source: U.S. Census, 1970 & 1980 * census tracts: 703-712, 804-806
Subsidized rental housing in Boston in the 1970s amounted to 41,700
units. Yet given the alarming economic conditions among the city's Black
population, the waiting list for public housing by the early 1980s amounted
to over 7,000 people. By 1980, 20% of Black households in Boston lived
in some form of subsidized or public housing. Meanwhile, between 1970
and 1980 there was a net loss of 18,000 units of private rental stock:
11,000 units demolished (over half within minority areas) and 7,000 units
lost to condominium conversions, particularly in the South End.15
The South End's distinction as "a model of desegregated living in
Boston" was threatened during the 1970s by the rush of white urban pro-
fessionals buying up the area's deteriorating bowfronts. Rich and poor
were in competition over the neighborhood housing and, given the proxim-
ity to downtown, the costs of decent housing were escalating. Many of the
area's poor were holding on simply by virtue of a rental voucher or their
place in public housing. 16
Urban Renewal in The Western Addition
In anticipation of passage by Congress of the 1949 Housing Act which
introduced the urban renewal program, the San Francisco Redevelopment
Agency (SFRA) was established in 1948. Its commissioners appointed by
the Mayor and confirmed by the Board of Supervisors, the SFRA, in its
early history, fit the stereotype of the cold-hearted public authority which
would rather capriciously classify an area as blighted and set about demol-
ishing it with little regard for area residents. 17
Chester Hartman, in his book The Transformation of San Francisco, is
candid in his disdain of the agency's performance over the years, particu-
larly with regard to its early history under the leadership of a series of
"political hacks". 18 Hartman contends that the definitive era of San Fran-
cisco urban renewal history began in 1959 with the appointment of M.
Justin Herman as the SFRA's new Executive Director. Tenacious, ener-
getic, politically astute, and committed to downtown renewal, Herman built
a "superagency" which at the time of his death in 1971 had twice the staff
of Boston's BRA, though Boston had more renewal projects and disbursed
far greater sums of federal grant money. 19 Though known as "St. Justin"
to banks and City Hall, to the people of the Western Addition who came to
be the recipients of "prisonlike housing", Herman was know as the "white
devil", "the arch villain in the black depopulation of the city". 20
To fully understand the origins of this perception, it is necessary to
explain the impact of the first phase of Western Addition renewal. Ap-
proved in the early 1950's, the Western Addition A-1 project consisted of
widening Geary Boulevard into an 8-lane highway at the Northern portion
of the Western Addition neighborhood and clearing blocks adjoining the
thoroughfare deemed blighted. This land in turn was developed into a rec-
reation center, expanded school sites, St. Mary's Cathedral, the Japanese
Cultural and Trade Center, medical facilities, retail/commercial space, and
housing. 21 Some 4000 families, predominantly low income Black and
Japanese-Americans, were moved out and virtually none was able to move
back.22 By 1973, some 1,853 new housing units had been constructed,
35% of which were federally subsidized for low and moderate-income
households.23
In the early 1960s, HUD requirements for community participation in
the planning process met with varying degrees of success. If in the South
End the process became an occasion to recognize the area's disparate
groups, SFRA initiatives were not so successful. The Agency found a very
hostile reception in some areas of the city, including the Western Addition
A-2 District (the site of the eventual Fillmore Center development). Be-
cause well-coordinated community groups were hard to identify, the SFRA
attempted to compose a body of neighborhood representatives with which it
could engage in constructive dialogue. But to many, this process was sus-
pect. Much to Herman's ire, an article of the period declared "the SFRA is
in trouble... .citizen groups have banded together to curb its powers....
Young priests and ministers are charging the redevelopers with utter disre-
gard for the fate of the poor."24
With the surprise election in 1967 of Joseph Alioto, one-time counsel
and later chair of the SFRA backed by "big financial interests", Herman
was assured that his redevelopment agenda would not be held up.25 A
clear advocate of business interests, and a firm supporter of downtown
renewal, Alioto was nonetheless not a household name among the elector-
ate. In garnering the support of the city's influential labor unions, notably
the International Longshoremen's and Warehouseman's Union (ILWU),
which by that time was mostly Black, Alioto secured his victory. The year
after his election, Alioto traveled to Washington to secure funding for the
Western Addition A-2 project.26 In addition, he also appointed ILWU rep-
resentative Wilbur Hamilton to the SFRA board -- later Hamilton would
become manager of the Western Addition A-2 project and eventually Exec-
utive Director of the SFRA27
Whereas in 1940 less than 1% of the city's population was Black, by
1960 this proportion had increased to 13.4%. Much of the Western Addi-
tion was in a state of decline, housing was overcrowded, and rents were
increasing. By 1960, nearly two-thirds of the housing in the Western Ad-
dition was "unsound" (43% substandard and 21% seriously substandard).
The City average at that time was 16% unsound.28 Building of residential
units during the 1950s averaged 2500 units per year, though due to urban
renewal demolitions this amounted to only a 6% increase in housing in ten
years. 29
The Redevelopment Plan for Western Addition A-2 was officially ap-
proved in 1964. The program included the "development of 5,372 new
housing units, the rehabilitation and retention of over 3,965 housing units,
the revitalization of the Japantown and Fillmore business districts, con-
struction of new commercial buildings, and the provision of new commun-
ity recreational facilities." 30 The SFRA's declared emphasis was on devel-
opment of new subsidized housing for low- and moderate-income families -
- preferably nonprofit housing sponsors from the Western Addition.31 Yet
lacking an articulated community voice, the viability of the plan as a vision
of the area's revitalization was in doubt.
Most of the housing since the late 1960's was developed under the
FHA Section 236 program with additional subsidies provided to at least
one-third of the units for the benefit of low-income families. During the
1980's some low income housing was subsidized under HUD's Section 8
program. The total number of completed low- and moderate-income hous-
ing developed under the plan comes to 2,769 units. Of the 3,965 units
scheduled for rehabilitation and sale by the agency, a mere 7% are eligible
for low- and moderate-income families and 37 condominiums have been
conveyed to families with incomes under 150% of the area median under a
shared appreciation mortgage with the agency. 32 In addition, 2,578 units
of market-rate condominiums and rentals are scheduled for the Western
Addition A-2 area -- Fillmore Center Development constitutes 43% of this
market rate total.33
Serious questions have been raised over the years as to the SFRA's
renewal agenda and relocation program demonstrated in the Western
Addition and elsewhere in the city. The agency's performance in the
Western Addition A-i area was generally regarded as unsatisfactory. A
federal study of SFRA files found that almost half of the 4,000 low-income
Black and Japanese-American households displaced by the A-1 project had
moved to unsatisfactory housing or were forced to accept major rent
increases; about a quarter of the residents were moved into deteriorated
housing in the A-2 area.34
Many of these people were among the 13,500 people displaced by the
Western Addition A-2 project. Neighborhood opposition to the project re-
sulted in the construction of several publicly subsidized housing projects
but this entailed a wait of 5 to 6 years before the new projects could pro-
vide replacement. Furthermore, the number of replacement units did not
offset the number displaced, and new rents were far higher than old rents.
For reasons such as these, urban renewal in San Francisco, as in many
cities across the country, was becoming known as "Negro removal". 35
The halcyon days of Justin Herman's SFRA were gone. Moreover, the
agency's capacity to manage public land and its responsibility to low-in-
come residents of an area became increasingly circumscribed as the stream
of money from Washington began to dry up. In Herman's dozen years the
agency attracted $128 million in federal urban renewal dollars for the city
of San Francisco. At its peak staff of 450, the agency was operating an an-
nual budget of up to $40 million. By 1983 as Fillmore Center was being
negotiated the SFRA annual budget was $12 million, its staff reduced to
138.36
The agency adapted itself quickly to the new rules of the Community
Development Action Grant (CBDG) program which replaced "categori-
cal" programs such as urban renewal. But with the Washington pipeline
delivering a fraction of what it had, increasingly the agency had to begin to
pay attention to the local political process. Whereas between 1975 and
1978 the SFRA got 57% of the city's total federal CBDG monies, by 1984
this was reduced to 22% of the total. The agency for the first time faced
serious competition for funds from community-based housing development
corporations that had begun to spring up in neighborhoods all across town.
By 1984, over half of the agency's budget was estimated to be derived
from sale of land it controlled.37
Meanwhile, the circumstances of the city's Black population had taken
a turn for the worse. Wartime industrial expansion had accounted for a
ten-fold increase in San Francisco's Black population by 1950. Two de-
cades later, Blacks accounted for 13% of the city's population. Yet during
the 1970s this percentage declined slightly. While some contend this was
due to the suburbanization of Blacks, this does not necessarily imply up-
ward mobility. The pattern of migration to Oakland, alluded to earlier,
appears to have prevailed in response to the escalation of San Francisco's
property values, rents, and gentrification. During the 1970's the Black
population percentage in Oakland increased from one-third to one-half.38
In order to appreciate the debate surrounding the Fillmore Center
proposal of 1983-84, it is important to understand the status of the Western
Addition at that time. Over previous decade, the Upper Fillmore area
north of Geary Boulevard experienced a dramatic rebirth primarily as a
result of gentrification and the boom in the city's residential real estate
market. Indeed, most of the SFRA's market rate housing program
included in A-2 took place in these blocks north of Geary Boulevard.39
Table 2 documents the changes in the Western Addition census tracts
south of Geary Boulevard. These blocks, traditionally known as the Fill-
more District, are the core of the Westem Addition, the location of the
bulk of the SFRA's subsidized housing and the home to the majority of the
area's low- and moderate-income population. While through the 1970s the
over-all percentage of Blacks in the neighborhood increased slightly, the
number of Black families increased dramatically. At the same time as the
percentage of Blacks in rental housing rose, the percentage of Black fami-
lies below the poverty level plunged from 28% in 1970 to 44% by 1980.
Table 2 Census Year
WESTERN ADDITION 1970 1980
* City-wide Population 715,674 678,974
-- % of city population Black 13% 12%
c. Census Tract Population * 11,543 14,015
-- % census tract population Black 60% 62%
- Number of Families in Census Tracts 2,580 2,771
-- % of census tract Black families 28% 49%
- Census Tract: Rental Housing as % of Total 80% 78%
o -- % of Black renters in census tract 55% 62%
* Census Tract: Residence 5 Years Previous
-- % of Black population in same house 42% 54%
-- % of Black pop. in same center city SMSA 34% 37%
* Vacancy Rate Among Rental Units 7% 7%
* Substandard Units: lacking full plumbing 6% 2%
0 City-wide: Median Family Income $10,503 $20,911
E
o * Census Tract: Med. Black Family Income $5,661 $7,801
-- % Black families below poverty level 28% 44%
-- % Black female hsholds below pov. level 18% 33%
Source: U.S. Census, 1970 & 1980 * census tracts: 158, 159, 160, 161
Census data suggests that by 1980 the need for rental housing afford-
able to low-to-moderate income residents of the Western Addition was
serious. As the Fillmore Center proposals were being made in 1984, San
Francisco had 47 public housing projects amounting to 7,038 units. In ad-
dition, there were 2,100 units of privately-owned low-rent subsidized Sec-
tion 8 developments, many in "rough shape, the legacy of years of ne-
glect".40 The San Francisco Housing Authority had a waiting list of over
4,000 households. Some 1,200 of the authority's apartments (one-sixth of
the entire stock) were "unoccupied and uninhabitable" leading the 1982-83
Civil Grand Jury to conclude that San Francisco faced an emergency in that
many people of low-to-moderate income could no longer find housing they
could afford in the city.4 1
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3.1 TENT CITY - BOSTON
The Tent City Protest
The Community Assembly for a United South End (CAUSE) had been
organized by Mel King in the mid-1960s to oppose the city's renewal plans
for the area. On Thursday, April 25, 1968, CAUSE occupied the BRA's
field office in the South End to protest the Authority's redevelopment
agenda. After a show-down with the newly elected mayor Kevin White
made front page news, the protestors sought "to keep the pot boiling". For
CAUSE leaders, the "Fitz-Inn" site was a natural target for a demonstra-
tion. 1
By the early 1960s, former Fire Commissioner William Fitzgerald
purchased about half of the 3-acre Tent City site and had the buildings on it
razed to open a parking lot. By 1965, the BRA had control of most of the
other half of the site and together with HUD approved the South End
Urban Renewal Plan promising to acquire the Fitzgerald property and de-
velop new replacement housing.2 When demolition and displacement
begun under the Plan did not result in any action on the Fitzgerald site,
CAUSE saw it as an example of the city's complacency. By 1968, under
the South End Urban Renewal Plan, over 1000 people had been displaced
and no new housing had been built. The "Fitz-Inn" site symbolized the
"arrogance of city officials ... who said parking was more important than
housing. "3
Early on the morning of Friday, April 26, about 40 CAUSE members
descended on the parking lot, blocked entrances, formed picket lines, and
began distributing leaflets that announced the lot had been closed because
"people in the South End want to live in decent homes at reasonable
prices....Housing should be built here so your cars will no longer park
here." As police arrived a crowd of about 1000 gathered. When a parking
lot customer drove his Volkswagen mini-bus into a line of pickets, a scuffle
erupted resulting in the arrest of 23 demonstrators.4
Demonstrators returned to the site the next day and began to set up
tents and other make-shift shelters. A community of about 100 people
spent the weekend in what the Boston Globe called the "tent city" that had
the "festive air of a gypsy camp". When "implied threats of forcible evic-
tion" were made if the lot was not cleared by Monday, CAUSE leaders de-
cided the point had been made and broke up the camp. The BRA in turn
made promises to build low cost housing "in the near future". 5
In a proposal designed "to provide community representation and in-
put into the urban renewal process" the BRA sponsored elections the next
year for the South End Project Area Committee (SEPAC).6 But by 1974
there was no housing on the site and the BRA proposed an 18-story luxury
apartment tower for the Tent City Site. A newly organized Tent City Task
Force halted the luxury high-rise plan. 7
At the same time, the deep community divisions which had been re-
vealed in forging the South End Urban Renewal Plan in the mid-1960s
reappeared. At one end of the spectrum was the Ad Hoc Committee for a
South End for South Enders. The Ad Hoc Committee held that poorer
residents were being displaced due to rehabilitation activities and the lack
of low-rent housing alternatives. They advocated for more subsidized
housing. At the other end of the spectrum was The Committee For a
Balanced South End, a group of middle-income residents which opposed
additional subsidized projects claiming there was already too heavy a
concentration of such development in the South End.8
When in the fall of 1975 the Tent City Task Force began efforts to
rehab vacant row houses across Columbus Avenue known as the "Frankie
O'Day Block", the Balance Committee filed a court suit seeking an injunc-
tion against the project.9 (This "sweat-equity" program for moderate
income South End residents was successfully completed by 1982.) Later
the Balance Committee failed in its efforts to halt the relocation from
Chinatown to the South End of the Pine Street Inn, a home for indigent
alcoholic men. Nevertheless the Balance Committee did succeed in con-
vincing HUD for a time to place a moratorium on the construction of ad-
ditional subsidized housing units in the South End.10
During this time the BRA claimed "a position of neutrality concerning
the housing controversy", content to regard the conflict less of a BRA-
community dispute than an internal neighborhood quarrel.11 By April,
1978, the tenth anniversary of the Tent City demonstration, the commun-
ity's concern over the Authority's "dwindling commitment" to urban
renewal housing goals led to the creation of POSSE (People Organized to
Save the South End) which organized another rally at the Tent City site and
a march on BRA headquarters.12
At this point the Authority was concentrating on the planning of
Copley Place, a $500 million mixed-use complex to be built on the air
rights of the highway interchange that bordered the Tent City site. 13 An
upscale hotel, office, and shopping development, Copley Place would come
to signify for many residents of the South End that the political power of
the city was predisposed to private, market-rate development -- essentially
cutting them out of the picture. The community was involved in a review
process for Copley Place and eventually succeeded in getting 25 of the 100
apartments built on the backside of the development set aside for people of
low-to-moderate income. But this may not have been due so much to the
community's influence as to the fact the private developer, with the city's
assistance, had secured a UDAG grant for the development and was
therefore obliged to make this concession. 14
In early 1979, the Tent City Task Force organized the Tent City
Corporation (TCC) as a non-profit community housing sponsor. At a
public hearing on the proposed Copley Place project the BRA pledged to
take the Fitzgerald land by eminent domain and encouraged the newly
created TCC to form a partnership with development professionals. Simul-
taneously the BRA's 1979 close-out assessment for South End urban renew-
al recommended the Tent City Site could support 280 apartments, up to
26,000 square feet of ground floor commercial space, and parking to serve
only the development.15
The Fitzgerald family expressed a "sudden interest" in developing a
parking garage and housing on the site, but their offer was rejected by
TCC because of the Fitzgerald's lack of experience in housing development
and because the Fitzgerald's housing goals were "incompatible" with those
of TCC. Nevertheless, the BRA proceeded to pit the Fitzgerald proposal
against one that TCC eventually drew up with another private developer.
In the spring of 1980 SEPAC and TCC demanded that the city's UDAG
application for Copley Place include Tent City housing. The BRA director
refused this demand but did promise to apply for a separate Tent City
UDAG in six months. 16
(While this application was never made, relentless pressure by Mel
King and SEPAC succeeded in convincing HUD to attach conditions on the
Copley Place UDAG requiring payback money to be used to help prevent
displacement of low income people in the South End and other neighbor-
hoods. This repayment stream to the city became the Neighborhood
Development Fund and is today the major moderate-income rental subsidy
of Tent City.)
The BRA's position in the early 1980s exacerbated the tension be-
tween itself and the community. First the Authority missed the application
deadline for a Tent City UDAG in 1980 and the next year refused to go
after any "last chance" UDAG money before the expected Reagan Adminis-
tration phase-out. Then the Authority refused to move to acquire the
Fitzgerald land either by negotiated agreement or by eminent domain.
During this time, SEPAC research discovered that between 1977 and 1980
the BRA had received as much as $1.7 million from HUD, "$950,000 of
which was specifically earmarked for purchase of [the] Tent City site.. "17
Finally in the Fall of 1982 the Urban Investment Development Corpo-
ration (UIDC), the private developer of Copley Place, purchased an option
of the Fitzgerald portion of the site and announced plans to build an above-
grade 7-story, 1,400 car garage to serve its mixed-use complex next door.
When TCC strenuously objected to this proposal, the BRA responded by
instructing TCC to work out a deal with UIDC. 18
A year later, with a newly-elected Board and a focused proposal gen-
erated with the help of Greater Boston Community Development (later The
Community Builders), TCC proceeded to seek sole tentative designation for
the Tent City site and reaffirmed its original affordability goals. In the
meantime, UIDC had finalized its purchase of the Fitzgerald site meaning
TCC was asking that the BRA take control of the entire 3 acres and desig-
nate TCC as the non-profit sponsor of a mixed-income development. But
lame duck Mayor White was not pleased with TCC's failure to come to
some understanding with UIDC and publicly accused TCC of killing the
"deal".1 9
The Tent City Proposal
In January of 1984, following a hard fought contest with Mel King,
Raymond Flynn became Mayor of Boston. Moving quickly to assure the
Black community that his campaign theme of concern for the city's neigh-
borhoods meant all neighborhoods, Flynn held a South End hearing in
May. There he announced his support for affordable housing on the Tent
City site and a garage "acceptable to the South End Community".20
While reluctant to exercise its power of eminent domain, the city
entered into negotiations with UIDC for site control while at the same time
encouraging TCC and UIDC to work out a mutually-acceptable mix of a
scaled-down garage plus housing. By mid-summer TCC and UIDC had
reached a general agreement on providing a 270-unit mixed income hous-
ing development with two floors of below-grade parking accommodating
roughly 700 cars.21 The broad outline of Tent City was established but
what is more, the community's goals had remained intact through over 5
years of negotiating with a range of players.
When the Tent City Task Force was originally founded in 1974, it
began by articulating some "Fundamental Principles for the Development
of Parcels 11 a and 11 b", the Tent City Site. Broadly stated, the principles
called for a mixed-income community that would reflect the racial and
ethnic mix of the South End. In 1978 the principles were revised and ap-
proved by SEPAC and can be summarized broadly into five main objec-
tives that would guide any future development of the site:
1. The housing must be affordable to South End residents.
Therefore 25% of the units "shall be" available to those
of low income; 50% "shall be" available to South End
working families and individuals; and 25% of the units
"can be" available at market level rents.
2. There should be a mixture of tenancy and home ownership,
particularly in the low-rise townhouses intended for family
occupancy.
3. Current and former South End residents shall have priority
for occupancy on the site and shall reflect the racial and ethnic
mix of the South End.
4. Existing housing on the site shall remain and not be demolished.
Existing owners should be given assistance to rehabilitate their
property if they desire and buildings presently owned by the
BRA should be returned to private ownership.
5. The design of new housing on the site shall be in keeping with
the scale, materials, and spirit of the bowfront rowhouses com-
mon in the South End.2 2
Attempting to test the feasibility of these principles, the Tent City
Task Force in 1978 elected to participate in MIT's "Total Studio", an urban
design studio course involving architectural students and planners from the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning. Comprised of 3 faculty mem-
bers and 16 graduate students, the studio prepared a detailed report outlin-
ing development and financing strategies, options for citizen participation,
and a series of physical design guidelines. The report provided members
of the Task Force with tangible pro-forma and design alternatives which
helped in negotiations with various possible development partners. It also
paved the way for a productive future relationship with the architect of the
development.23
By the spring of 1985, together with Greater Boston Community
Development (GBCD) as its development consultant, TCC was working
closely with the BRA in developing schematics, cost estimates, and contract
details for the project. A change in tentative designation allowed the city to
hold title to the Tent City site (through the BRA) while granting surface
and air development rights to TCC for the development of a mixed-use
housing complex. In turn, the BRA granted underground development
rights to UIDC to build a two-level parking garage which would become
the foundation for the housing above. These separate development rights
were formally structured as individual 99-year leases. 24
As compensation, UIDC (by this point merged with JMB Properties to
form JMB/Urban) traded the surface and air rights of its half of the Tent
City site for the development rights on a nearby Huntington Avenue site.25
The BRA regarded JMB/Urban as an "enormously good citizen" in coming
through on this trade. But it was not without strings attached. The BRA
anticipated risks in JMB's proposal to build a 300,000 square foot office
building on the Huntington Avenue site. Concern about community
opposition that might scale back or stall the project, the BRA assigned its
interest in the soon-to-open Marketplace Center development adjacent to
the thriving Faneuil Hall Market. (While JMB did not achieve all its objec-
tives on Huntington Avenue, a 265,000 mixed-use office/retail building was
recently completed and the company has never tapped into the BRA's col-
lateral). 26
After TCC was granted tentative designation as the developer of the
Tent City site in the Fall of 1984, the city promptly filed a $10 million
UDAG application with HUD -- something that 2 years before had been
rejected as an option by the White administration. A new city government
was determined to show "where there's the will there's a way" and other
public agencies, notably the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
(MHFA) followed suit. When in 1985 HUD rejected the city's UDAG
application, the city responded by pledging $30 million over time in
repayment of the earlier Copley Plaza UDAG. 27 Today, this money makes
up the subsidy stream for the all-important 50% moderate-income
apartments.28
Meanwhile MHFA became the primary lender providing a $29 million
First Mortgage for the development. When a $3 million construction loan
from Aetna Life Insurance failed to pan out, the MHFA increased its loan
amount by that amount. In addition, the agency designated a yearly subsidy
stream of over $500,000 from its State Housing Assistance Rental Program
(SHARP). These funds are in the form of a loan which helps support the
affordable rents; the program allows repayments to be recycled back into
the project when such recycling will benefit the low- and moderate-income
residents.29
A myriad of funding sources was required to develop and to now
operate Tent City. In addition to the state and BRA assistance noted above,
federal Section 8 and State Chapter 707 rental assistance subsidies help low-
income tenants make up the difference between 30% of their income and
the government-determined fair market rent. Seed money for development
costs totalling $750,000 came from seven different lenders. And two BRA
grants totaling $673,000 helped pay for site clearance, new sidewalks, the
new street (Yarmouth Place) over the parking garage, and streetlighting on
the site.3 0
Finally, a $10 million equity syndication package was generated
through the sale of limited partnership interests in the Leighton Park Lim-
ited Partnership, the legally designated owner of Tent City. The general
partner is a subsidiary of TCC. In addition to investing $10 million over
seven years to take advantage of the project's tax losses, the limited part-
ners take part in any cash flow generated by the project's commercial and
retail space. Besides providing Tent City with equity funds to cover devel-
opment costs and provide construction and operating reserves required by
MHFA, the limited partners provide a net worth for TCC of approximately
$1.5 million to be held as a back-up reserve.31
As the ground lease arrangements were finalized and the funding came
together, in 1984 TCC and JMB/Urban hired Goody, Clancy & Associates
as the architect for both the garage and the mixed-use housing complex. A
highly respected Boston-based firm, Goody, Clancy had previously acted as
a design consultant to the Tent City Task Force. Now officially on board,
the firm drew up a schematic design which reflected the massing and mix
that had gradually been refined since 1978.32
Over the next two years the design developed around TCC's Funda-
mental Principals, JMB's garage requirements, and various urban design
considerations. Of the latter it had been agreed early on that the mixed-use
housing complex would be clad in red brick in keeping with its 19th-cen-
tury context. Similarly, while the goal of 270 units meant some form of a
tower would be inevitable, the architect was careful to scale the project in
such a way that it provided a suitable transition from the brick and brown-
stone row houses of Columbus Avenue to the modem high-rise Copley
Place development. 33
Members of the South End community were particularly concerned
that the project be a transition to the cosmopolitan world of Copley Square.
The simultaneous transformation of the Amtrak/Orange Line mass transit
corridor bordering Tent City to the north into a landscaped pedestrian
avenue provided an ideal buffer. Community input was strong in favor of
making a statement of the Tent City's high wall along the pedestrian park --
as if to say "This Is Where Gentrification Ends". The architect com-plied
with a stepped wall of brick which gently curves away, allowing pedestri-
ans along the "Southwest Corridor" a direct view of the terminus of the
landscaped avenue, the Back Bay Transit Station. 34
One of the Fundamental Principles of Development had been to pre-
serve the few bowfront rowhouses clustered randomly along Columbus
Avenue, and Dartmouth and Yarmouth Streets. But early on the cluster on
Dartmouth Street presented problems. First they were in very bad con-
dition. (A former tenant in one of the units who now lives at Tent City
recalls a series of fires around 1980 suspected of being caused by arson.
She links these episodes with concurrent BRA offers to her and other
tenants to be relocated.) Secondly, these units posed an enormous difficulty
in the design and construction of the below-ground parking garage. For
these reasons the units on Dartmouth as well as those on Yarmouth Street
were demolished.35
A plan to restore the last cluster of row houses along Columbus Ave-
nue prevailed as the new construction of the rest of the project got under-
way around it. But when rehabilitation began in 1988, a bearing wall col-
lapsed. The condition of the rowhouses was re-evaluated and it was de-
cided that these too should be demolished. The final ten units of the Tent
City development were designed by Goody, Clancy in a rowhouse style
compatible with the rest of the project and the neighboring bowfronts. 36
The design development process consisted early on of weekly meetings
with the TCC Board and any one else from within the community who
might be interested. In some matters decisions were straightforward:
MHFA, as primary lender, had specific guidelines for as to a laundry facil-
ities, the square footage of bedrooms and bathrooms, the size of the multi-
purpose community room, and to some extent the unit mix (ie: the number
of 1,2,3, and 4-bedroom units). But the TCC Board was strong in its advo-
cacy of 3- to 4- bedroom units for families -- and that these units be town-
houses with separate entrances (not elevator-accessed high-rise units). 37
There was also much concern about the "democratization" of the units.
Whether a 1-bedroom or a 3-bedroom, units for low-to-moderate income
tenants were to be the same as those a market-rate tenant might rent. In
fact, so that no stigma would ever be attached to any unit, it became policy
that units would rotate among tenants in the various income categories. 38
The architect recalls that despite occasional debate and the pressure to
complete drawings under "fast track" conditions, everyone on the develop-
ment team -- from the client to the architect to the general contractor --
was of the same mind, namely: "that every person has a God-given right to
a decent place to live".39 Of the concem that a "social housing bias" had
infected development teams in the past, the architect recalls that there were
a couple of problems along those lines initially. For example, one brick
subcontractor early on did not take seriously the architect's and client's at-
tention to detail and was soon replaced. As the job proceeded through
1987 and 1988, the architect recalls that people working on the job took
pride in their work and in the fact that they were building for the "com-
mon man" -- that "market-rate housing good enough for everyone". 40
Tent City Described
Tent City opened in August of 1988 and has since won widespread
acclaim including several architectural awards and national recognition
from the New York Times and Architectural Record. Many people take
tremendous pride in having been associated with a project that over two
decades has required such tenacity. For others who are not aware of what
went into it, Tent City's appeal may be purely aesthetic.
Situated at a complex juncture of pedestrian and transit activity -- and
be-tween the cosmopolitan world of Copley Place and the brick and brown-
stone neighborhood of the South End -- Tent City is a 269-unit mixed-in-
come/mixed-use community built on 3 acres over a below-grade parking
garage. An articulated four-story brick facade on Columbus Avenue turns
the corner on a pinnacle and proceeds up Dartmouth Street where it gradu-
ally steps up to respond to the high-rise Copley Place complex.
This facade forms a protective barrier for the cluster of townhouses
and landscaped courtyards in the internal court. The entire development is
clad in an orange-red brick skin which bulges occasionally to form a bay
window or a walk-up entrance. Recessed windows punctuate the outer wall
and carefully placed decorative tiles accent the seriousness of the brick.
The residential component to the 269-unit project is divided between
176 units in an elevated mid-rise building and 93 flats or duplexes in the
townhouses. The unit mix consists of (1) studio; (93) 1-bedroom apart-
ments; (92) 2-bedroom apartments; (66) 3-bedroom apartments; and (17)
4-bedroom apartments. Each unit in the mid-rise is equipped with an all-
electric kitchen and heating system and is fully carpeted. Townhouse units
have gas kitchens, individual gas heating systems, and are also fully car-
peted. There are 17 units located throughout the development which are
accessible to the handicapped. 41
One quarter of the apartments are reserved to people of low income
(defined as no greater than 50% of the City of Boston median income);
50% of the units are reserved for people of moderate income (defined as
50%-120% of the City of Boston median income); and 25% of the units are
rented at market rates. (Because the development contains units for low-
income persons it is exempted from Boston's rent control ordinance). 4 2
Federal Section 8 and State Chapter 707 rental assistance subsidies for
the low-income tenants make up the difference between 30% of the te-
nant's income and the government-determined fair market rents.43 The
50% moderate-income units are divided into a sophisticated 4-tier arrange-
ment (ie: A, B, C, and D units). While the unit types and quality do not
differ, a person in a two-bedroom C unit, for example, may pay $562 per
month while a person in a two-bedroom B unit might pay $421 per month.
If the person living in the C unit loses her job, in time her unit might on
paper be changed to a B unit; conversely, should the man living in the
original B unit get a raise, he might eventually pay rent on a C unit. The
advantage of this flexibility is that it enables tenants to weather financial
difficulties and remain in the development -- thereby helping to ensure the
stability and cohesiveness of the community.44 (see Appendix)
Non-residential components of the development consist of a two-story
reception lobby flanked by management offices, a multi-purpose Commun-
ity Lounge and kitchen, and 6,500 square feet of ground floor commercial
space. The below-grade parking garage has a capacity for 700 cars, 129 of
which are reserved for Tent City residents at below-market rates.45
PROJECT SUMMARY
TENT CITY
APARTMENTS
- Affordability *
- Types of Units
SIZE of DEVELOPMENT
- Residential Component
- Retail/Commercial Component
- Multi-Purpose Area
- Below-Grade Garage
- Total Site Area: 3.3 Acres
Total Number of Units
- low income (25%)
- moderate income (50%)
- market rate income (25%)
Studio (550sf)
1- Bedroom (650sf)
2- Bedroom (850sf)
3 - Bedroom (1,200 sf)
4- Bedroom (1,525 sf)
269
67
135
67
1
93
92
66
17
315,000 SF
8,600 SF
2,500 SF
Total SF above grade 327,000 SF
(2 levels @ 120,000 sf each = 240,000 SF)
Housing Density: 81.5 Units/Acre
COSTS of DEVELOPMENT (excluding parking garage)
- Total Development Costs (no land cost)
- Cost per Unit
- Cost per Square Foot
SPONSOR
OWNERS
ARCHITECT
$42,882,000
$159,413
$131.14
Tent City Corporation - non-profit developer
Tent City Corporation - managing gen ' partner
Leighton Park Investors - limited equity partners
Goody, Clancy & Associates, Inc.
PUBLIC SUBSIDY
- certain development costs (incl. land assembly)
- mortgage (low-interest loan)
- rental subsidy
BRA
MHFA 30-year
Federal Section 8
State Chapter 707
State SHARP Program
BRA's NDF Fund
DEVELOPMENT OPENED AUGUST 1988
*Affordability: "low income" defined as less than 50% of City of Boston Median
"moderate income" defined as between 80%-120% of City Median
"market rate" defined as having no income limitations
The Development in Operation
One tenant has characterized the rent-up of Tent City as a "cattle call"
when about 6,500 people submitted applications for the 269 apartments.
Nevertheless, occupancy came in at less than 90% in the first year primar-
ily because the rehabilitation of the existing Columbus Avenue row houses
had to be abandoned and plans drawn up for replacing them. (This final
building was completed in the summer of 1990, providing the last 10 units
of the development.) Furthermore, with fewer units the project was not
eligible in the first two years for the full amount of SHARP rental subsidy
that had been expected in the pro forma.46
Nevertheless, rent-up has increased steadily such that today Tent City
enjoys an occupancy rate of 97%. The waiting list for the moderate-
income units stands at about 300. Vacancies which develop for the market
rate units are typically filled without a long delay -- area real estate agents,
occasional advertisements in Boston newspapers, and word-of-mouth
recommendations have sufficed. The 25% low-income units are first listed
with the Boston Housing Authority (to be eligible one must have either a
Section 8 or Chapter 707 certificate). All applicants are screened by the
project's property manager, The Community Builders (TCB), TCC's
original development consultant.47
There are five groundfloor retail spaces at Tent City: an upscale cloth-
ing store and cafe, an optometrist, a convenience market, a hairdresser, and
a lobby for an ATM bank terminal. The Community Builders and the
architect both recall the TCC Board being very clear that the small amount
of retail space within the project was meant to go the women and minority
owned businesses first, preferably from the South End. No sophisticated
market studies were done; instead the Board felt, for instance, that one did
not need to be a "rocket scientist" to see the need for the convenience store.
This has been a minority-owned business from the start.48
One surprise thus far for TCC has been that despite the fact that less
than .5 cars per unit is provided on site for tenants to rent, only about 80
stalls are used. It seems to have less to do with the parking rates (which
amount to $150 per month for market-rate apartment renters and one-half
to one-third of that for others) than with the fact that many people at Tent
City do not own cars. (Given the project's strategic location this is not so
surprising.) The stalls that are not used are leased back to JMB which
owns and manages the garage to accommodate Copley Place shoppers and
area office workers. 49
The Tent City Corporation is considered the parent body of the Tent
City Development Corporation, the development arm of Leighton Park
Limited Partnership. The Tent City Development Corporation is the
Managing General Partner for the project; about 100 equity investors who
contribute $10 million in equity syndication are limited partners. The Tent
City Corporation Board of Directors is made up of 18 members of the
South End community who are committed to seeing Tent City succeed.
Ultimately their intention is that, in 15 years when the SHARP rental sub-
sidy is due to terminate, the Tent City development might be purchased
outright by the Tent City Corporation and/or the tenants while maintaining
the affordability of three-quarters of the development's units.50
Tent City is managed by TCB on a negotiated contract basis. As
manager, TCB is responsible for tenant selection, rent collection, building
maintenance, and security. TCB's screening process adheres to MHFA
guidelines while at the same time it endeavors to achieve "the racial and
ethnic mix of the South End" as spelled out in TCC's Fundamental Princi-
ples. Project security consists of 24hr "desk coverage" by a "concierge" in
the mid-rise lobby by day and 2 security guards (including one on patrol)
at night.51
Tent City Corporation also provides a full-time "tenant coordinator"
for Tent City. The Tenant Coordinator's responsibilities are not defined
explicitly but have come to include: convening a Tenant's Council, a group
of 15 tenant volunteers which meets once a month to deal with issues of the
community; coordinating the "Keylatch" tutoring program which typically
meets twice a week and averages about 35 children, 15-20 of which come
from within Tent City; and organizing a Parent's Group around fundrais-
ers and family events. Late this summer the Tenant Coordinator hopes to
start an art program for children within the development to be run by
another Tent City resident.52
The current Tenant Coordinator, one of the original Tent City
activists, began her job two and a half years ago when the development
opened. She issues a Tenant Council Newsletter once a month and makes
herself available to all of the tenants. Almost exclusively, however, it is
the low-to-moderate income population that takes advantage of her
presence. 5 3
Ellis Memorial, a South End social service provider, has recently
started an after-school day care service for infants-to-2 1/2 years. Tod-
dlers both from within the development and outside amount to about 20.
The service is provided in the multi-purpose Community Lounge which
faces a contained patio area outside. 54
Assessing the development's operation since its beginnings two and a
half years ago, four general issues emerge. First, interviews with the
architect and tenants suggest a few "bugs" had to be worked out after
construction -- common to any new building. Original wood-frame
storefronts did not work out for climatic reasons and the flashing of the
bay windows proved problematic. In addition, controlling the carbon
monoxide vapors being exhausted from the below-grade garage was an
early problem that has since been rectified. The architect cites the fast
track schedule as having been a critical factor causing some of the "bugs".
One of the strongest lessons of the project for him was that fast tracking
the project, made necessary by financing constraints, was ultimately at the
owner's disadvantage because realistic costs were obscured by the rush to
work with incomplete drawings. 55
Several tenants have mentioned their displeasure with soundproofing
between units -- in both the mid-rise or the townhouses. One tenant
claimed she could hear virtually everything her neighbors were doing.56
Another tenant complained that the ringing phone in the unit above him
and his neighbor's weight training routine were a constant irritation. 57
And finally, the early history of the wear and tear on the grass in one
of the 3 courtyards required the planting of some box hedges to prevent its
use as a playfield.5s (A basketball court and tot lot is located about 100
yards down the Southwest Corridor and the nearest playground is Spar-
row Park, further down the Corridor by about a quarter mile.)
As mentioned previously, there are five retail establishments on the
ground floor. In two and half year of occupancy each seems to have
gained a foothold in the local market. But the owner of the upscale cloth-
ing store and cafe noted that when he approached the TCC Board with his
proposed store he was given a very cool reception. The Board had origi-
nally hoped only minority owned businesses could fill the retail spaces and
had actually planned for 6 shops facing the Southwest Corridor and Copley
Place. When the board found no takers and came to the realization that its
hopes for "affordable clothing" were unrealistic, the Board grudgingly
allowed the white businessman the right to develop the space set aside for 5
shops into a unique store/cafe concept which, perhaps given its proximity
to Neiman Marcus and Copley, has done well. 59
Conversations with the Tenant Coordinator and tenants reveals some
common perceptions about Tent City's "mix" of people. First, everyone
seems to be of the opinion that generally the market-rate tenants are unin-
volved in the development. Remarkably consistent was the view that of the
market-rate population, the most conspicuous group is the college students.
Students live in both the mid-rise (primarily 1- and 2-bedroom units) and
the townhouses (3- to 4-bedroom units). It is the students living in the
townhouses which seem to cause the most irritation to the tenants inter-
viewed. The primary complaint is that their loud music and wild parties
show no respect for the working parents in the development. The Tenant
Coordinator adds her frustration that none of the students has ever offered
to be a part of the on-site tutoring for children. 60
Finally, there is the matter of the project's acceptance, both among the
tenants and within the community. Generally, the sense of pride felt by the
original activists, the development team, and members of the Board ap-
pears to exist within the broader context of the community as well. The
market, the dry cleaner, hairdresser, and optometrist, and the clothing
store are frequented by neighbors in the South End. Many of the blocks
immediately adjacent to the development have quite a diverse population
and the project's strategic location provides it with a busy flow of pedes-
trian traffic from the community. Last summer, Tent City residents, pri-
marily members of the Tenant Council, organized a "Block Party" which
featured a cook-out and entertainment. The event attracted a good number
of neighbors and the Tenant Council plans to do it again this summer.61
Nevertheless, conversations with the Tenant Coordinator and tenants,
especially those involved with the Tenant's Council, suggests there is also a
good deal of isolation and some contentiousness within the Tent City com-
munity. Members of the council complain that only a handful of people
ever participate -- whether its to plan an event or sort out some social is-
sue. In addition, personality clashes within the council seem to have com-
promised its potential. When a recent council meeting broke off in a
shouting match, the council member chairing the meeting used the next
issue of the Tenant Council Newsletter (available to all tenants) to criticize
what she called the "lynch-mob mentality" that threatened to divide the
Black residents of the development amongst themselves. 62
Another white tenant charged that the newsletter had become a racist
propaganda piece that just served to widen the gulf between the people of
low-to-moderate income, predominantly Black, and the market-rate
tenants, many of whom are white. She claimed several key people within
the development lacked a firm commitment to stay and make a community
-- that they had one foot out the door and would just as soon find
themselves a condo somewhere. 63
Still, a single mother of two children seems philosophical about it all.
Having lived for seven years in crowded conditions in a remote part of
town, she was delighted when her application was accepted two and a half
years ago. She observes that a lot of people without kids complain about
kids. She admits she's not pleased that some of the students make so much
noise or that she can hear her neighbors through the walls. But when asked
if she feels her participation is encouraged at Tent City, she responds af-
firmatively: "I've never lived in a place like this before."64
While most people seem to keep to themselves at this point, she ex-
plains that people have been at Tent City for two and half years at most:
people may not have settled in and gotten to really know each other yet.
Building a community, she implies, is as much a project as was the creation
of her new home.
1 Stalvey, J. G. "The Twenty-Year Demonstration Project", South End News, April
28, 1988; p. 12.
2 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986 (TCC: Boston, 1990).
3 Kruckemeyer, Ken, co-founder Tent City Task Force and former President TCC,
(interview May, 1991).
4 Stalvey, p. 12.
5 Stalvey, p. 15.
6 BRA, "South End Environmental Assessment" (South End Urban Renewal "close out"),
Spring 1979, (Abt Associates Inc., Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, Real Properties
Resources, Inc., Jason M. Cortell and Associates), p. 6.
7 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
8 BRA, "South End Environmental Assessment", Spring 1979, p. 9.
9 Kane, Michael; original member Tent City Task Force, current member Tent City
Corporation Board (interview December, 1990).
10 BRA, "South End Environmental Assessment", Spring 1979, p. 10.
11 BRA, "South End Environmental Assessment", Spring 1979, pp. 9 & 10.
12 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
13 Posner, Joshua. "Tent City: Creative Financing for Affordable Housing", Urban Land,
November, 1989, pp. 6-11.
14 King, Mel; Adjunct Professor and Director of Community Fellows Program, Depart-
ment of Urban Studies & Planning, MIT; co-founder Tent City Task Force, (in-
terview November, 1990).
15 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
16 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
17 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
18 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
19 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
20 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
21 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
22 TCC, "The Fundamental Principles for Development" (originally drafted by the Tent
City Task Force in 1974; revised 1978).
23 MIT, "Tent City Report 1978", (School of Architecture and Planning, MIT);
(studio leaders: Philip Herr, Julian Beinart, Rod Freebairn-Smith), 1978.
24 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
25 Posner, p. 8.
26 Whitman, Bob; Principal Tent City Project Manager for BRA -- 1984-1986, (interview
February, 1991).
27 TCC, Tent City Chronology 1966-1986.
28 Posner, p. 10.
29 Posner, p. 10.
30 Posner, pp. 9 & 10.
31 Posner, p. 11.
32 Wooding, Geoffrey; Associate/Project Manager of Tent City; Goody, Clancy &
Associates -- Architects; (interview February, 1991).
33 Wooding,(interview February, 1991).
34 Wooding,(interview February, 1991).
35 Wooding,(interview February, 1991).
36 Wooding,(interview February, 1991).
37 Wooding,(interview February, 1991).
38 Wooding,(interview February, 1991).
39 Wooding,(interview February, 1991).
40 Wooding,(interview February, 1991).
41 Gallagher, Susan; Assistant Property Manager - Tent City; (interview February, 1991).
42 TCC, "Confidential Private Placement Memorandum: Leighton Park Limited Partner-
ship", (the equity syndication Offering Memo), December 1986.
43 Posner, p. 11.
44 Jacobson, Bob; Executive Director -- Tent City Corporation, (interview December,
1991).
45 Posner, Joshua; Director of Housing Development -- The Community Builders; (inter-
view December, 1990).
46 TCB, "Tent City Operating Budget for 1989".
47 Gallagher, (interview February, 1991).
48 Jacobson,(interview December, 1991).
49 Posner, (interview December, 1990).
50 Poston, Paul; member TCC board, former Chair of Tent City Development Corporation
-- 1989-90; (interview December, 1990).
51 Gallagher, (interview February, 1991).
52 Seymour, Toni; Tenant Coordinator -- Tent City; (interview February, 1991).
53 Seymour, (interview February, 1991).
54 Seymour, (interview February, 1991).
55 Wooding,(interview February, 1991).
56 Tolin, Tina; Tent City resident; (interview February, 1991).
57 Cook, June; Tent City resident; interview February, 1991).
58 Wooding,(interview February, 1991).
59 Marotta, Gary, Owner -- Street Clothiers/Back Door Cafe; (interview February, 1991).
60 Seymour, (interview February, 1991).
61 Seymour, (interview February, 1991).
62 TCA, "Tent City's Tenant Council Association Newsletter," February 1991.
63 Sullivan, Susan; Tent City resident; (interview February, 1991).
64 Tolin, Tina; Tent City resident; (interview February, 1991).

FILLMORE CENTER
SAN FRANCISCO
FILLMORE STREET
* -
-- -1L .~
- - *
6-4 - * -4 * 0 46
STEINER STREET
SITE PLAN
ELEVATION
e'.-
-
kU
O
0u
<-N-
3.2 FILLMORE CENTER - SAN FRANCISCO
The Proposal
"Don't get sentimental about Victorians in the Western Addition,"
Wilbur Hamilton, director the the SFRA, told an Examiner reporter in
1978. "I'm as committed to the preservation and refurbishment of Vic-
torians as any housing official in the City, but we have to face the historical
fact that before the black people who lived here in the 1940s -- before the
current Victorian revival -- the average Victorian was an overcrowded,
underutilitied tenement, owned by an absentee white landlord. The people
who lived here wanted out."1
Hamilton came to the Western Addition from Texas at the age of
seven. His father was pastor of the Emanuel Church of God in Christ, the
first Black congregation to build its own church in San Francisco.
(Hamilton Playground, situated across Geary Boulevard from Fillmore
Center, was named after him.) "A man with a mission", Wilbur Hamilton
was raised in the Western Addition, fought in Korea, received a doctorate
of divinity, and in 1969 was appointed by Mayor Alioto to the SFRA. In
1977 he was named the agency's executive director.2
The director was an ardent proponent of urban renewal and strongly
denied the SFRA was an agency of "Black removal". While admitting the
mass housing projects were a sociological disaster, Hamilton was an ad-
vocate of smaller-scale, low-density housing.3 As manager of the Western
Addition A-2 project in the 1970s and later as the agency's executive
director, he was directly involved in the development of many of the FHA
Section 236 and Section 221(d)(3) projects, most of which are low-rise
developments and constitute the majority of the area's low-to-moderate-
income housing.4
In June of 1970, about half way into the life of the A-2 program (as
measured by the duration of federal funding to it), the SFRA issued a re-
quest for proposals for "a new undertaking called the Fillmore Center in
the heart of the Western Addition Redevelopment Area".5 The agency had
ambitious plans to reverse the decay along Fillmore Street with a large,
mixed-use complex which might include "shops, offices, medical facilities,
private housing for low-to-moderate income families, public and private
senior citizen housing, private rehabilitated housing, restaurants,
entertainment facilities and parking areas." 6
The agency was specific about the inclusion of merchants who would
be displaced by the development, the number of senior and low-to-moder-
ate income units, and the sponsor of the medical complex. Then agency
director M. Justin Herman reminded interested parties that this was to be
no ordinary shopping cen-ter but an unusual concept "evolved in collabora-
tion with the community". The SFRA would assist in the creation of a
community-based development team which, in a unique "marriage" with a
commercial developer would both develop and jointly manage the business
center. A strong interest was expressed to make this "an accomplishment
with strong Black or Afro flavor by Black residents and businessmen." 7
Six months later the SFRA set out to review the three proposals re-
ceived. Two of the proposals were soon dropped: one for essentially not
being "Black enough", the other apparently due to the fact that a key mem-
ber's personality was perceived as too "militant and divisive".8 The third
proposal was made by some influential Black leaders of the Bay Area,
including Dr. Carlton Goodlett, Assemblyman Willie Brown, and John
Williams, Executive Director of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency.
Their proposal met "in varying degrees" the agency's expectations. 9
Though in July of 1971 this third group was selected as the agency's
developer-candidate, less than a year later the agreement was cancelled due
in part to what the group perceived as resistance from Mayor Alioto.10
Soon afterward, the agency, apparently frustrated by the lack of ini-
tiative from within the community, sought out Pyramid Development Com-
pany, a group of Black professionals. By the mid-1970s it appeared a deal
would come together with Prudential Life Insurance as the major source of
funds. But perhaps due to the infighting prevalent at the time among mem-
bers of the Western Addition Project Area Committee, Prudential suddenly
backed out.1 1 By late 1980, after numerous extensions the SFRA termi-
nated its agreement with Pyramid. 12
At this point, Western Addition A-2 Project Director Gene Suttle de-
cided to try a different strategy for developing Fillmore Center. Incre-
mental demolition over the course of twenty years had left nearly nine
acres of land vacant and had become a focus of the agency's frustration in
the wake of the federal retreat from urban renewal. Instead of hoping for
the big solution, Suttle's architects, economists, and real estate analysts re-
commended the area be broken into parcels to attract smaller, incremental
development. 13
With public resources scarce, Suttle and others at the SFRA saw a
market-oriented strategy as not only practical, but in keeping with the ori-
ginal intention of developing Fillmore Center into the retail hub of the
Western Addition. Now within a veritable "sea" of public subsidized hous-
ing, Fillmore Center was regarded as the long term answer to the area's
economic decline -- a stable market-rate core that could help unleash the
disposable income that, contrary to popular belief, Suttle and others main-
tained existed in the Western Addition. The SFRA sought distinctly
market-driven proposals, counting on the terms of contemporary tax
exempt bond financing to reserve at least 20% of the new units for people
of low-to-moderate income. Such a development would serve as a step-
ping stone for those ready to leave public housing but not willing or able to
leave the neighborhood. 14
In 1983, with the incentive of a UDAG from HUD, Safeway Stores,
Inc., became the first developer in the Fillmore Center project by construc-
ting a 47,000 sf "super store" containing a bakery, delicatessen, pharmacy
and floral department. The long hoped-for "anchor" for Fillmore Center,
Safeway would also provide over 100 jobs to area residents. In addition,
Safeway agreed to construct a 71,000 sf commercial/office building along
Fillmore Street under the same UDAG program. 15 Still, nearly 9-acres sat
vacant across the street.
In the course of the next three years a handful of proposals were con-
sidered: a condominium/commercial office development, a multiplex
theater and dinner club, and a new home for Third Baptist Church and
school. During this time one minority developer approached Donald H.
Tishman, a white, Sausalito-based developer, about a joint-venture. Intelli-
gent, energetic, and politically well-connected, Tishman had a proven track
record in residential and mixed-use develop-ment and had recently com-
pleted with a 360-unit garden apartment complex in San Jose using tax
exempt financing. 16
Tishman's development reputation had been established in the midwest
and the east. He had built some 10,000 units under Section 8 and Section
236 housing programs, mostly in suburban settings. In 1983, he was capti-
vated by an enormous housing development proposed for Chicago's West
Side redevelopment area. In what had long been Chicago's skid row dis-
trict, ground was being broken on a 2,346-unit mixed-use complex to be
called Presidential Towers. Consisting of four 49-story towers with high-
tone stores at grade and within walking distance to offices in The Loop,
Presidential Towers was directed toward young urban professionals, typi-
cally single or married without children. 17
The developers of Presidential Towers saw this last wave of baby
boomers as ideally suited to downtown living. Well-educated and well-
heeled, these successful professionals spurned the boredom and anonymity
of the suburbs for a cosmopolitan lifestyle: immediate access to restau-
rants, specialty shops, trendy clubs, and sophisticated cultural attractions.
Belying this sense of glamour and freedom, however, was the fact that
increasingly these people were not able to afford home ownership in the
city or the suburbs, and because they were typically saddled with credit-
card debt, they had little choice but to rent. 18
The developers of Presidential Towers, and presumably Don Tishman,
had in mind the kind of renaissance that had followed the development of
Sandburg Village on Chicago's Near North Side some 30 years earlier. In
fact, some of the same developers had been involved in that project and re-
membered the risks and the rewards: "We thought that by putting a lot of
attractive, reasonably priced middle-class housing all at once it would have
an effect. From Sandburg east to Lake Shore Drive, the neighborhood
became a very respectable, very sought after place to live."1 9
Indeed, the developers likened the dynamics of a project like Sandburg
Village to "dropping a pebble in the pond and watching the ripples grow."
20 Apparently Don Tishman saw Fillmore Center as an ideal candidate.
He not only agreed to join with the Black developer but boldly proposed
that a large-scale, high-density mixed-use garden apartment complex could
work along Fillmore Street. He proposed fusing the hodge-podge of mo-
dest development proposals into a 1000 unit mega-project -- ironically the
sort of thing the SFRA had once advocated.
Three aspects of this daring new proposal were of concern here to the
agency: 1) aside from tax exempt bond financing, there would be no pub-
lic money available for such a large project; 2) the high density scheme
proposed by Tishman called for several high-rise apartment towers, a con-
cept with a troubled past in the Western Addition; and 3) as important as
open space was to the agency, the sort of lush, tropical gardens as Tishman
proposed (complete with palm trees and water falls) struck some in the
agency as inappropriate to the community.
Nevertheless, the indomitable Tishman pressed on and his enthusiasm
seemed to infect nearly everyone he met. When the SFRA reacted cooly to
the high density scheme he initially proposed he called on Bechtel Corpora-
tion in hopes of creating a "turn-key" project where everything from arch-
itecture to construction could be provided by one source. Bechtel's design-
ers generated a primarily low-rise mixed-use scheme with very little open
space. When this failed to impress Tishman, he turned to the architectural
firm of Daniel Mann Mendenhall and Johnson (DMJM). They sought to
blend the high density of towers with neighborhood-scale buildings front-
ing the street. Their scheme captivated the developer.21
DMJM architects also developed a good rapport with the SFRA and
soon Gene Suttle and others expressed satisfaction with the compromised
density and the open space. Given Tishman's dynamism, and the fact that
this was the first proposal with real momentum in years, Suttle and the
agency soon were in a reactive mode. Based on his early market studies,
and no doubt by the precedent being set by Presidential Towers (which also
used tax exempt financing), the developer proposed to build only 1- and 2-
bedroom units. Tishman had only to point up the street to the young urban
professionals who were flooding into market-rate housing in nearby Pacific
Heights and the Upper Fillmore. Nevertheless, while the agency was
clearly in favor of a market-oriented development, it was concerned that
families not be left out of the picture and insisted that some 3-bedroom
units be included.22
In addition, the agency's zoning for the 9-acre site called for a sub-
stantial infusion of ground floor retail/commercial space. The agency
encouraged the 73,000 square feet proposed by the developer be concen-
trated along Fillmore Street to restore the vitality the street had once sup-
ported. Furthermore, it would agree with Tishman's proposed Health Club
only if it were sold as an amenity for those living in the new development -
- it would not be open to the public. 23
As DMJM worked to satisfy the developer's demands and agency
requirements, Tishman worked feverishly to find lenders for the project.
For years, experience in the Western Addition had demonstrated a reluc-
tance (some would say an aversion) on the part of local banks to participate
in the area's revitalization. In 1984, Don Tishman found not much had
changed. Eventually he had to piece together funding from outside lenders
such as Citicorp of New York, the Bank of Nova Scotia, and later, Sanwa
Bank of Japan. Tishman's formed a limited partnership, Fillmore Center
Developers, with four other groups but with his firm, Housing Associates,
Inc., as the sole General Partner.24
In November of 1985, SFRA Executive Director Wilbur Hamilton
announced that the agency had authorized the execution of a Land Dispo-
sition Agreement (LDA) for the 9-acre site. At a cost of $23.10 per square
foot, the Fillmore Center parcel would be sold to Fillmore Center Devel-
opers for $9,007,530. This price was determined by the agency to be "fair
reuse value based upon the evaluation of two independent appraisal reports
[and] by staff in accordance with the Agency's practice." 25 In addition, the
SFRA agreed to permit the "fast track" construction schedule proposed by
the developer. Project financing would come primarily from the Agency's
issuance of privately-backed tax exempt mortgage bonds approximating
$95 million. It was anticipated that the $20 million in equity required
would be secured by public syndication of limited partnership interests.
The developer estimated total development costs would come to $145
million.26
Simultaneously, the development team explored several structural
systems that would be cost effective for this complicated project. Initially,
Perini Construction worked with the architects at DMJM to devise a solu-
tion to the problem of locating parking below residential development of
various heights. The contractor priced various alternative schemes such as
an all-concrete high-rise system and a low-rise wood-frame system -- a
typical combination in the city at the time. But when Perini's estimate of
$83,000,000 exceeded the budget by some $10 million, Tishman became
disenchanted.27
He called in Dillingham Construction to compete with Perini and pre-
sumably shave down the estimate. With DMJM forced to produce 2 sets of
drawings according to each contractor's "value engineering" hunches, a
frenzied pace was launched. When both contractor's estimates then came in
roughly equivalent at $99 million, Tishman served up an ultimatum: only
by cutting the cost down to the earlier estimate would one of the contrac-
tors get the job. Soon Dillingham, against better judgement made a "rather
flippant" decision in December of 1986 to go with an all-concrete structur-
al system and tie itself to a guaranteed maximum price of $83 million.28
Earlier, Tishman had suggested a European structural system unpro-
ven in California known as "tunnel forming" could conceivably make an
all-concrete system financially feasible. Consisting of poured-in-place
modular forms, the concrete ceiling and sidewalls of each unit form a
stackable structural system. Under optimum conditions, an experienced
subcontractor could build the towers at the rate of a floor a week.29
Not only was this an unrealistic expectation, but with the added costs
of transferring the enormous bearing loads over the below-grade parking
and the premium for using such a sophisticated system in otherwise routine
wood-frame low-rise construction, the "tunnel form" concept proved to be
a colossal and persistent financial nightmare for the project. The first con-
crete subcontractor ran into "a million and one" concrete mix problems
and was never able to meet the optimistic schedule of the project's fast
track construction. This subcontractor eventually went bankrupt.30 When
Dillingham could not keep to the guaranteed maximum price, the contrac-
tor was released by Fillmore Center Developers and a suit and countersuit
followed. Six months after commencing construction, the project had to be
refinanced. 31
Citicorp, the primary lender, soon began to lose faith in Tishman.
Integrated Resources, Inc., a New York-based equity syndicator, was
brought in by the developer as a "deep pockets" partner, a move which
mollified Citicorp for a time. Integrated agreed to contribute $7 million
up front -- but with the caveat that should there be a subsequent cost over-
run, Tishman would have a limited opportunity to "cure it". Should he fail
to do so, Integrated Resources would take over as the general partner. 32
The deal with Integrated Resources was closed in late summer, 1987.
Construction continued, though it was clear the original 27 month con-
struction schedule was no longer realistic. Tishman convinced Turner
Construction to take over the project and bring it back on line. But, in
order to avoid the contractual problems surrounding a guaranteed maxi-
mum price (GMP) that had haunted its predecessor, Turner declined to act
as a General Contractor but instead as Construction Manager under an
expenses and fee arrangement.33
Meanwhile, financial difficulties continued to plague the project as the
full cost of the structural system became apparent. Exacerbating the prob-
lem was the fast track construction schedule which resulted in construction
drawings never being fully complete so as to allow all parties to realisti-
cally assess costs. With lenders pointing to the overly optimistic time sche-
dules and subcontractors pressing for payment, the developer found him-
self "fighting for dollars". The "value engineering" studies had allowed
very little room for error and efforts to scale the project back had ramifi-
cations that were never fully weighed.34
By December 1988 the project was in "technical default". Well behind
schedule and facing irritated subcontractors, Tishman was up against the
wall. Construction never stopped, however, as lenders continued to allow
construction loan draws to see the project along. But Tishman's work-out
plans eluded him and the banks grew wary.35
In the meantime, Integrated Resources was having troubles of its own.
Its $1 billion in assets were largely underwritten by the New York invest-
ment house Drexel Burnham Lambert. By 1988, Drexel's roll in the junk
bond market was over and it was facing increasingly nervous investors, to
say nothing of investigations of illegal activity by the Security and Ex-
change Commission. Citicorp Real Estate Investment, sensing that Inte-
grated Resources might soon be bankrupt and in no position to take over
Fillmore Center as General Partner, insisted that the partnership be re-
structured. 36
Integrated Resources sold 1 % of its interest to a partnership of three
individuals which would become the new General Partner; Don Tishman
was cut out of the picture. The new partnership, known as Fillmore Cen-
ter Associates (FCA), is made up of a Black developer (who had been part-
ly responsible for bringing Tishman in in the first place), a member of the
original Tishman firm of Housing Associates, and a key player formerly
with Integrated Resources. Formed in early 1989, FCA constitutes the
third ownership structure in the development's young history.37
As the project neared completion in 1990 and rent-up was in full
swing in the completed portion of the development, construction cost over-
runs forced yet another "technical default". Again, construction did not
stop, and though subcontractors were forced to wait 53 days for payment,
in January of 1991 an additional $24 million was raised from a variety of
lenders (including a three-month bridge loan of $13 million by Citicorp) to
sustain the project through completion in April, 1991.38 After this third
refinancing of the project, total development costs are expected to total
$220 to $230 million.39
Description of Fillmore Center Completed
Today Fillmore Center stands as an almost-completed residential/com-
mercial mixed use project on 9 acres in the heart of the Western Addition.
There are three towers in the development (two 19-story and one 15-
story), two mid-rise buildings (12-story and 9-story), and low-rise units
oriented primarily onto Steiner Street and Fillmore Street, the main re-
tail/commercial thoroughfare through the Western Addition. An exten-
sively landscaped garden and plaza, featuring palm and redwood trees as
well as a waterfall, meanders through the internal core of the site account-
ing for nearly half the site's acreage. Parking underneath the plaza pod-
ium and below-grade contains over 1200 stalls.40
The residential component totals 1,113 units comprised of (307) studio
apartments; (431) 1-bedroom apartments; (343) 2-bedroom apartments;
and (32) 3-bedroom apartments. Each unit, whether in a flat, a townhouse,
a garden-oriented building, or a penthouse is equipped with an all-electric
kitchen and baseboard heating system and is fully carpeted.41 Many of the
units throughout the development feature private balconies or patios and
several townhouse apartments feature fireplaces. The exterior of the de-
velopment features bay windows, articulated roofs, and a smooth stucco
finish painted in pastel shades.
PROJECT SUMMARY
FILLMORE CENTER
APARTMENTS
* Affordability *
- Types of Units
Total Number of Units
- low income (20%)
- moderate income (30%)
- market rate income (50%)
Studio (550sf)
1- Bedroom (750sf)
2- Bedroom (950sf)
3 - Bedroom (1,350 sf)
SIZE of DEVELOPMENT
- Residential Component
- Retail/Commercial Component
- Multi-Purpose Area
Total SF above grade
933,000 SF
73,000 SF
34,000 SF
1,040,000 SF
- (Below-Grade Garage 2 levels @ 250,000 sf each = 500,000 SF)
" (Community Center (jointly developed off-site) 22,000 SF)
- Total Site Area: 9 Acres Housing Density: 124 Units/Acre
COSTS of DEVELOPMENT (including parking garage)
- Total Development Costs (including land cost)
- Cost per Unit
- Cost per Square Foot
$231,112,332
$207,650
$150
Fillmore Center Associates -for-profit developer
Fillmore Center Associates - managing gen'l partner
Integrated Resources Investors - limited equity partners
Donald Tishman - limited equity partner
Daniel, Mann, Johnson, Mendenhall
- mortgage (low-interest loan via SFRA bond issue)
- rental subsidy
Fannie Mae 30-year
none
DEVELOPMENT OPENED DECEMBER 1990
*Affordability: "low income" defined as less than 80% of S.F. Regional Median
"moderate income" defined as between 80%-150% of Regional Median
"market rate" defined as having no income limitations
1,113
223
334
556
307
431
343
32
SPONSOR
OWNERS
ARCHITECT
PUBLIC SUBSIDY
Twenty percent of the housing units are reserved for low- and moder-
ate-income people. In accordance with terms of the project's tax exempt
bonds, "low income" is defined as no greater than 80% of the San
Francisco SMSA median income; "moderate income" is defined as between
80% and 150% of median income. In addition, one third of the units are
offered at "affordable rents" which amounts to the lowest of a) 30% of
150% of median income; b) designated "affordable rent"; or market rent.
Finally, the balance or 50% of the units are designated as "market rate".
(T) (Because the development contains units for low-income persons it is
exempted from San Francisco's rent control ordinance.) 42
The non-residential components of the development consist of: a
34,000 square foot health club with lap pool, weight room, basketball
court, squash courts, sauna, and juice bar; and 73,000 square feet of retail
space located pri-marily along Fillmore Street. Uses to date include a wo-
men's apparel store, a florist, and a concierge service, in addition to two
locations at opposite ends of the development for a Montessori school and
childcare facility. At present FCA is in the process of signing a news-
stand, travel agency, insurance company, and a restaurant. 43
Fillmore Center Associates is also in the process of constructing a
22,000 square foot Community Center across the street from the develop-
ment. Built by the developers under a "turn-key" agreement, the center
will be owned and operated by the West Bay Community Development
Corporation, a non-profit arm of the Third Baptist Church. The center will
provide office space for community groups, a program for senior citizens,
and community services such as childcare. The center is to be funded by
the Mayor's Office of Community Development, the Third Baptist Church,
and the SFRA. 44
The Development In Operation
Fillmore Center officially opened on September 13, 1990. Rent-up
has occurred incrementally as phases of the project have been completed.
At this writing, some 700 units have been completed and are about 75%
occupied (over 85% in the completed tower units but only about 60% in
the low-rise units). 45 According to Fillmore Center Associates, the rent-up
is exceeding their pro forma projections and those of Citicorp. The devel-
oper claims low- and moderate-income units have rented up quickly,
though not the (32) 3-bedroom units (perhaps supporting Tishman's initial
market studies which supposedly indicated families were moving out of the
Western Addition). Completion of the remaining 400 units is expected in
April, 1991. Permanent take-out financing will be provided by the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae); it is expected to occur by
early 1992 -- contingent, in part, on achieving an overall occupancy of
85%.46
Meanwhile, a project leasing agent laments the difficulty in attracting
the market-rate tenant the development is geared for. He notes the obvious
appeal to young urban professionals of the Upper Fillmore just above
Geary Boulevard. But he adds that "tire kickers" who come down to Fill-
more Center looking for an apartment are often reluctant to even keep a
tour appointment when they look a few doors down and see a barricaded
liquor store, a check cashing operation, and the public housing bordering
the development.47
Meanwhile, the developer admits that commercial lease-up is not
meeting expectations. Yet Webster Towers, a 156-unit mixed-income/
mixed-use development created on the coattails of Fillmore Center and
situated on the Safeway site across the street, has achieved lease-up of
nearly three-quarters of its 60,000 square feet of retail/commercial space
within its first two years.48 Fillmore Center Associates find this news en-
couraging -- as well as the fact that Webster Towers has a 92% occupancy
rate in its mixed-income apartments. 49
The developers of Fillmore Center are proud of the project's record
with regard to affirmative action and responsiveness to its neighbors. FCA
claims to have surpassed the goal of awarding 15% of total project costs to
minority and women owned businesses. Almost 60% of the project's con-
struction jobs have been held by minorities (over 50% of whom are
African-Americans). In addition, FCA has estimated that nearly a third of
the overall workforce has been composed of Western Addition residents
and that some $12 million in wages will have been pumped into the local
economy since construction commenced in 1987.50
Despite such accomplishments, Fillmore Center has opened beneath
clouds of controversy. In addition to the enormous cost overruns, the
three refinancings, and the fact that ownership since 1986 has officially
changed hands three times, the development has suffered from bad press.
Questions of safety were raised last year when it was learned a city build-
ing inspector had failed to adequately inspect the project. A stop work
order was issued while the city knocked out walls to check code compli-
ance.51 (The inspector himself became embroiled in scandal surrounding
alleged conflict of interest in his inspecting in an area where he owns
property.) 52
To add to the project's woes, charges of discriminatory rent practices
against prospective low income and minority tenants have been leveled at
the developer/managers. Under the terms of the SFRA's land disposition
agreement, prospective tenants are initially screened by the privately-
managed leasing office which then forwards applications to the SFRA for
review. The charges focus on the propriety of that link between the pri-
vate sponsor and the public agency whose bonds essentially stipulate the
inclusion of low- and moderate-income people in such projects.53
This is probably the most contentious issue of Fillmore Center. The
terms of the land disposition agreement and the tax exempt bonds reflect a
policy of the SFRA in the early 1980's that allowed for the inclusion of
20% low- and moderate-income persons to expire after 10 years. In ef-
fect, the developers of Fillmore Center can, as early as the year 2000, con-
vert the development into exclusively market-rate rentals or condomin-
iums. The SFRA cites a provision within the agreement that allows for the
agency to purchase the 20% affordable units to arrange its own "write-
down" disposition agreement with low- to moderate-income tenants. But
the fact remains that long term affordable rental units are not provided in
this development.
This policy is not an aberration but rather has been the nature of vir-
tually all of the agency's mixed-income housing in the 1980's. In addition
to Fillmore Center, five other developments, accounting for some 3,000
units, were developed under the same policy and their affordability terms
will expire one after another in the course of this decade.
Presently the pendulum is swinging the other way, no doubt partly as a
response to the criticism surrounding this short-term strategy. Current
policy of the San Francisco Redevelopment Authority, in concert with the
Department of City Planning and the Mayor's Office of Housing, is to en-
sure a 50 year affordability to new rental units developed as part of pub-
lic/private ventures in the city. This new time frame has been advocated by
public officials as providing San Franciscans of low-to-moderate income
with affordable rental housing "in perpetuity". 54
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EV0 PERFORMANCE
ANALYSIS
CRITERA

4.1 MIXED-INCOME/MIXED-USE ASSESSED
This chapter will focus on whether Tent City and Fillmore Center are
successful MI/MU developments. These cases will be analyzed according to
the performance criteria of design, financing, and management. This first
section of the chapter will concentrate on the mixed-income component as
the critical factor in the project's identity; what distinguishes these projects
from other mixed-use project's is the mix of income groups. The mixed-
use component will be assessed in terms of how it serves to integrate the
development to its surroundings; this is a factor of the range of goods and
services offered residents of the development as well as neighbors. Finally,
it is the combination of the mixed-income and mixed-use which brings
together the project's identity with its capacity to integrate into the neigh-
borhood. To the extent that this combination encourages interaction among
residents and between residents and neighbors, the project can truly build
community.
The Mixed-Income Component:
Shaping the Project's Identity
The strength of Tent City as a mixed-income community is the direct
result of public policy converging with very articulate community goals.
Ambitions of the Tent City Task Force were born out of frustration with
the urban renewal record on displacement and the provision of affordable
housing for South End residents. A vigorous debate within the community
was evident in the course of the 1970s as the area became increasingly gen-
trified. While some newcomers were purely real estate speculators with
little interest in retaining the neighborhood's poor population, other new-
comers joined with area natives and fought to maintain the neighborhood's
racial and economic diversity. This group faced enormous challenges as it
transformed itself from an advocacy organization into a development spon-
sor; their great achievement is that the Fundamental Principles they had es-
poused as activists survived the transition.
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At the same time, it is clear that in addition to the Task Force's deter-
mination, the political and economic weight of both the MHFA and the
BRA were essential to the development of the project. The first mortgage,
several site improvements, and most importantly rental subsidy streams
amounting to over $25 million are designed to make Tent City fly no mat-
ter what. While the Fundamental Principles cite too many lofty goals to be
achieved on one site -- from tenancy to home ownership, elderly housing
to sweat-equity programs, retaining all existing housing on the site as well
as providing a community garden -- it is precisely this idealism and com-
mitment to change that attracted the political will necessary to see this pro-
ject through.
Tent City's special identity in Boston is centered around the integrity
of its history. The devotion of area residents to the ideal of economic and
racial integration in general is epitomized by the development itself. Tent
City has grown out of its context and by virtue of the support of two public
agencies, it will remain a mixed-income development in perpetuity. The
ultimate objective of the project is a form of tenant cooperative ownership
-- highlighting TCC's broad aspiration of empowering people of low-to-
moderate income.
Whereas Tent City was born out of community protest, Fillmore
Center was forged largely from redevelopment policy and the nature of
bond financing in the early 1980s. When work in the Western Addition A-
2 redevelopment area began in the the late 1960s, the SFRA envisioned
Fillmore Center as the retail/commercial center for the neighborhood -- a
pivotal retail hub that would a attract discretionary income and provide an
alternative to the dependency of public housing for families in the area.
When the proposal for the eventual development was first made, there was
very little community input. The developers claimed that demographic
trends and their market studies suggested the city was losing its middle
class population and that the number of families in the Western Addition
was declining.
But the 1980 Census Data indicated that while the city's middle class
population had indeed declined, the need for affordable rental housing
among people of low-to-moderate income had increased -- especially
among families of the Western Addition. Lacking a well-coordinated
106
neighborhood constituency and without the political and financial clout it
had during the urban renewal period, the SFRA did not aggressively
advocate a mixed-income development that would attract middle class
renters and at the same time serve people of the area truly in need.
In retrospect, both the SFRA and the developer argue that what the
Western Addition did not need was more subsidized housing, but rather a
market-oriented alternative for area residents. For many people in the
Western Addition, however, Fillmore Center's low-to-moderate income
rents are not a realistic alternative. With "low income" defined as less than
80% of regional median income, Fillmore Center is a stepping stone for
very few. SFRA officials concede that the 80%-150% of median range
promoted by the developer as "affordable" is actually market-rate today.
The six MI/MU projects developed under the SFRA's tax-exempt
bond program, including Fillmore Center, have been under fire for alleg-
edly discriminating against low-to-moderate income people. A report by
SFRA staff in 1989 found that at that across time 1 in 6 units set aside for
low-income San Franciscans sat vacant and that of those units rented, 90%
were occupied by whites.(O) When affordable housing advocates charged
that holders of Section 8 certificates were being discriminated against,
however, the developer/sponsors of the six projects objected. They as-
serted that that Section 8 holders constitute "very low income" (ie: less than
50% of the area median income) and that the requirements of the bond
program do not include this group.1
Much of the controversy of Fillmore Center surrounds its identity as
a mixed-income development. The spirit of the terms of the bond financ-
ing is that housing affordable to people of low-income will be provided in
developments attracting market-rate renters as well. But behind the seman-
tics of "low", "very low", and "moderate" is a reluctance on the part of the
developers to embrace this spirit. A profound ambivalence marks Fillmore
Center's identity as a mixed-income environment. The project's design,
amenities, marketing strategies, and 10-year term of affordability all imply
that the inclusionary provisions amount to little more than a vehicle by
which a massive infusion of market-rate housing could be accomplished.
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The Mixed-Use Component:
Integrating the Project Into the Neighborhood
While the BRA advocated ground floor retail as a comprehensive
planning objective, potential obviously varies from site to site. Tent City
Corporation, in planning that went back as far as the MIT Total Studio of
1978, was quite aware of the attractiveness of its site. Located strategically
between the cosmopolitan Copley Square, Back Bay district and the brick
townhouses of the South End, the Tent City site enjoyed significant foot
traffic. This was further enhanced by the construction of Copley Place
over the air rights to the Massachusetts Turnpike, the refurbishment of the
Back Bay Transit Station across the street, and the completion of the South-
west Corridor pedestrian park adjacent to the site. The clear advantages of
its location allowed TCC to plan more according to "gut" feeling than to
exhaustive market surveys.2
The Fundamental Principles of the Tent City Task Force were not as
specific about incorporating a mix of uses as they were about achieving a
mix of incomes reflective of the South End. TCC approached the planning
of the retail functions of the development not from a marketing perspective
but with social goals in mind. Tent City founders envisioned retail services
which would cater to the needs and tastes of low-to-moderate income
people. Consistent with the goals of expanding opportunity, Tent City
founders saw ground floor retail as providing "incubator" space for small,
minority-owned businesses. The desire is also expressed that the commer-
cial space be priced within the range of area merchants and that a market
analysis be done. Early on, the board was convinced of the need and via-
bility of a small grocery store. Suggestions of a dry cleaner and a cloth-
ing store seemed appropriate to the board as well.
But the TCC board had difficulties with the proposal for an upscale
clothier/ cafe because the owner was not a minority and did not intend to
sell clothes affordable to low-income people. When the goal of having six
minority-owned shops facing the Southwest Corridor did not pan out, the
board acquiesced and allowed the clothier/cafe owner to make one large
space out of 5 smaller ones. The owner claims his unique concept of
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blending a clothing store with a cafe/espresso bar is doing quite well --
though his customers are generally not Tent City residents.3
In limiting the definition of mixed-use to revenue-producing func-
tions, a factor of Tent City's success which is overlooked is its symbiotic
relationship to the two-story parking garage beneath the development.
Built by UIDC under the same 99-year ground lease as Tent City, the
garage accommodates Tent City residents, Copley Place shoppers, and
nearby office workers. While functionally Tent City operates separately
from the privately-owned and managed garage, what may be overlooked is
the fact that the garage structure is literally the foundation of the project --
a tremendous write-down for Tent City. While not directly cross-subsi-
dized, Tent City's existence hinges upon the attraction of people of means
to Copley Place. Not only do they park under Tent City while shopping,
dining, or enjoying entertainment, but their presence ensures the success of
Copley Place which, in turn, has ensured that the UDAG grant is repaid --
the major rental subsidy stream of the project.
In some ways, the mixed-use aspect of Tent City might be regarded as
a convergence of rather naive, if laudable, goals of community economic
development with the cold reality of market "wisdom". In the end, the
goals must face the test of the marketplace, and in the case of Tent City, the
advantage of location underlies the success of its retail components. Simi-
lar community economic revitalization strategies tried off the beaten path
have not fared as well.
Like Tent City, the strategy of creating a concentration of retail/com-
mercial activities at Fillmore Center was born more of gut instincts than
detailed market studies. But two factors greatly inhibited previous attempts
to restore the area to its former glory. The Western Addition A-1 plan
had focused on depressing Geary Boulevard at Fillmore Street in order to
enhance traffic flow to and from downtown. While schools, playgrounds,
and a mix of residential and com-mercial functions were planned for the
margins of Geary Boulevard, Fillmore Street was destined to deteriorate in
the background.
Another factor which inhibited resurrection of the Fillmore Center
area was the general aversion of local lending institutions to the area.
Charges of "redlining" were commonplace during the district's urban re-
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newal phase and later, Fillmore Center's developers could find no local
bank for construction financing. Meanwhile, especially in the course of the
last 15 years, Fillmore Street north of Geary Boulevard -- through Japan
Town and up to Pacific Heights -- has experienced a remarkable renais-
sance.
By 1984 the SFRA had succeeded in getting Safeway Stores, Inc., to
build a "superstore" of lower Fillmore Street, with ancillary commercial
and office space. This would be the extent of the commercial "anchor" it
had once envisioned. With the proven sustainability of small shops, eater-
ies, and service stores just up the street, the plan was adjusted in response
to the "wisdom" of the marketplace. The Agency's strategy shifted from
the mega-shopping center to a ground floor retail strip concentrated on
Fillmore Street. 4 Much like dental work, the pattern of first floor retail
topped by bay window apartments was meant to "fill in the gap" along
Fillmore Street.
Mixed-use at Fillmore Center, in other words, is oriented exclusively
to the consumer. With the long-awaited "anchor" across the street, and
with neighboring Webster Tower's commercial and retail space filling up,
Fillmore Center anticipates a synergy to develop along Fillmore Street.
Certainly the population among the Center's 1,113 units will help support
the new retail space. But if neighbors of the development are not drawn to
the ground floor retail, not only will the stores fail, but the one tenuous
link between the new development and the neighborhood will be lost.
Combining Mixed-Income & Mixed-Use:
Fostering Interaction
Among Residents and Neighbors
Of course the difficulties of combining residential functions on top of
retail or commercial space can be daunting. Architects for both Tent City
and Fillmore Center faced tremendous challenges in attempting to reconcile
the structural grid of the housing with that required for the parking garag-
es below-grade. The retail and commercial space sandwiched in between
has its own special requirements for utilities, service access, fire separa-
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tion, and security. These aspects, in turn, have great implications in terms
of liability.
Early experience prompted the MHFA to adopt a policy whereby the
residential and retail/commercial functions of all future projects would
have to subsist independent of one another. Though underwritten as a total
development, a project's rental income stream would be immune from the
faulty performance of retail space -- and visa versa. Nevertheless, city
planning departments, redevelopment authorities, and housing finance
agencies have continued to encourage the mix of retail with residential in
strategic locations. Even though the factors of the marketplace are some-
times miscalculated or not fully appreciated, the notion of vibrant street
activity coupled with the stability of a residential community remains a
compelling aspiration for planners.
At Tent City the goal of combining incomes and uses was born of an
activist ideal to build a total community. Integrating different groups of
people reflective of the South End's diversity was one part of the com-
munity; integrating different uses to provide on-site support services and
encourage interaction among residents and area neighbors was the other
part. Among residents, the architecture of Tent City is intended to foster
interaction. The sense of security and hierarchy of public to private space
will be described in more detail in the next section of the analysis. The
larger point is that, like the neighborhood context of which it is a part,
Tent City is meant to elicit the participation of its tenants. Its lobby, multi-
purpose meeting room, and outdoor courtyards are intended to foster
communication among residents, not isolate them from on another.
The on-site management office, Tenant Council, and Parent Group
are intended to serve as support mechanisms within the community. More-
over, the day care service and a tutoring program -- both centered in the
project's multi-purpose room -- have been designed as a means of connect-
ing Tent City to the neighborhood. The inclusion of other area children
within the on-site programs has had the effect of linking families in the
community to Tent City. Furthermore, the multi-purpose room is regu-
larly used in the evenings for meetings of various South End organizations
free of charge, reinforcing the ideal of Tent City as a true neighborhood
center.
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Fillmore Center's mix of income groups and uses is distinct from this.
Aside from the obvious difference of scale, Fillmore Center, in the charac-
ter of both its residential component and its retail/commercial component,
is focused on the dynamics of the market. The consumer -- of housing as
well as goods and services -- is on his or her own, free to choose among
the offerings that presumably have been developed according to market
demand. The promise of the free market -- consumer discretion and
trickle-down consumption -- is fully embraced here. The emphasis is on
serving oneself and not on engaging in community-wide activities.
While the project's affirmative action policy of marketing retail and
commercial space is intended to involve area residents in the development,
the residents of Fillmore Center are not encouraged to interact among
themselves or with residents of the neighborhood. Fillmore Center does
not include on-site support services for residents of low-to-moderate in-
come. The proposal accepted by the SFRA called for a community center
will provide office space for community groups, a program for senior
citizens, and community services such as childcare. 5
Fillmore Center does include two separate sites for a Montessori
School within the development -- but the school is run as a private venture
unaffiliated with the development or the community center. The focus of
community interaction at Fillmore Center is its health club, located below
the surface of the landscaped podium in the interior of the development.
Available to residents and outsiders for a monthly fee, the health club is
considered the vehicle for social intercourse in as much as the developer
sees the need for such a vehicle. At this writing, no tenant organization
exists at Fillmore Center though the developer has indicated there.are plans
to form one.6
The flip side of this issue of interaction, and the factor on which the
development's success is predicated, is whether Fillmore Center will attract
the market-rate tenants as intended. Certainly the mixture of retail and
commercial establishments provided on site will have to cater to tastes
beyond those of the neighborhood. In this sense, the mixture of income
groups and uses is delicate. Too many croissant bakeries and high-tone
clothiers may be inappropriate for neighbors with limited means. But too
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many fast-food restaurants or discount shoe stores may alienate the tenants
with the greatest ability to pick up and move elsewhere.
Conclusion
The blending of income groups and some degree of retail/commercial
use may result in an overall synergy and a significant vehicle by which the
development is integrated into a neighborhood. The developers at Fillmore
Center, for example, are counting on its Fillmore Street retail to provide
the same charm and quality of services that have made similar mixed-use
developments along the Upper Fillmore attractive to residents and neigh-
bors alike. But the blending of uses may not result in any synergy at all --
retail space may be completely unrelated to the population within the
housing above -- as would appear to be the case with the upscale clothier/
cafe at Tent City -- or unrelated to the population of the neighborhood as is
no doubt the case with the concierge service at Fillmore Center. More-
over, the nature of resident and community services provided, and in par-
ticular the physical placement of these services, clarifies the objectives of
these developments.
The character of income-mixing and mixed-use at Tent City and
Fillmore Center is reflective of the projects' sponsors. The non-profit,
activist-inspired Tent City Development Corporation had a mix in mind
that placed the priority on serving people of low-to-moderate income in the
South End. The private, profit-oriented Fillmore Center Associates envi-
sioned a market-oriented development dependent upon attracting large
numbers of people from outside the Western Addition. Such distinctions
amount to more than refinements of the definitions of mixed-income and
mixed-use. The intentions of the sponsors, rather than categorical defini-
tions, determine whether the promise of MI/MU is ultimately realized.
1 Rhett, Byron -- Project Director: Hunters Point/India Basin/Western Addition Projects;
and Shirley Wysinger -- Assistant Project Coordinator; (interview January, 1991).
2 Kruckemeyer, Ken; co-founder Tent City Task Force and former President TCC,
(interview May, 1991).
3 Marotta, Gary; Owner -- Street Clothiers/Back Door Cafe (interview February, 1991).
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4 Suttle, Gene; Senior Deputy Executive Director -- SFRA; (formerly Western Addition
A-2 Project Director); (interview January, 1991)
5 Suttle, (interview January, 1991)
6 Davis, Robert G.; Vice President -- Fillmore Center Associates; (interview January,
1991).
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4.2 REVIEW OF ARCHITECTURAL FORM
Meeting a nominal definition of MI/MU does not necessarily mean a
particular project will succeed as a MI/MU development. Ultimately the
success of a project depends on how well people enjoy living, shopping,
and congregating in and around it. Shaping the physical form involves
more than making sure car exhaust from the below-grade garage does not
find its way into the apartments. As introduced in the first chapter, qual-
ities of scale, material, and spatial diversity distinguish projects with archi-
tectural character from those that are anonymous and disorienting.
An attention to detail in the design of a window opening, a sensitivity
to human scale in a courtyard, a gradation from public to private space in
an entry sequence -- these aspects of design which together can help impart
a special identity to a building are not unique to MI/MU development. But
because such projects can engender community opposition and skepticism
among prospective lenders and investors, it behooves the developers of
MI/MU projects to be especially sensitive to these characteristics of good
design. In bringing life to the sidewalk and attracting neighbors to the
project, a retail/commercial component can help integrate the project to its
surroundings. Moreover, carefully designed semi-private spaces can be
expressive of the project's diversity and foster interaction among its resi-
dents.
In this section, Tent City and Fillmore Center will be reviewed in
terms of how their formal qualities contribute to identity, integration, and
interaction. Together, these qualities reveal much about the integrity of
Tent City and the ambivalence of Fillmore Center as MI/MU developments.
Identity
A development's identity is made up of the sum of detail and symbol-
ism which make it both a part of the city and personally significant to its
residents as "home". Facades, roofs, doorways, and steps can individually
serve a utilitarian function and yet, in concert, can be thematically linked.
What makes MI/MU unique is that not only must the form of the residential
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and retail components merge, but together the ensemble must attract people
of very different backgrounds.
TENT CITY
It is undoubtedly true that Tent City would not be what it is today
were it not for its position on a seam in the fabric of Boston. Passed the
cosmopolitan world of Copley Square, the South End is a tweedy texture of
brick bowfronts, small stores, churches, and an occasional restaurant. City
street grids collide in the South End, providing a variety of spatial experi-
ences in close proximity to each other. Unlike San Francisco's Western
Addition, much of the neighborhood's 19th century housing stock remains,
particularly on the side streets. Columbus Avenue, the two lane thorough-
fare that crosses Dartmouth Street at Tent City, features some of the area's
subsidized housing, though most of the government-sponsored projects are
to the south. Tent City, at the northem-most edge of the South End, is
situated on one of the neighborhood's choicest site.
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The Southwest Corridor that sits between Copley Place and Tent City
is more than just a pass-through for people headed for public transporta-
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tion. Situated between Copley Place and Tent City, a public plaza marks
the intersection of the landscaped corridor and Dartmouth Street. In addi-
tion to the rail transit underground, auto traffic for Copley Place shopping
and entertainment passes this point destined for the garage beneath Tent
City. The prestige of the location has enabled the upscale clothing store,
one Tent City's ground floor retailers, to expand its espresso bar into a
cafe with outdoor seating.
While the scale of Tent City is a departure from the collection of
19th-century bowfronts, the density is not unheard of in the South End.
Just next door to Tent City on Columbus Avenue sits Methunion Manor.
Built in the early 1970s, Methunion is designed as a six-story, flat-roofed
box -- so generic (and apparently cost-effective) that it is repeated several
times down Columbus Avenue. Though clad in brick, the color of the
facade is mottled. The windows, punched superficially into this tight skin,
are spaced in a static rhythm interrupted by two entry points along its 100-
foot length.
While similarly dense, Tent City is distinct from Methunion and
other projects in the way it achieves its density. The mid-rise tower steps
down from its apex at the Southwest Corridor to form a hard outer street
edge of five-story walk-up apartments, shielding a softer inner court.
Landscaped and featuring two clusters of townhouses, the inner core of the
project resembles the character of the brick bowfronts it faces across
Yarmouth Street. This unique spatial combination makes Tent City unique
in the South End and serves to clarify the joint between the districts. The
weight of Tent City's residential density leans up to the edge along the
Southwest Corridor, holding fast like a hunched shoulder across from the
modem, precast Copley Place high rise. The texture of the mid-rise tower
wall is stripped-down compared to the five-story walk-ups it descends to
meet. The orange-red brick skin appears especially taught at the tower as
it wraps around the curve of the Southwest Corridor.
Tent City borrows a set of architectural components and motifs from
its 19th-century neighbors: bay windows, bow windows, sand-stone lintels
and window sills, front stoops, two-tone ribbons of brick at the building's
base, and black iron hand rails. While respectful of proportion and materi-
als, Tent City departs from a complete repetition of the past with a degree
of playfulness: decorative ceramic tiles amidst the brick facades, a turret,
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and a faux-mansard roof. Tent City avoids mimicking yet remains true in
spirit to the charm of its 19th-century counterparts. The development
stands self-confident in its surroundings -- as if part of the family.
Tent City's arched entry:
literal for some residents, symbolic for others
Within the grand archway and above the main doors along Dart-
mouth Street, bronze relief letters announce not the project's address, but
its name: TENT CITY. The architect has noted that considerable debate
surrounded the decision of what to name the project. For the purpose of
successfully attracting the required equity syndication, one of the project's
financial investors felt that Leighton Park, the corporate-sounding name of
the Tent City Corporation's non-profit parent company, would enhance the
project's appeal. This plucked a nerve in the TCC board and community
representatives who together fought hard and won back the name Tent
City.1 It serves as a reminder to natives and newcomers alike that this
development was born of a community struggle and is a symbol of
accomplishment for many in the South End. The name thus epitomizes the
special identity of Tent City.
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FILLMORE CENTER
Whereas at Tent City the juncture between two districts is defined by
a pedestrian parkway, at Fillmore Center a wide traffic artery serves more
to divide than define the two districts. Day and night, Geary Boulevard is
alive with traffic taking people downtown or home to the western districts
of the city. In the 1950s, as the focal point of the SFRA's Western Addition
A-1 plan, Geary Boulevard was widened and retail/commercial develop-
ment was envisioned for its new flanks. Vehicular congestion at Fillmore
Street, the neighborhood's traditional retail thoroughfare, was carefully
prevented by depressing Geary at that point. The result, however, was that
over the years Fillmore Street has been isolated as motorists speed past it.
The Fillmore-O'Farrell crossing serves as the gateway to the heart of
the new Fillmore Center and is intended to thrive on foot traffic up and
down both sides of Fillmore Street. Fillmore Center's 73,000 square feet
of retail space is lined up along the west side of the street and extends three
blocks. The office building on the east side of the street, built as part of
the Safeway development, features an assortment of retail stores on its
ground floor and flanks about one-third of the new Fillmore Center retail.
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The Fillmore-O'Farrell crossing aspires to be the anchor point of the
new area -- and it would not be the first time. During the district's hey-
day, this intersection, crowned by the electrically-lit metal arches, was
among the busiest in town. Today, the butcher shop, liquor store, and
cleaners that have hung on through years of the area's depressed condition
figure prominently in its rebirth by offering newcomers a sense that
Fillmore Street is not a recent, artificially-created retail strip. The old
establishments serve as a link between Fillmore Center and the thriving
Upper Fillmore, distinguished by its older buildings.
Fillmore Center stands out in its surroundings by virtue of its con-
trasting scale. The ensemble of high- and mid-rise towers constitute a ma-
jor transformation of the neighborhood's landscape. For people who spend
their day downtown, or who live in the Golden Gateway or on Russian
Hill, Fillmore Center is not unusual -- it passes for yet another cosmopol-
itan apartment complex. And yet, despite its years as a proving ground for
publicly-assisted housing of various types, the Western Addition features
relatively few highrise housing projects as compared to similar redevelop-
ment areas of Chicago, New York, and Boston. For people who reside in
the Western Addition and may not spend their day downtown, the high-rise
is perceived as something incongruous to the neighborhood, if not a threat.
Fillmore Center: Looking south along Fillmore Street
The architects of Fillmore Center sought to mitigate the scale of the
project by articulating the facades. The array of bays, balconies, split pedi-
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ments, and occasional chimneys illustrates how a combination of distinct
elements can still fall short of a thematically-linked composition. While
Fillmore Center avoids the box-like sterility of its institutional neighbor, El
Bethel Terrace, it does so at the cost of any visual relief whatsoever along
Fillmore Street. By contrast, and presumably for cost reasons, within the
landscaped court and at the family walk-up units along Steiner Street, bay
windows and other architectural elements appear infrequently.
Meanwhile the architects employed the pediment motif religiously in
the design of the building elevations. Each of the 45-degree pediments is
split by various widths to allow for a balcony, a bay window, or a vertical
accent. Consistent with the city's Downtown Plan, the tower roofs are
tapered -- here by means of split pediments on each of the facades. Pitched
obediently at 45-degrees no matter how wide the building, some of these
pediments create enormous shed spaces a floor or more in height. The
towers themselves, meanwhile, taper not an inch as they rise skyward. In-
stead they are capped abruptly at random heights. The verticality which
might have been celebrated is lost in the squat proportions.
1
"Fillmore Center" was christened in 1970 in the SFRA's Request for
Proposals. Its name was more of a hope than a promise -- a hope that this
empty basin of the Fillmore District might be transformed into a retail hub
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and a prosperous mixed-income community. In one sense it is remarkable
that such an enormous amount has been accomplished along these sorry
blocks. Its towers send a signal to those who for years cruised under and
past Fillmore Street that the Western Addition is on the mend -- a place to
move to or at least visit.
Yet beyond the signal the bright towers may send to outsiders, and
for all the hope the developer and architects may have intended in the
design, the character of the buildings may send the wrong message to
people of the Western Addition. The presence of towers in an area with an
aversion to towers, the lushly landscaped court that outsiders are discour-
aged from taking advantage of -- these qualities of form emphasize the
project's aloofness in the neighborhood. Gates and skybridges send a mes-
sage to people on the street that the development is for residents only.
Integration
Beyond economic and racial integration within a development, there
is the issue of how to incorporate retail/commercial space into a multi-
family environment. In part this means goods and services should appeal
to residents of different income groups. In addition, because one of the
primary goals is to integrate the MI/MU project into the surrounding com-
munity, there are issues of how neighbors and others can be encouraged to
participate in the development. Typically this is the intention for project's
retail space, but sometimes other on-site services, or recreation areas can
also attract non-residents. A MI/MU development can provide continuity
along the street edge, connecting portions of a neighborhood or even ad-
jacent districts.
TENT CITY
Good multi-family housing is sensitive to context and avoids appear-
ing monolithic. At Tent City, the architects preserved the continuity of the
district's ground floor retail space while also developing a sophisticated
rhythm of bay windows and flat surfaces, walk-up entrances, and recessed
brick openings in order to make the development seem the result of incre-
mental infill construction. Changes in brick shade, disconnected lines of
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decorative tile, and seemingly haphazard roof permutations are meant to
appear as an amalgamation of styles bearing on the tastes of various pro-
perty owners. In fact, this is one building, and upon close inspection, the
language is not as haphazard as first hits the eye.
The undulation of the brick skin around bays and bows avoids redun-
dancy. There is plenty of relief for the eyes in the flat surfaces with deep
recessed windows and the entry stairs that go up to stoops in the walk-up
apartments. The facade pivots on the turret at the Dartmouth/Columbus
crossing and continues until interrupted by a collection of brick bowfronts
-- the last ten units of the development, completed nearly two years after
the rest of the project. Originally this had been the site of existing bow-
fronts which the community had hoped to salvage. Nonetheless, the new
units are reminiscent of what they replace while blending in proportion,
detailing, and craftsmanship with the rest of Tent City.
The bulk of Tent City's ground floor retail space is situated along
Dartmouth Street and turns the corner down the Southwest Corridor. The
way this space meets the sidewalk differs from the detailing of the walk-up
apartments to either side of it. Whereas at the residential blocks a sequence
of setbacks, landscaped edges, steps, and alcoves denote apartment entranc-
es, the retail space is pressed to the sidewalk face. The one exception is at
the convenience store where the difference in elevation between the store
and the sidewalk required a series of steps and a ramp for people in wheel-
chairs. Still, the brick detailing and iron railings tie this transition space to
the building facade while the green awnings that project over it announce
the stores to passers-by.
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There is therefore a special dynamic in a form's integration into its
surroundings in that typically one perceives continuity of form while in
motion. The nature of the project's shape is continually changing as pat-
terns of light shift and as the pedestrian moves through space. At Tent City
this dynamic is particularly distinct because, unlike San Francisco's ortha-
gonal arrangement, Boston is a virtual collision of grids -- partly the result
of an awkward topographical configuration, mostly the result of the un-
bridled real estate expansion of the late 19th century. Tent City's site con-
figuration means the play of sunlight through the day and through the sea-
sons is somewhat unpredictable. The trapezoidal site is situated such that no
one surface is cast in shadow all day long.
This is a considerable advantage for a project which allows no pref-
erential disposition of units: there is no truly disagreeable exposure. This
is not to suggest that the architect did not capitalize on this advantage. In-
deed, Tent City enjoys a lively play of sun and shade throughout the day
because not only is the site well-situated, but the buildings are proportioned
to allow for maximum sun penetration. At dawn the sun strikes the Dart-
mouth Street facade and peaks down the Southwest Corridor. By mid-day,
the full intensity of the sun is directed into the landscaped inner court and
the clusters of townhouses. By late afternoon the setting sun is beaming
back up the Southwest Corridor.
One consequence of the project's particularly dense northwest corner
is that from the inner court the tower can appear to loom over the town-
houses of the inner court in the morning shadow. In addition, the project's
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elevator penthouse, set back from the Dartmouth Street edge, from the in-
ner court protrudes in an otherwise carefully-stepped roof line. By mid-
afternoon, however, the townhouses have the sun to themselves and the
mid-rise becomes only a back-drop.
From its perimeter, Tent City is a four-sided piece of urban design.
It holds down the prominent Dartmouth/Columbus corner with the pinnacle
and blends sensitively with the existing brick rowhouses of Yarmouth
Street. The new internal street which penetrates the development, named
Yarmouth Place, further binds the project to the neighborhood as the new
townhouses are all given street edges. Meanwhile, as the facade of the mid-
rise steps up gradually along Dartmouth Street the project's retail space
embraces the sidewalk and the public plaza around the corner. From the
Southwest Corridor, the mid-rise tower curves deferentially to reveal the
view to the Back Bay Station, making Tent City a key part of the Southwest
Corridor climax.
FILLMORE CENTER
Unlike Boston's South End, much of the grand Victorian-era housing
south of Geary Boulevard was demolished. While other areas of San
Francisco experienced a remarkable rejuvenation at the hands of the new
urban gentry during the 1970s, the Western Addition was consistently
avoided. Efforts to create a new district over the past two decades have
been largely disappointing. Today the Western Addition is a veritable
pastiche of various redevelopment strategies: a handful of isolated, insti-
tutional towers (relics of earlier times like the El Bethel Arms and the
notorious Pink Palace -- now both converted to elderly housing); a occa-
sional, face-lifted Victorian; some recent condominiums (generally near
Geary Boulevard); and large swaths of low-rise townhouse clusters featur-
ing front lawn setbacks and rakish angularity, giving some parts of the dis-
trict an oddly suburban appearance.
Like Tent City, a certain calculated randomness is meant to suggest
that this is not a monolithic development, even though it is. The architect
at Fillmore Center celebrated diversity by inventing a series of variations
on the same basic parts: bay windows and split pediments, for example.
The clearest instance of this "calculated randomness" is along Fillmore
Street where 5-story apartment buildings are arranged side by side. About
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25' wide each, these seemingly separate buildings recall the typical San
Francisco lot size. Along the sidewalk edge, the project's ground floor re-
tail space is linked by a series of green awnings. Both the style and colors
of the 5-story apartment buildings alternate in a rhythm that is inexplicably
interrupted by one of the development's towers. Whereas the other towers
all step back from the street edge, this one visually interrupts the continuity
with other mid-rise buildings down Fillmore Street.
View of pedestrian plaza at the Fillmore-O'Farrell Street crossing
As this is the district's main retail/commercial corridor, the magnate
of a considerable amount of foot traffic, the continuity of storefronts is
critical. As in any successful retailing arrangement, the vitality of these
shops will depend on anchor destinations at either end. The pull from the
north consists of the existing retail establishments immediately across
O'Farrel Street and, ultimately, the activity of the Upper Fillmore. With-
out a comparable draw to the south, Fillmore Center's efforts to restore
economic vitality to the street might be seriously jeopardized.
Fillmore Center is aligned along a north-south axis and therefore
enjoys a long morning exposure on its Fillmore Street retail facade. By
mid-day the sun has fully penetrated the inner landscaped court and pro-
ceeded to warm the back side of the units which were in shadow all morn-
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ing. From this point on, however, the tower along Fillmore Street casts a
long shadow on its immediate neighbors. Similarly, another tower and a
mid-rise block at the northern-most edge of the site are arranged such that
the small public plaza that serves as the development's gateway is in shade
most of the day.
The trade-off of the project's massing is that nearly half the site
acreage is devoted to the landscaped inner court. The breadth of this open
space offers a marvelous opportunity to create vistas, panoramas, and focal
points within the project. But while the light of the internal court is in-
viting to pedestrians, the lack of benches and high planter walls suggest this
is not a place for the public to linger. (A lawn and seating area does exist
on the terrace level one level up, though this is inaccessible to non-resi-
dents.) While Ellis Street is being converted to a landscaped pathway, it is
flanked by high side walls and beneath two skybridges. This street-level
link from Fillmore to Steiner Street may only exacerbate the feeling among
neighbors that the development is off limits to them.
Pedestrian skybridges across Ellis Street connect the residents' terrace
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Interaction
In his hypothetical Radiant City, Le Corbusier espoused "open space"
between apartment blocks for recreation. In reality, the left-over space
between public housing blocks becomes an urban no man's land -- neither
as large as parks nor as intimate as private gardens. Open to everyone and
belonging to no one, such space is commonly avoided, even abandoned.2
In the first chapter, the reconfiguration of a notorious public housing
project centered around creating a hierarchy of public to private space. A
wide, tree-lined boulevard now welcomes residents returning from the
larger city context. From this main artery more secluded streets, side-
walks, and entry paths complete the entry sequence. Townhouses and mid-
rise buildings are clustered to create courtyards of various dimensions over
which residents take a proprietary interest. Despite the large scale of a de-
velopment, it is this range of spatial qualities that gives people with a sense
of privacy and security. Semi-private space provides unique opportunities
for intervention that is conducive to the building of community.
TENT CITY
The Southwest Corridor offers a spatial transition from the intensely
public, cosmopolitan glitz of Copley Place and the venerable Copley Square
to the quieter, more residential South End. The corridor acts as a sort of
back yard for the neighborhood, a semi-public/semi-private zone in which
area residents can stroll, visit, and play. Several small playgrounds and tot
lots were created along the handsomely landscaped promenade, culminating
with Sparrow Park about a quarter mile from Tent City.
For the residents of Tent City, the experience of coming home in-
volves a full series of transitions. The activity of Dartmouth Street and
Copley Place gives way to a small public plaza where Tent City's gently
curved wall on the Southwest Corridor serves as a backdrop. Around the
corner, the mid-rise tower steps back dramatically to reveal the develop-
ment's front door, literal for some Tent City residents, symbolic for
others. Proceeding through this doorway, one encounters the develop-
ment's spacious two-story main lobby. There are no seats as this is intend-
ed not as a place of leisure but as a transition point. For resident's of the
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mid-rise, the concierge at the desk will buzz them into the adjacent elevator
lobby.
For residents of the townhouses, the lobby serves as a pass through
to the more secluded world of the inner court. To the right of the arched
entry to the courtyard, the outdoor patio off the development's multi-pur-
pose room takes in maximum sun exposure. To the left, a lawn stretches
out, flanked by a tree-lined path. Light posts and benches occur regularly,
making this outdoor space a gathering spot for residents. Residents of the
townhouses or walk-up apartments follow sidewalks to set-backs and indi-
vidual, recessed entry alcoves with their mail boxes. (The architects were
successful in convincing the Postal Service that units accessible from the
street deserved their own address.)
Clustered townhouses and outdoor seating invite interaction
The fact that there are no balconies at Tent City may be explained by
more than climatic considerations. Not only would the cost of balconies
have been prohibitive, but more importantly, as elements of segregated
outdoor space they would have been anachronistic at Tent City. Here, out-
door space is not regarded as personally private. Though a few of the fam-
ily townhouses have enclosed patios, generally residents who want to get
some fresh air and sunshine can do so on one of the benches along the pe-
destrian path, or in one of the two more secluded courts.
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At Tent City, the two semi-private courtyards framed by the town-
house clusters are intended to foster interaction. In the larger court, kitch-
ens of the ground floor family units are situated to offer parents the oppor-
tunity to keep an eye on their children playing. Attention to sight lines and
details such as entry alcoves and landscaped edges, gives residents a
proprietary interest in this area they share.
The stand-alone townhouses at the center of the development are
clustered around a rather small, very secluded courtyard. Though
accessible from two sides, it is virtually a secret zone for the enjoyment of
these townhouse residents. By mid-day this space serves as a sunny seating
area for some of Tent City's senior citizens. Later in the afternoon, the
space is frequently a favorite with children of Tent City riding bicycles
around the tight radius of the court's four trees. The architect did not
intend this space to serve as a playground but has learned that the seniors
and families who face into this private court tend not to mind, but rather
enjoy the opportunity to supervise the development's children.
In designing these two courtyards, the designers have attempted to
create more private worlds within the semi-private world of the inner
core. There has been no need for gates or other barriers. Each of the
courtyards is accessible to area neighbors on foot. And yet, the propri-
etary sense that resident families have about these spaces serves to discour-
age strangers from lingering.
FILLMORE CENTER
At Fillmore Center, a pedestrian footbridge crosses Geary Boulevard
east of the development, connecting residents of the Western Addition with
the Japanese Cultural and Trade Center. Long a favorite of many San
Franciscans, Japantown is considered the area's landmark. This major
mixed-use complex attracts many people from other parts of the city. A
path from the landing of the Japantown pedestrian footbridge on Webster
Street cuts diagonally through the Safeway Shopping Center and culminates
at Fillmore and O'Farrell Streets, the gateway to Fillmore Center. A sim-
ilar footbridge to the west of the development connects Kimbell and Hamil-
ton Playgrounds, two semi-private recreation areas for residents of the
Western Addition. However, equipped with its own health club and semi-
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private landscaped terrace, it remains to be seen whether residents of Fill-
more Center will make use of these public playgrounds.
As a very large development, Fillmore Center features a variety of
entry sequences. The 3-bedroom walk-up apartments facing Kimbell
Playground are stepped back along the sidewalk and feature front stoops
which serve as a transition from the public sidewalk. By contrast, the
walk-up apartments between the retail stores along Fillmore Street feature
a high flight of steps which spring abruptly from the building face. With-
out a landing at the sidewalk or a respite as they climb over 8 feet over the
ground floor retail, the entry sequence to these apartments lacks an effec-
tive transition from public sidewalk to the privacy of one's front door.
(All residents of Fillmore Center, whether in the walkups or the towers,
have their mail delivered to a central location; the developers were unable
to convince the Post Office that any of the units warranted individual ad-
dresses.)
Fillmore Center: development entrance along Eddy Street
At Fillmore Center, the variety of unit types -- from walk-ups to
tower units to roof-top penthouses -- have been designed to be secure and
private. Many units have balconies, and all the units at the podium level
have private patios screened by wood fences. Such private outdoor space,
coupled with the scarcity of seating on the podium level itself, creates an
introverted atmosphere. It is ironic that the 4-acre landscaped inner court
seems intended primarily for viewing. Unique not only in the Western
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Addition but across the city as well, in this focal point of the development
the only place where interaction is encouraged is on the lawn of the terrace
level which is restricted to residents.
At semi-public plaza level below, no lawns, few benches, and planter
walls typically over 3 feet high make lingering difficult. Neighbors of the
project are not invited to enjoy this mini-park in the center of their own
neighborhood. Though the exterior circulation zones have been deftly
separated from the street without oppressive walls and bars, if Fillmore
Center is to be the catalyst of the area's revitalization, its form does little to
embrace the neighborhood.
1 Wooding, Geoffrey; Associate/Project Manager of Tent City; Goody, Clancy &
Associates -- Architects; (interview February, 1991).
2 Chermayeff, Serge & Christopher Alexander. Community & Privacy: Toward a New
Architecture of Humanism (Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York, 1963), p.66.
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4.3 PROJECT FINANCING
Tent City and Fillmore Center, though different in many respects,
both illustrate the challenges and complications resulting from the state-of-
the-art financing of the 1980s. Public regulatory and financial incentives
play the key role in shaping these MI/MU developments. On the one hand,
rents for a percentage of the apartments are subsidized by writing down the
cost (or lease) of the land and perhaps by means of a public grant or loan.
The retail component of the projects is influenced primarily by the devel-
opment's mortgage. Whether public or private, the terms of debt financing
for mixed-income rental housing explicitly limit non-residential uses.
In the course of this section, Tent City and Fillmore Center will be
analyzed in terms of how the financing shaped first the residential compo-
nent and then the mixed-use component. The chapter will conclude with a
look at the risks and costs of involving private investors in the financing of
these projects.
Mixed-Income Component
Making any affordable housing feasible requires reducing the normal
costs of development and subsidizing a certain number of units over time
such that people of low-to-moderate income pay no more than 30% of their
income to rent. Being proposed for publicly-owned land, both Tent City
and Fillmore Center benefited from not only regulatory incentives such as
density bonuses and zoning allowances for mixed-use, but also from the
manner in which the site was sold or leased.
Where at Tent City the site is leased from the city, a combination of
federal, state, and local grants and loans have been coordinated to provide a
rental subsidy for 30 years. At Fillmore Center, by contrast, the site was
sold at a market price. Density bonuses were granted to allow more high-
rent apartments in order to cross-subsidize the affordable units. In both
instances, this combination of land disposition and rental subsidy deter-
mines the nature of the project -- and its duration as a MI/MU develop-
ment.
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Table 1
TENT CITY: SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT PRO FORMA
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
- Site Acquisition
- Construction
- Design, Surveys, etc.
- Developer's Fee
- Payments on First Mortgage
- Construction Loan Interest
- Financing Fees
- Professional Fees: Legal, Development Consulting,
Environmental Assessment, Accounting, Appraisal
- Syndication Sales Commissions
- Supplemental Mgt. & Syndication Fees
- Marketing & Rent-Up
- Taxes, Insurance during Construction
- Staff Costs, Community Sponsor
Total Development Costs
SOURCES OF FUNDS
First Mortgage (MHFA 30-year loan)(1)
Grant Funds from BRA (2)
Demolition Funds
Public Improvement Funds
Costs Paid by UIDC (3)
Eauitv Syndication Funds (4)
Total Sources of Funds
$1
$29,592,000
$1,900,000
$3,250,000
$2,150,000
$2,000,000
$1,100,000
$1,130,000
$700,000
$575,000
$300,000
$110,000
$75,000
$42,882,001
$32,159,000
$130,000
$543,000
$50,000
$1 0.000.000
$42,882,000
1. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
2. Boston Redevelopment Authority. It also assembled the site and leased it to the
developer for 99 years for $1 per year.
3. JMB/Urban Investment & Development Company, developer of the adjacent
Copley Place, paid some of the costs of demolishing structures prior to construc-
tion of Tent City.
4. Equity Syndication funds are raised through the sale of limited partnership inter-
ests in the project.
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The first factor affecting the term of the projects' affordability is the
manner in which the land is conveyed to the developer. At Tent City, the
BRA structured a unique land lease to serve TCC and UIDC -- as well as
the Authority itself. In 1985, TCC was granted surface and air rights by
the BRA in order to develop the housing. At the same time, the BRA
granted below-grade development rights to UIDC to build the garage by
trading other UIDC interest in the site for development rights to another
nearby site. Both TCC and UIDC signed a 99-year land lease that locks in
affordability requirements.
The BRA's preference to lease its land rather than to sell it outright is
reflective of the relative autonomy of the Authority. Wholly self-suffi-
cient, the BRA in recent years has been a major influence in virtually all
development across the city. As the city planning body as well as the city's
redevelopment arm, the Authority has been able to shape land use policy by
encouraging development on key sites, linking the interests of one project
to those of another -- sometimes across town. By maintaining control over
the Tent City site, the BRA can continue to exercise influence by preserv-
ing and protecting the affordability of 75% of Tent City's apartments in
perpetuity.
The SFRA finds itself in a much different position. As revealed in
the case study, the Agency co-exists with the City Planning Department and
The Mayor's Office of Housing. During the 1950s and 1960s, in the hey-
day of urban renewal, the SFRA was a powerful, free-wheeling body,
largely dependent on funding from Washington and thus detached from the
vagaries of the local political scene. But with the federal retreat in the late
1970s and early 1980s, the Agency had to rely on less federal money -- and
it had to compete among newly-formed community development corpora-
tions for that which was left. As a result, the SFRA felt a growing need to
sell many of its sites simply to maintain itself. Such was the case by the
mid-1980s when Agency Executive Director Wilbur Hamilton recom-
mended to the redevelopment board that the 9-acre Fillmore Center site be
sold for $9,000,000 ($23.10 per square foot) -- determined to be the pro-
perty's fair reuse value.1
The terms of the land disposition agreement are clear about the
income qualifications for the 20% low-to-moderate income units (not more
135
Table 2
FILLMORE CENTER: DEVELOPMENT PRO FORMA
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
- Site Acquisition
- Construction Costs
- Professional Fees: Design, Engineering, Legal,
Accounting, Retail Lease Commissions
. Financing Fees:
Construction Loan
Fannie Mae Take Out (1)
Underwriters Fees (2)
Miscellaneous Fees
- Interest Expense
Construction Loan thru June 1992
Issue "F"(3)
- Building Permits, Inspections & Utility Fees
- Taxes, Closing Costs, & Insurance
- Developer overhead and misc. charges
- Residential Marketing Costs
- ProDertv Management Start Un
Total Development Costs
$9,008,000
$157,100,000
$9,415,000
$1,412,500
$2,102,300
$ 5,760,000
$4,204,500
$28,639,694
$1,250,000
$3,215,000
$2,412,000
$3,895,000
$2,400,000
$600,000
$231,413,994
SOURCES OF FUNDS
Construction Loan (Citicorp)
Issue "F" Loan
New Loans - "Bank Group" (14 add'l lenders)
Net Rental Income during Construction(4)
Integrated Resources Capital Contribution
Sale of Issue "F" bonds and Misc. Income
Hedge Proceeds Received(5)
Develoner Funds
Total Sources of Funds
$95,000,000
$31,000,000
$81,230,000
$14,520,332
$5,500,000
$1,782,000
$1,340,000
$740,000
$231,112,332 (6)
1. The Federal Mortgage Insurance Agency is commonly known as Fannie Mae;
2. Underwriters for Issue "F" and Issue "A" bonds (see 3.);
3. Issue "F" is a tax-exempt, non-rated "junk bond" issued as a Second Mortgage;
4. Income has been received from completed portions of the project;
5. FCA has recovered this much of the interest ceiling hedge required by new lenders;
6. As of January, 1991, this Pro Forma projected a $301,662 deficiency over costs.
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than 80% of area median income) and the 30% "affordable" units (not
more than 150% of area median income). But what is also clear is the
developer's intention to design and construct the residential units for
possible resale as condominium units upon expiration of the project period
-- 10 years from the point of 50% occupancy. At this point the Agency
reserves the right to buy 20% of the units at a 20% discount to preserve
low-income residency. The developer will also offer to sell the units to
existing tenants at a 10% discount, will provide moving expenses to those
who do not buy, and will provide lifetime leases for the elderly (those
tenants at least 62 years old).2 But ultimately, the SFRA's influence over
the fate of this large site is negligible.
At this writing, in exchange for issuing an additional $24 million
bond to help cover cost overruns, the SFRA is considering requiring that
half of the units slated for "low-to-moderate" income people actually be
available to those with incomes less than 50% of the area median -- meant
to rectify the concern that the truly needy were cut out by the terms of the
initial mortgage revenue bonds. Thus, not so much by design as by virtue
of unfortunate financial circumstances, the Agency may have an opportun-
ity to exercise influence over the use of the site -- at least until the project
term expires.3
The second factor affecting the projects' affordability is the subsidy
to below market-rate units. With apparently no write down of the land
cost, the only land use concession the SFRA had at its disposal in encour-
aging a mixed-income development was density. Despite the fact that
nearly half of the site is reserved for open space, at 124 units per acre
Fillmore Center is the most dense development in the neighborhood, on par
with similar projects downtown. The developer proposed 1,113 units
because given the nature of the mortgage revenue bond program (ie: that 1
in 5 units must be reserved for low-to-moderate income households), to
build fewer units would jeopardize the cross subsidy built into the rent
structure. Given that the higher rents of the market-rate units help offset
the losses incurred by the low-to-moderate income units, the developer's
proposal was meant to insure the project's economic viability -- and a
reasonable profit.
While the record at Fillmore Center is relatively new, concerns about
compliance to the spirit of the bond program have already arisen. Because
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under the terms of the initial bond issue the developers were under no
obligation to accept them, Section 8 holders were turned away when rent-
up began. The developers pointed out that they were not required to accept
applications from prospective tenants with incomes less than 50% of the
area median. But because other similar projects in the city had consistently
misrepresented the fact that low-to-moderate income units were available,
suspicions about the intentions of the private developers at Fillmore Center
have been exacerbated.
Patterned at least in part after Presidential Towers in Chicago's West
Side redevelopment area, Fillmore Center has become a target of afford-
able housing advocates wary of private developers. At Presidential Tow-
ers, despite benefiting from a tremendous discount on the land price and an
underhanded waiver of the affordability provisions for 20% of the devel-
opment's units, the project defaulted in 1990 when its occupancy rate fell
below 90%.4 HUD's agreement to pay off the project's mortgage, making
Presidential Towers the largest claim ever made against the federal govern-
ment's multi-family mortgage insurance fund, focused the debate on the
public costs of private folly. 5
Indeed, critics of Fillmore Center question whether the risks of the
project will ultimately rest with its private owners. The developers were
largely taken at their word when they proposed that with 1,113 units they
would be able to maintain 20% of the units for people of low-to-moderate
income. There is nothing to preclude the developer from selecting tenants
from the upper ranges of each income tier except periodic pressure from
the SFRA to meet affirmative marketing requirements. Should debt ser-
vice and maintenance costs begin to exceed income, the developer may well
default.
But the fact that the mortgage is federally-insured makes it unlikely
the government will allow such an enormous project to fail. With this
safety net, the developer's incentive to minimize the risks of cross subsidy
rests in self-interest, not in making the project truly affordable to those in
need. By pre-1986 law (under which Fillmore Center was developed), an
applicant whose income is determined to meet the low-to-moderate income
classification is never again questioned.
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The rental subsidy stream at Tent City also amounts to a major pub-
lic investment, but here the monitoring of the affordability goals is explicit.
The project enjoys four significant rent subsidies from federal, state, and
local government. First, under the Federal Section 8 and State Chapter 707
rental assistance programs, the project receives a subsidy for low-income
tenants equal to the difference between 25 to 30 percent of a tenant's in-
come and the government-calculated fair market rent.6
Secondly, the BRA's Neighborhood Development Fund (NDF),
created from the repayment to the city of the Copley Place UDAG loan,
allots an average of $1 million a year to Tent City in a declining balance
for a period of 30 years. The payments, made monthly, provide long-term
rental assistance for housing costs of low-to-moderate income residents.
The NDF funds are a loan to the project by the city and are expected to be
repaid starting in 30 years after the MHFA First Mortgage is amortized. 7
Finally, the MHFA's State Housing Rental Assistance Program
(SHARP) provides the project with approximately $865,000 annually in the
form of a loan. The program allows repayment to be recycled back into
the project when such recycling will clearly benefit low- and moderate-
income tenants.8 Lately, however, the SHARP program's weaknesses have
come to light. Experience of the last several years has shown that the
growth rates on which the SHARP program is predicated are not being
achieved today. Without some self-adjusting mechanism, affordable hous-
ing projects dependent upon state assistance can find projected cash flow
scenarios completely untenable after only a few tough years. To the extent
that Tent City can accommodate a down-turn (by virtue of its 50% A-B-C-
D moderate-income tier), it becomes a more stable environment for people
who might otherwise be forced to move out.
These four crucial rental subsidies are carefully coordinated to allow
not only for income fluctuations and a certain amount of market depres-
sion, but they are also designed to maximize the opportunity for TCC to
exercise its option to- purchase the development in when the SHARP subsidy
terminates in Year 15. At that point, the NDF stream (that has been declin-
ing over time) suddenly more than doubles and remains high through the
20th year when its balloon interest payment is due. In addition, at the criti-
cal juncture in Year 16, the Second BRA Loan of $10.3 million commences
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presumably to give the non-profit sponsor-turned-owner some room to
prepare for the balloon interest payment.
Non-Residential Component
As described in 1.3 Strategies for Development, the terrs of govern-
ment-backed bond issues and tax-exempt financing stipulate that only 10%
of the mortgage proceeds can go toward non-residential uses. (Since 1986
this has been further limited to just 5%). This serves to discourage mixed-
use, whether retail/commercial space or community service offices and
multi-purpose meeting rooms. Of course, a developer is free to seek out
private financing for a more extensive mixed-use component, but usually
arranging for more than a single underwriter in the mortgage of a MI/MU
project is difficult. Consequently, the search for debt financing was the
critical step in defining the functional diversity of Tent City and Fillmore
Center.
Tent City is fundamentally distinguished from Fillmore Center by the
fact that its lending source is public. As the project proposal came together
in 1984, it was clear that the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
(MHFA) was the wisest choice for both the construction loan and perma-
nent financing. MHFA is in the business to support such mixed-income
environments: since its inception in 1969, the agency had assisted in the
production of over 50,000 apartments of various income levels state-wide.
Funds for its loan programs were raised through the sale of bonds to
private investors; proceeds were typically loaned to non-profit and limited-
profit developers who agreed to create rental housing according to strin-
gent Agency guidelines. 9
Furthermore, Tent City Corporation's (TCC) goals of income mixing
aligned perfectly with those of the MHFA. The Agency typically required
20 to 25% of its units to be affordable to people of low-income and that
moderate and middle-income households also be accommodated; TCC
envision a community comprised of 25% low-income and 50% moderate-
income households, and the balance with no income limitations. In
addition, as long as the housing and retail components could stand alone in
a project's Pro Forma, mixed-use was regarded by the MHFA as an impor-
140
tant vehicle by which projects in key areas could enhance local economic
vitality.' 0
Necessary construction and take-out financing was secured at Tent
City, then, because there was a "good fit" between the non-profit's proposal
and the Agency's mandate. It was a perfect example of clearly articulated
community goals coinciding with well-defined, proven public policy. The
MHFA initially agreed to lend $28.6 million in a combined construction
loan and 30-year mortgage. When Aetna Life Insurance failed to provide a
$3 million piece of the financing, the Agency stepped in and upped its
commitment of $32 million.11
In addition, the BRA, once hesitant to embrace the idea of a mixed-
income community on the site, now came through with a subsidy stream
known as the Neighborhood Development Fund (NDF) -- a result of the
payback on the Copley Square UDAG. The BRA pledged a $20.7 million
non-recourse loan to be made in annual disbursements. This BRA loan
actually constitutes a second mortgage on the project. (A Second BRA
Loan of $10.3 million will commence at the 18th year -- construction plus
15 years operations -- and is intended to assist Tent City Corporation
should it exercise its option to purchase the development in Year 16.)
Finally, the MHFA's SHARP subsidy stream is also considered a loan and
constitutes the Third Mortgage of the project. 12 The second and third
mortgages allow for payment to be plowed back into the project as long as
the affordability requirements are maintained.
The MHFA allowed 10% of the proceeds from the First Mortgage to
finance the development of the ground floor retail space. The multi-
purpose room and entry lobby qualified as "integral" to the residential
component and, under an exception to the bond requirements, were
financed out of the proceeds reserved for residential development.13
Table 3, based upon cash flow extrapolated from actual returns for
the first 3 years, shows that, at best, the non-residential component amounts
to only 8% of the residential rental income, 4% if the public rental subsid-
ies are included as income. It is unlikely that the retail component would
ever be able to subsidize the residential component. On the other hand,
should the retail component falter, the MHFA, per its policy on MI/MU
projects, has required TCC to post a letter of credit (amounting to 4% of
the mortgage amount) to insulate the residential component.14
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Table 3
TENT CITY: CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS*
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
(1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992)
INCOME
Gross Rents(+5% from yr 4) $1,473,173 $2,343,993 $2,392,229 $2,465,944 $2,589,241
-vacancy(varies)&bad debts $132.018 S46.639_ 48.96_ 4S61909 S90.623
Effective Net Rent $1,341,155 $2,297,354 $2,343,265 $2,404,035 $2,498,618
Retail Space Income $27,034 $182,006 $185,007 $231,372 $237,156
Parking & Laundry Income $54,281 $174,471 $167,535 $172,406 $175,854
other inc.(excess rents, int) S142.392 S144.302 S158.206 3149.396 S150.896
Totai Operating income $1,564,862 $2,798,133 $2,845,203 $2,957,209 $3,062,524
SHARP subsidy $628,206 $803,105 $730,232 $791,376 $766,134
NDF (UDAG repayment) S864.577 S875.924 $1.197.315 11.221.959 $1.170.768
TOTAL hVCOW $3,057,744 $4,477,162 $4,772,750 $4,970,544 $4,999,426
EXPENSES
Administration (incl. mgt.) $259,475 $378,626 $351,990 $391,676 $411,260
Operating Expenees $199,825 $367,516 $330,803 $355,000 $372,750
Maintenance $160,342 $315,842 $331,724 $390,000 $409,500
Taxes & Insurance $130,410 $188,498 $188,789 $207,864 $209,943
Parking Lease/Laundry S18.128 319.7690 S21.53L8 23476 S25.589
TOTAL CTSOFOPERT47 S $768,180 $1,270,242 $1,224,844 $1,368,016 $1,429,042
N Q 0 $2,289,564 $3,206,920 $3,547,906 $3,602,528 $3,570,385
Fin. Expenses (debt service) $2,537,875 $3,041,763 $3,253,830 $3,306,864 $3,377,386
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW ($248,311) $165,157 $294,076 $295,664 $192,999
* based upon extrapolating actual returns and debt service 1988-1990
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Fillmore Center, by contrast, features a lending patchwork of private
institutions. In shopping for a lender in 1984-85, developer Donald
Tishman could find no local banks interested in his major proposal for the
Western Addition. While the SFRA agreed to issue a $95 million mortgage
revenue bond for the development, Tishman had to go to Citicorp in New
York to secure a construction loan. At the completion of construction,
originally scheduled at 48 months from the time of the bond issuance, the
bond would become a 30-year First Mortgage backed by Fannie Mae.1 5
In addition to Citicorp, four other banks -- again, none of them local
-- hold an interest in the project's First Mortgage: Bank of Nova Scotia,
Dai Ichi Congo Bank, Sanwa Bank, and Sumitomo Trust. Through the
course of construction delays, three changes of ownership, and three
refinancings, 14 more banks have become involved in the project in addi-
tional loans totalling $71 million. (Only two of these additional lending
institutions, Security Pacific and Home Savings, are local.) These new
bank groups bring the total number of privately-held mortgages to five.16
Whereas the public patchwork of Tent City is characterized by a
coordinated strategy, the private patchwork at Fillmore Center is more
disparate, members being brought in at various phases of the project's
difficult history -- sometimes at the insistence of earlier lenders. Without
the support of the large local banks, FCA has had to court a myriad of
outside institutions, many of them foreign. The developer recalls taking
Japanese bankers on a walk through the Western Addition hoping to
convince them of the saliency of the development -- and of the surrounding
area. 17
Unfamiliar with the context, banks from outside the area became
increasingly wary as news of cost overruns became apparent. Moreover,
as many of these banks were making unprecedented commitments to real
estate development, they were concerned that the returns for the MI/MU
project compare favorably with market-rate developments. But socially
beneficial dimensions of MI/MU projects do no necessarily enhance the
profitability of such investments -- from the perspective of the private
lender the mixing of race and income groups actually adds to the risks.
The estimated operating budget for the completed Fillmore Center
illustrates the debilitating effect of having to involve so many lenders in the
project. As Table 4 shows, even in a best case scenario (ie: a rental occu-
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Table 4
FILLMORE CENTER
ESTIMATED OPERATING BUDGET*
INCOME
- Residential Income $16,000,000
- Retail/Commercial Income (incl. Health Club) $2,000,000
Total Income $18,000,000
EXPENSES
- Administration (incl. management)
- Operating Expenses
- Maintenance
- Taxes & Insurance
Total Expenses $6,000,000
NET OPERATING INCOME $12,000,000
DEBT SERVICE (five mortgages) $20,000,000
CASH FLOW/DEFICIT ** -$8,000,000
* source: estimated based upon extrapolation of rent projections and interview
with T. Numainville, Chief Financial Officer, FCA;
** estimated for at least the first ten years of operations.
pancy over 95% and fully-leased retail space), the project will lose as much
as $8,000,000 per year due to the high cost of its loans. Overburdened by
debt, the developer projects that it may be as long as 12 years before the
project breaks even. 18
Like Tent City, funding for the mixed-use component at Fillmore
Center was limited to 10% of the initial bond issue and 5% of the post-
1986 bond known as Issue "F" (and described in the following section).
This funding allowed for 73,000 square feet of retail/commercial space
including the two day school sites. But unlike Tent City, Fillmore Center
was unable to take advantage of exceptions allowing residential money to
be used where such uses serve residents directly and are functionally inte-
grated with the housing. In the case of the Community Center, because it is
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located across the street from the development it could not qualify. The
Health Club might have qualified had the developers not opened it up to
outside membership. 19
In struggling to work out its massive debt, and with its retail compo-
nent contributing at best only 10% as much as its rental income, Fillmore
Center's viability in the early years will depend upon an extremely high
occupancy rate.
Risks of Private Investment
Finally, with the dramatic decline in federally subsidized housing,
developers seeking funding for low-income housing have been turning to
state and local programs. But while such programs often help make the
construction of low-income projects feasible, it is generally not enough to
provide a deep and lasting rental subsidy. For this developers have had to
rely on partnerships with private investors in the form of equity syndica-
tion. Here the tax losses of a low-income housing project are sold to
private individuals or corporations to offset their other income. But the
costs and risks to the low-income housing developer can be significant.
Originally, Tishman had expected to raise some $20 million in equity
for Fillmore Center through a syndication in 1986. When the Tax Reform
Act of that year effectively precluded this strategy, Tishman convinced the
SFRA to allow him to structure the equity in the form of additional debt.
Dean Whitter Reynolds was credited with devising a tax-exempt, non-rated
"junk" bond that could function as a Second Mortgage on the project.
Known as Issue "F", the $33 million bond scheme was hailed by industry
analysts as "a triumph of innovation".20
Nevertheless, at Citicorp's insistence, Tishman also had to find a
source of genuine equity. He struck a deal with Integrated Resources, Inc.,
of New York, an established syndicator. Initially Integrated Resources had
agreed to raise $11 million in equity that, after fees and commissions,
would yield $7.5 million for Fillmore Center. In the end, only $5.5 mil-
lion was provided.21 Though Integrated Resources became the managing
general partner of Fillmore Center, by the Fall of 1988 its high-risk trad-
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ing practices came under fire in the course of a Securities and Exchange
Commission investigation of several well-known Wall Street investment
brokerage houses.22 A year later, anticipating failure, the SFRA insisted
ties with the syndicator be severed. By February 1990, Integrated Re-
sources had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.23
Soon after, Integrated Resources sold 1.05% to the three individuals
who became Fillmore Center Associates (FCA). In so doing, "Integrated
Syndicated Partners" released its rights and liability as managing general
partner to FCA, though the project is still 96.5%-owned by the Integrated
Resources private investors. (The balance, or 1.7%, is owned by Don
Tishman, the original developer cut out earlier when Integrated Resources
managed the second refinancing.) 24
In addition to the high costs of the equity syndication, it is in the best
interest of the private investors at Fillmore Center to sell the project at the
end of the 10-year affordability term. Whether market-rate rentals or con-
verted to condominiums, the goal of the equity partners is to make a
healthy return on their investment. The interests of low-and-moderate in-
come tenants are temporal despite the SFRA's stipulation that the afford-
able units be offered at a 20% discount.
Tent City was coming on line at about the same time as Fillmore
Center. In early 1985, an equity syndication offering was made and was
one-third subscribed when the uncertainty surrounding the congressional
debate over national tax reform threatened the expected tax shelter benefits
of the project. The offering was withdrawn. Yet at the beginning of
December, 1986, the equity syndication offering was made again -- this
time under the terms of the new Tax Reform Act's transition rules. A
"relief period" of 7 years was available whereby investors could take ad-
vantage of tax losses and at the same time depreciate the project according
to the accelerated schedule of the old law. The $10 million offering, which
called for 100 limited partner investors to invest $100,000 each over 7
years sold out in two weeks.25
Proceeds from the $10 million syndication helped the project pay its
development and management fees, make payments on the first mortgage,
and pay for certain construction costs. Investors can take advantage of the
project's tax losses, have a stake in any extraordinary retail income, and, at
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the end of the 15-year term, are entitled to the appreciation in the 67
market-rate units.26
TCC retains the option to purchase the development after 15 years at
the higher of either A) the then-appraised Fair Market Value of the 202
Low and Moderate Income Units plus the Fair Market Value of the unre-
stricted 67 Market Rate units; or B) $58,000,000 (the outstanding debt on
the affordable units) plus the Fair Market Value of the 67 unrestricted
Market Rate units -- but less the outstanding debt of $63,300,000 it would
be able to assume. Thus, while private investors provided the equity
essential to the development of the project, they remain subordinate to
TCC, the managing general partner. Even if TCC did not exercise its
option to purchase the development, terms of the MHFA mortgage and
BRA ground lease would prevent a private owner from converting the
project to market-rate rental or condominiums). 27
Nonetheless, creative financing schemes meant to involve private in-
vestors in the development of low-income housing are considered dubious
by many affordable housing advocates. They cite the inefficiency resulting
from the difference between the cost of the tax credit to the federal gov-
ernment (in terms of forgone revenues) and the amount of actual equity
raised from the sale of the tax credit. In addition, as the Integrated Re-
sources equity syndication at Fillmore Center (and to a lesser extent Tent
City's syndication offering) shows, a large amount of gross equity raised
from the sale of the tax credit actually goes to pay syndication costs -- it is
never invested in housing. Moreover, the costs and creative energy in-
volved in arranging a patchwork financing scheme involving 5 or more
separate financing sources (at Fillmore Center, over 25) are very high and
often not explicitly reflected in development pro formas. 28
As a catalyst for the development of low-income housing, the low-in-
come tax credit has been predicated on scenarios of low construction costs
coupled with rising income level. This may have been true in the south-
west up until recently, but it is exactly opposite of the need exhibited in
central cities. Instead of focusing on the pressing housing needs of the low-
to-moderate income inner city population, new tax credit requirements
focus on saving the federal government money. Public/ private partner-
ships have been encouraged by federal policy not so much because they
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"are inherently more efficient or sensitive to client needs, but because they
are vehicles for both limiting federal expenditures and leveraging federal
funds." 29
The fact is that in the wake of the federal retreat, the growing de-
mand for rental housing for low-to-moderate income households is out-
stripping the capabilities of state and local entities. Community-based non-
profit organizations, while solely able to offer the low-income tax credit,
face serious risks which ultimately can jeopardize the organizations them-
selves. A restored federal presence in the financing and development of
affordable housing need not pre-empt state and local efforts, but can ac-
tually reinforce them and provide direction while also attracting private
capital and expertise. National programs such as the Enterprise Founda-
tion, the Local Initiative Support Corporation (LISC), and the new Nation-
al Equity Fund (created by LISC), provide excellent examples of how pri-
vate and public resources can be joined to support locally-based affordable
housing initiatives.
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4.4 PROPERTY MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS
In some respects, the tenant selection process and management of Tent
City and Fillmore Center are similar. With regard to marketing and in-
come recertification, however, there are important distinctions which will
be identified. And though each development includes some degree of ten-
ant participation today, neither Tent City nor Fillmore Center features the
kind of tenant involvement in management meant to transfer responsibili-
ties to the residents.
The premise of this analysis is that MI/MU developments are distinct
from traditional market-rate or public housing projects. As functionally
complex environments which propose to integrate people of diverse eco-
nomic and racial backgrounds, mixed-income/mixed-use developments
require a special kind of tenant. In more homogeneous, isolated environ-
ments tenants might be less willing or less able to work toward integration.
But because a key measure of success in the MI/MU development is the de-
gree to which neighbors interact and build connections, residents of such
projects must do more than simply meet an income requirement. There is
a distinction to be drawn between eligibility and suitability: those who are
most suitable to the MI/MU context are cognizant of the special challenges
of income mixing and committed to participating in the building of com-
munity.
This analysis will concentrate on four aspects of the case studies'
property management: Tenant Marketing & Selection; The Mixed-
Use Component; Maintenance & Security; and Tenant Participa-
tion. Respective policies, practices, or plans of Tent City and Fillmore
Center will be compared and contrasted. The analysis will conclude on the
subject of collective ownership.
Before beginning the analysis, a brief description of the management
arms of each development is in order. Property Management at Tent City
is provided by The Community Builders (TCB) on a 3-year negotiated con-
tract basis. Begun as a two-person community-based organization in the
South End in 1964, today TCB has a staff of over 170 and has created over
6,000 homes as well as workplaces for low-to-moderate income families,
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the elderly, and the handicapped. In addition to residential development
services including assembling financing, TCB provides property manage-
ment and legal services for community-base non-profit organizations.
TCB acted as the development consultant to Tent City beginning in 1984.1
At Tent City, TCB's management team consists of three people: the
manager, an assistant manager, and an administrative assistant.2
At Fillmore Center, the developer, Fillmore Center Associates
(FCA), provides on-site management. The management team was
assembled to manage Fillmore Center only -- FCA owns and manages no
other properties. FCA management is comprised of a director, 6 leasing
agents, and two administrators. One administrator concentrates on
paperwork required by the redevelopment authority; the other, a "move-
in" coordinator, is responsible for seeing that units are prepared for the
arrival of new tenants. 3
Both Tent City and Fillmore Center have employed outside leasing
agents to lease the projects' retail/commercial space. There are two rea-
sons for this. First, the non-residential component requires special exper-
tise to market effectively; on-site staff concentrate on managing residential
tenant selection, rental income, and overall project maintenance. Secondly,
and most importantly, the income stream from the lease space is typically
separated from that of the residential component as required by the terms
of the projects' bond financing. In neither project was the lease space con-
ceived for direct tenant involvement (ie: in an ownership role). While
functionally integrated with the housing, the retail/commercial component
is considered by management in each case as being subordinate to the hous-
ing.
Tenant Marketing & Selection
The history of assisted housing in this country has been profoundly
influenced by the struggle between national objectives and local discretion.
Perhaps no where has this struggle been more pronounced than in the
tenant selection process of public housing. The challenges of finding
housing for the neediest at the local level has sometimes run counter to the
federal objective of achieving broad objectives such as racial desegrega-
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Resolving two conflicting goals of regulatory justice has typically
fallen on local bureaucrats: equity (treating like cases alike on the basis of
clear rules) and responsiveness (making exceptions for persons whose
needs require the stretching of the rules). On the one hand, rule-oriented
bureaucracies have been seen as inhuman, faceless, and unresponsive; on
the other hand, sometimes too much local discretion has caused some
applicants to be treated unfairly -- thus undermining policy goals.5
Similarly, the challenge in mixed-income housing is to resolve the
broad inclusionary provisions of government regulatory and financial in-
centives with the challenge of addressing local need. In the tenant selection
process, project managers play the pivotal role in striking a balance be-
tween responsiveness (to the goals of fostering a sense of community) on
the one hand and equity (impartiality with regard to income criteria) on the
other. Within legal limits, the discretion of these managers is crucial to
creating a tenant mix that can indeed result in the building of community.
Both Tent City and Fillmore Center have strategies for attracting
market-rate renters that are distinct from techniques used to find people of
moderate- or low-income. Opening in a strong economy, Tent City found
listing available market-rate units in the Boston Globe to be expedient. In
addition, word-of-mouth played an important role in initial rent-up. With
the recent downturn in the regional economy, renting of at least two vacat-
ed market-rate units has involved a local leasing agent.6
For Tent City's low-income units, for which holders of federal Sec-
tion 8 and state Chapter 707 certificates are eligible, the Boston Housing
Authority maintains a waiting list from which Tent City management
draws. For the 50% moderate-income tier, Tent City maintains its own
waiting list; now numbering over 300 applicants, the waiting list has been
closed. While units are available for the elderly and the physically handi-
capped, Tent City has not had to aggressively market these units. In cases
where there has been a turnover in such units, TCB has gone to the Hous-
ing Authority with a specific request, or has tried to fill a unit by contact-
ing handicap support groups or outreach programs. 7
The information packet presented to prospective tenants is explicit
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about how the development began and what it aspires to be:
In 1968, a diverse group of South End residents set up tents on an
overgrown parking lot in a dramatic protest against the City of
Boston's failure to replace dozens of brick townhouses demolished
years earlier under Urban Renewal. The residents called their camp
site TENT CITY.. .If you want to experience the best of Boston, we
invite you to become a resident of TENT CITY and share the satis-
faction of living in a community that cares.8
All prospective Tent City tenants are interviewed on site. For low-
income applicants, the selection process entails a review of one's rental
history and credit rating (if possible); TCB does not make home visits of
the low-income tenants. Incomes for all low- and moderate-income tenants
must be recertified annually as required by the MHFA and BRA rental
subsidies. 9
As mentioned in the case study, it has come as a surprise to TCB and
the TCC board that so many college students would be attracted to Tent
City. It is estimated that over 30 college students live at the development
and pay market-rate rents. While some of the 4-bedroom townhouses are
occupied by students, there has been no talk of reserving such units for
families (many of whom are low-income). Not only is such a policy legal-
ly dubious, but it would also run counter to the TCC board's goal of main-
taining income stratification across the various unit types. 10
At Fillmore Center, marketing of the market-rate units consists of
listing available apartments in the San Francisco Chronicle and San Fran-
cisco Examiner. Other techniques -- such as listings in magazines and
mailers -- have typically not been successful, though to encourage full rent-
up, FCA has a policy whereby any resident whose referral brings in a new
tenant, will receive $100.11 The SFRA expressed concern at one point that
Fillmore Center marketing was misleading. Promotional brochures trum-
peted the development's many amenities and conveniences, while using only
Caucasian models. One such brochure, entitled "Blueprint for the Good
Life", describes the project's attributes:
Welcome to San Francisco's newest neighborhood... .And in this
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neighborhood renting a video, shopping for gourmet treats, even
picking up your dry cleaning, is as easy as running down stairs.
We designed it that way because we understand the needs of your
lifestyle.... It's good to know that even concierge and maid service
are available should you want them. And we've added other ameni-
ties you generally find at the most expensive buildings, like park-
ing and triple point security -- in the garage, at the elevators and
at your apartment. Your peace of mind is important.12
Today, FCA claims an affirmative marketing strategy -- in addition to
using multi-racial models in brochures, apartments are listed in Black
periodicals and 50% of the leasing staff is African American.13
As for the 20% low-to-moderate income units, FCA maintains its own
waiting list. Concerns about Fillmore Center have centered around the fact
that Section 8 certificate holders were not considered eligible by manage-
ment. Thresholds less than 80% of area median income were regarded by
the developers as "very low income" and therefore not part of the original
objectives of the bond program.
At this writing, as the San Francisco Board of Supervisors considers
approving an additional $24 million bond issue to cover the latest project
cost overruns, the debate over Section 8 eligibility has resumed. The de-
velopers maintain they are philosophically opposed to such a move: "It's
contrary to good planning. There are too many good subsidy units around
[Fillmore Center]. The original planners envisioned a shallow subsidy in
order to attract the middle class."14 Nonetheless, community pressure and
SFRA leverage are intent upon revising the earlier policy.
FCA management conducts interviews of prospective tenants at the
on-site leasing office, though for low-to-moderate income prospects, it was
decided recently that home visits might be required as well. In addition to
rent paying history, asset limits must be verified as per SFRA's require-
ments. Incomes are verified for low-to-moderate and "affordable" (less
than 150% of median) prospective tenants only at the time of application --
not yearly. So if, for example, a low income tenant's income were to in-
crease beyond 80% of median income, that unit would effectively be lost
from the low-to-moderate income tier until the tenant changes units or
moves out altogether.15
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Non-Residential Component
Given some of the special marketing requirements of managing the
rental component, one might expect that the retail/ commercial component
of a mixed-income environment would also have some special characteris-
tics. For instance, because the residents are not made up of one economic
group, and in fact may be diverse ethnically, it might seem reasonable to
expect different businesses would cater to different tastes. Management, in
other words, would do more than simply display a "For Lease" sign, but
might actively recruit types of business that serve the needs or desires of
specific groups of people.
Or, to the extent that mixed-income/mixed-use developments are in-
tended to provide opportunities for neighborhood entrepreneurs and serve
as focal points of community economic development, it might be reason-
able to expect management to encourage minority- or women-owned busi-
ness enterprises. In one recent development in Oakland's Chinatown, the
local community development corporation established a priority for the
project's ground floor retail: space would be made available for local mer-
chants in areas as small as 400 square feet (ie: a 20' x 20' space). Such
flexibility is intended to provide small business enterprises with "incuba-
tor" space in which to get started. 16
To a certain extent, the experience at both Tent City and Fillmore
Center reflects a consciousness of such concerns, but, in practice, it seems
the priority of simply finding a rent-paying business has been the more
significant determinant of the projects' mixed-use character. Lease-up, in
short, has been guided by the "wisdom" of the marketplace rather than by
idealistic notions of community economic development.
At Tent City goals for the non-residential component were alluded to
generally in the Fundamental Principals for Development. It was actually
in the debate among TCC board members during the project's design phase
that specific plans for the retail/commer-cial space were shaped. It had
been hoped that South End minority- and women-owned businesses could
locate at Tent City.
The board did not think it took a "rocket scientist" to see the need for
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a convenience store on the site, and indeed, the minority-owned market be-
came the first business to open at Tent City. The board later signed the dry
cleaners and eyeglass center, also minority-owned. But meeting these goals
was more the result of a wait-and-see attitude than an aggressive marketing
strategy. Eventually the bank ATM lobby and the non-minority owned
clothier/cafe took up the prime corner along the Southwest Corridor and
Dartmouth Street because no other viable minority business proposals were
received.
At Fillmore Center, as of this writing, about one-quarter of the
73,000 square foot retail/ commercial space is leased up. Uses to date
include the two Montessori School sites, the concierge, flower shop, dry
cleaner, and the women's clothing store. New prospects include a news-
stand, travel agency, a delicatessen, a restaurant, and an insurance com-
pany. Like Tent City, the developers of Fillmore Center intend to promote
minority- or female-owned businesses. Overall, FCA has a goal that be-
tween 25% and 30% of all the businesses will be minority owned. (Of the
20,000 square feet leased so far, approximately 75% of the businesses are
minority- or women-owned.) 17
Because proportionally the retail/commercial component of Fillmore
Center is larger than that at Tent City, the notion that management might
play a direct role in attracting businesses that appeal to various resident or
neighborhood groups is more relevant. To be sure, certain services have
been attracted to live up to the promotions of "creature comforts" referred
to in the development's promotional brochures. Presumably, in addition to
the concierge service and dry cleaners, the newsstand, delicatessen, and tra-
vel agency are meant to appeal primarily to the well-paid urban profession-
als the developers hope to entice.
The Safeway shopping center across the street, features, among other
small establishments, a family discount shoe store and fried chicken fran-
chise. Recently, Webster Tower signed a video rental store and a family
restaurant. The Fillmore Center developer has indicated that they are try-
ing to sign a "ribs" restaurant -- presumably to meet a demand that could
be provided by both the new development and the existing neighborhood.
It remains to be seen how new businesses along Fillmore Street will do, but
it is clear that to survive they will have to appeal to more than just the resi-
dents of Fillmore Center. Shoppers from surrounding neighborhoods who
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drive to the Safeway Shopping Center will have to venture beyond the
shopping center to Fillmore Street in order to patronize the new businesses.
Maintenance & Security
Good management promotes sound maintenance practice which en-
sures resident satisfaction, resulting in fewer vacancies and a lower turn-
over rate. This, in turn, allows more money to go into debt service and
operating expenses, which, to complete this reinforcing cycle, lead to sound
maintenance practice. 18 Both cases under consideration here demonstrate a
commitment to this policy. Tent City has a full-time, non-union mainte-
nance force of seven, including two women, and one on-site person.
Others are hired on a contract basis to handle large maintenance and repair
jobs.1 9 At Fillmore Center, a full-time maintenance crew of 11 includes a
chief engineer, 4 journey-men engineers, and 6 janitors. As part of an
agreement the developer made with the city and the local labor council for
project approval, the Fillmore Center maintenance crew is unionized.20
If maintenance entails so many different levels of skill, one wonders
if, as part of assuming some management responsibility, the residents of
Tent City and Fillmore Center might begin to take a role in project upkeep.
One might expect that unskilled and semi-skilled jobs would be an ideal
source of employment or even job training for capable low-income tenants
-- and would go far in promoting a sense of responsibility and pride among
community residents. Current policy at both developments do not allow
this. At Fillmore Center, the agreement to go with outside union labor is a
barrier to residents. Similarly at Tent City, while not union, members of
the current maintenance crew are not from the South End. TCB has a
policy of not hiring residents or neighbors, maintaining that such a
precedent would open management to charges of favoritism.21
In terms of security, Fillmore Center has a non-union force of 12
guards who are spread out over 3 shifts per day every day of the week.
Two of the guards patrol the 9-acre site at all times and a central security
control point consists of a series of television screens by which the devel-
opment is monitored at all times. 22 At Tent City, the main lobby off of
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Dartmouth Street features 24-hour desk coverage: a concierge by day, a
guard at night. In addition, at night a second guard roams the develop-
ment. 23
As with maintenance, neither Tent City nor Fillmore Center envisions
any role for tenants in the developments' security. For example, it is un-
likely a tenant surveillance force will materialize given that there is no
mechanism by which tenants of these two projects might begin to assume
some responsibility for resident safety. To date, ideas such as a Parent
Watch program or a Vandalism/Graffiti committee have not been dis-
cussed -- perhaps primarily due to the fact that no incidents have given rise
to such discussion.
Tenant Participation
The history of tenant participation in public housing suggests there
are many forms tenant organizations can take: Social, Service, Security,
Internal Resident Representation, and External Resident Representation.
Sometimes, social and service organizations develop spontaneously around
the mutual interests a group of residents have in hobbies or church, in
keeping residents informed via a newsletter, or in monitoring security by
voluntarily posting floor captains.
There are many reasons why the formulation of such groups might be
encouraged by the project manager:
-to consolidate grievances and residents' requests;
-to provide a forum for dealing with small problems before they
become big;
-to become a vehicle of communication between the tenants and
management;
-to promote the sense of community among residents;
'to assist in city and neighborhood planning by articulating needs
for additional or improved facilities such as schools, traffic lights,
or recreation areas;
'to be a positive force in combating undesirable influences;
'to provide a stabilizing influence in the neighborhood;
'to create an impetus for organizing the support for resident projects
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such as cooperative day care;
-to encourage residents to assume greater responsibility for the care
and use of the property.24
As compelling as some of these reasons may be, neither Tent City nor
Fillmore Center has clearly articulated the objective of formulating a ten-
ant group. Instead, they seem to have begun under the assumption that
such organizations are probably a good idea, but with a certain ambiva-
lence about just what they can accomplish. Perhaps this is reflective of the
uncertainty surrounding the degree of discretion management can exercise
legally in the selection of tenants.
This appears to be the case at Fillmore Center. As recently as
January, 1991, the developer said there was no plans to form a tenant
council. Any and all community-based organizations would be situated in
the Community Center across the street from the project. But perhaps
partly due to recent SFRA influence, a result its new involvement with the
project surrounding the issues of Section 8 eligibility and an additional
bond, FCA now talks of coordinating a neighborhood council among
Fillmore Center, nearby Marcus Garvey Cooperative Apartments, Yerba
Buena West , and the Police Department. This neighborhood council, in an
embryonic state at the moment, would be comprised of 3 tenants from each
of the three residential developments in addition to police representatives --
and is envisioned by FCA as a means of enhancing "community
relations".25
When asked whether there are now plans to establish a tenant organi-
zation within Fillmore Center itself, the developer says such a plan is under
consideration -- but only in so far as such an organization might be a
vehicle for settling social grievances or voicing resident concerns. FCA
does not see a resident organization assuming any management responsibil-
ities: as a private development, Fillmore Center is not going to become a
"self-governing" development. 26
At Tent City, by contrast, a tenant organization was envisioned for
just that purpose as the project proposal was honed in 1984. The TCC
president at the time recalls that the goal was established whereby residents
would take an increasing role in the management of the development and
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one day be able to exercise an option to purchase the project in a limited
equity cooperative arrangement. In fact, three years after the project was
to have begun, the residents were to have formed the majority of the TCC
board, traditionally comprised of 18 members of the South End commun-
ity.27
But in the two and a half years since the project's completion, resi-
dents of Tent City have not gained any representation on the TCC board.
In-stead, the board provided a full-time person to act as a Tenant Coordi-
nator. This person was given very little direction in her role and, largely
of her own initiative, began the Tenant Council and started a monthly
newsletter. The 15-member Council has had 3 chairpersons in its two year
history. It meets monthly to plan social events or handle disputes and, of
late, the members of the group have been very divided over the purpose of
the Council. The Tenant Coordinator claims the group is unaware of their
potential strength.28
Meanwhile, while the initial cooperative apartment idea went by the
wayside, the TCC claims equity syndication proceeds over the course of the
first seven years amounting to a few million dollars will be put in a holding
account. This money will appreciate in value such that by the termination
of the SHARP subsidy in Year 15, a 20% cash downpayment will be avail-
able for TCC's purchase of the development from the limited investors. 29
But unless tenants begin to play a larger management role in the course of
the next decade, this purchase will probably not involve them directly and
the chance of them having a true equity stake in the development -- origi-
nally the ultimate goal -- will have been missed.
Conclusion
In the United States the housing collective has not enjoyed wide accep-
tance. Given the increase in home ownership opportunities for millions of
Americans in the years after World War H -- by virtue of government
mortgage insurance and the income tax deduction -- the single family house
has been the dominant ideal of ownership and independence. But with ris-
ing real estate prices and construction costs in the past two decades, the
limited equity cooperative has emerged as a viable, if infrequently insti-
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tuted, form of ownership. Here, tenants do not necessarily own an indivi-
dual dwelling unit as much as a piece of the whole: their monthly pay-
ments are no longer rent but equity, allowing them a controlling stake in
the overall development. As opposed to the tradition of dependency en-
couraged in public housing of the past, housing cooperatives foster in-
dependence and responsibility.
Community-based non-profit organizations that create development
arms frequently have the goal of cooperative ownership in mind. The very
meagerness of resources for low income housing in the 1980s has compell-
ed these groups to adopt a resourceful, self-reliant posture where they con-
centrate on one project at a time. The Tent City Corporation aspired to
create a self-managed, cooperative housing development on the site of com-
munity protest. But with the building now complete, the mechanism by
which this cooperative arrangement might be accomplished, the Tenant
Council, lacks the same vision and inertia that guided the Tent City Task
Force earlier.
Fillmore Center, meanwhile, purports to be nothing like a cooper-
ative. In fact, the mixed-income component of this development is ephem-
eral -- it is little more than a vehicle for the provision of market rate hous-
ing in San Francisco. It may, indeed, disappear from the rental housing
market altogether in a decade if it is converted to condominiums.
Mixed-income/mixed-use developments should aspire to something
more. The goal of integrating different economic and racial groups dis-
tinguishes such projects from typical market-oriented projects. As func-
tionally complex, economically-integrated environments, MI/MU develop-
ments can be regarded as microcosms of the equitable city ideal. Tenants
of such developments are unlike other renters in that they are vested with
the responsibility of making such tentative integration efforts work. In
their selection, and through their participation, the tenants of MI/MU de-
velopments must be prepared to take on the responsibilities for building a
cohesive, self-reliant community.
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V0 CONCLUS]ON

5.1 LESSONS
FROM TENT CITY & FILLMORE CENTER
This final chapter is organized around an assessment of how well the
initial proposition of identity, integration, and interaction stands up in light
of the analyses of Tent City and Fillmore Center. The conclusions from
the analyses of the cases will be cast in the broad framework of MI/MU
development: What constitutes a mixed-income/mixed-use development?
What constitutes success for such developments? What are the character-
istics of design, financing, and management which most significantly con-
tribute to the successful realization of laudable objectives?
Identity
As the case studies demonstrate, the objectives of creating a mixed-
income environment can vary considerably. At Tent City, the mixed-in-
come objective was to provide an affordable, sustainable environment for
low-to-moderate in-come people of a neighborhood facing the pressures of
displacement by urban renewal and the market-rate conversion of existing
housing. Today, a quarter of the units are reserved for people of very low
income (less than 50% of city median). Half of the units are reserved for
people of moderate income (between 50% and 120% of city median) in a
sophisticated graduated tier to ensure a) that not all the units of this tier go
to people making 120% of median income, and b) that income fluctuations
can be accommodated, allowing people to remain in the development.1
Tent City's integrity as a mixed-income environment is historically
based. The initial protest, the subsequent formation of the task force, and
the eventual transformation into a development sponsor -- all have served
to identify and articulate a series of significant values within the larger
community of the South End. Tent City is most successful in the ways in
which it manifests and nurtures these community-based values. The TCC
board, while not yet reflective of the project's residents as originally in-
tended, is reflective of the neighborhood; through its history and the mem-
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ory of its members, the board provides continuity to the early activism.
Tent City stands out as a unique mixed-income environment while also
reflecting the social diversity and architectural character of the South End.
At the same time, if prevailing market forces have tended to segre-
gate income and racial groups, then Tent City can be seen as a subversion
of the market. Large amounts of government assistance were assembled to
create a housing environment which, given the institutional constraints of
the building and lending industries, the market would not provide. Taking
to heart a responsibility to protect "the public interest", policy makers at
the MHFA and the BRA have been determined that mixed-income environ-
ments should exist to meet the basic needs and rights of low-to-moderate
income people not met by the marketplace.
In the case of Fillmore Center, the mixed-income objective was to
infuse a market-oriented population into a neighborhood traditionally de-
pendent on housing assistance. One in five of the new units is reserved for
people of low income (less than 80% of the regional median). Another
30% is reserved for people making a "moderate" income (though when
calculated as high as 150% of regional median it amounts to a market-rate
income). 2 The short-term inclusion of low-to-moderate income people is
actually more a mechanism for expanding the supply of private rental
housing than an attempt to meet the needs of local residents. Without ex-
plicit affirmative goals and graduated tiers, applicants in the upper ranges
of the income tiers may be selected over the truly low- and moderate-
income applicants, in order to preserve the middle class orientation of the
development.
Fillmore Center is only nominally a mixed-income development.
The objectives of the project were based primarily upon the hopes of the
redevelopment agency; there was no set of well-articulated community
values. The project comes to the Western Addition ambivalent about its
origins, its purpose, and its duration as a mixed-income environment. For
those already in the economic mainstream, choosing to live at Fillmore
Center amounts to choosing among an array of goods and services: per-
sonal discretion is based upon the ability to pay. Here, private rental
housing caters to the tastes and values of the middle-class consumer -- for
comfort, convenience, and security. The needs of those outside the econo-
mic mainstream, however, are not likely to include a concierge or a ja-
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cuzzi. The identity of Fillmore Center as a mixed-income environment is
inextricably bound up in assumptions about values measured in terms of
money.
Fundamentally, identity as a mixed-income environment centers on
the issue of "grain". Physically, to the degree that a project responds to its
context -- and has a context to respond to -- it can be an expression of the
identity of the neighborhood. Socially, the neighborhood's economic and
racial diversity can lend clarity to a mixed-income proposal: to the extent
that within the neighborhood there is evidence of the very diversity the de-
velopment aspires to, a project can serve as a focal point of the neighbor-
hood's identity. The finer the grain of the neighborhood, both social and
physical, the better the prospects of success for a MI/MU development.
In a neighborhood that is generally homogeneous in terms of class or
race, for instance, a MI/MU project might appear as an aberration. Even
at the edge of a homogeneous neighborhood, the prospect of such a project
integrating with its surroundings by means of its ground floor retail alone
is not assured. Fillmore Center seems destined to illustrate how the sudden
infusion of a distinct group of people can preclude the acceptance of a pro-
ject among area residents.
Reflective of the Grain Distinct from the Grain
By contrast, in a neighborhood or on a seam that is heterogeneous in
character, the prospects of a MI/MU development blending in is greater.
Tent City may be a dense development concentrating people of diverse
background in one location, but the mix is not inconsistent with that of the
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district. The project appears more like a microcosm of the neighborhood
than an aberration. As such, the ground floor retail stands a better chance
of appealing to a greater number of area neighbors where the needs and
tastes of the neighbors is consistent with those of the project's residents.
Matters of scale, material, and vernacular are essential for a project
to be identified with its surroundings. Tent City not only benefits by its
distinctive context but its scale is appropriate for infill development in the
district. Here the architects managed to respond to the neighborhood and
at the same time give the project a special "custom fit" quality. With the
Victorian character in the basin of the Western Addition largely demol-
ished, the developers at Fillmore Center had little choice but to produce a
new fabric ior the neighborhood. But the prospects that a massive infusion
of housing might blend into the neighborhood are cast in doubt. The sheer
scale of the development sets it apart from its context; rather than relating
to the neighborhood, the development appears detached. There is little
evidence that Fillmore Center reflects either the nature of the community
or the context of the Western Addition.
It is not always easy to identify which seams in the fabric of the city
would, in fact, be the most promising for the location of a MI/MU project.
A convergence of foot traffic, sidewalk shopping, public transportation,
and open space would appear to be ideal prerequisites of the most promis-
ing sites. Moreover, as many tenant management organizations have
learned, the prospects for success are helped tremendously if the district is
generally on the up-swing; it is quite unlikely that a single development is
going to reverse an area's decline. But most importantly, where a project
is borne of the grain of a district that is physical and social diverse, it is
more likely to take root.
Integration
As proposed at the outset, the incorporation of non-residential uses,
particularly ground floor retail/commercial space, can bring economic vi-
tality to the sidewalk and also integrate a development into the fabric of the
neighborhood. At Tent City, the limited amount of space devoted to retail
space is intended appeal to a cross section from the community -- both
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within the project and within the neighborhood as a whole. While the
retail space must function within the framework of the marketplace, it was
not conceived to generate a profit for the development; rather, it is intend-
ed to serve the needs of low-to-moderate income residents and provide an
opportunity for local entrepreneurs.
At Fillmore Center the retail/commercial space is substantial and is
explicitly intended to be a market-oriented catalyst for neighborhood revi-
talization. Integration is a critical goal of the mixed-use component, but to
the degree it is predicated on a new population and new tastes in the area, it
is an especially precarious proposition. Given that the majority of the de-
velopment's residents are of higher income than area neighbors, it remains
to be seen how well or how quickly the ground floor retail space will
enable the project to fit into the neighborhood. Furthermore, because
there is no public rental subsidy at Fillmore Center, the mixed-use compo-
nent must do more than just carry its own weight: if may ultimately have
to absorb some of the development's losses should residential occupancy
fall off.
Both cases also illustrate the importance of non-residential compo-
nents other than retail/commercial space as an integrative device. At
Fillmore Center, a health club serves as the project's convocation point,
and because other neighborhood residents are invited to join, it can attract
area neighbors to the project. At Tent City, the private parking garage for
an adjacent shopping center enabled the affordable housing to be built by
providing the foundation for the project. In parking at the development,
Copley Place shoppers are made aware of Tent City's existence and of the
fact that mixed-income environments need not look like the notorious
housing projects of the past.
In addition, the incorporation of on-site community facilities can also
serve to integrate the developments to their neighborhoods. At Tent City,
the multi-purpose room is used not only for tenant council meetings and
social functions, but also serves the child care service and tutoring program
by day -- and is available to residents and neighbors alike. Fillmore Center
provides no space or services within the development. Physically distinct
from the project, the community center which Fillmore Center is helping
to build is unlikely to result creating a link between the development and its
neighbors.
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As compelling as the notion of integration may be, the analyses of
Tent City and Fillmore Center are consistent in demonstrating the difficult-
ies of incorporating mixed-use in mixed-income development. This is true
in three respects. First, because these projects both involve government-
backed mortgages and some sort of tax exempt financing, the strict stipula-
tions regarding the use of proceeds for non-residential functions discour-
ages mixed-use. Taking advantage of exceptions to these provisions re-
quires a conviction in the promise of mixed-use that is not often found in
lenders and housing developers.
Secondly, for all the affirmative action aspirations a developer might
have for retail/commercial space, the experiences of Tent City and Fill-
more Center suggest that such goals sometimes must be compromised in
order to simply secure a viable business. It is not likely that the developer
will be free to compose a retail mix that might ideally suit the needs of
both residents and neighbors. Instead, the mix is ultimately at the mercy of
the market. Where private entrepreneurs correctly gauge the local demand
-- which may or may not coincide with what the housing developer might
have hoped -- the mixed-use component might be viable. But where de-
mand is misjudged or simply insufficient, commercial turnover will have a
debilitating effect on the development as a whole. Nothing is more detri-
mental to a MI/MU development than vacant storefronts.
Finally, providing community facilities is no guarantee that residents
and neighbors will use them. At Tent City, the multi-purpose room is put
to regular use because a full-time Tenant Coordinator arranges the child
care, tutoring services, and tenant council meetings. In addition, neighbor-
hood groups are made aware of the room's availability and are encouraged
to take advantage of it. Without direct and consistent coordination, the po-
tential for community space to serve an integrative role is lost.
Interaction
The premise of this thesis has been that perhaps together a mixed-
income and mixed use component can form a unique, socially diverse en-
vironment conducive to building a sense of community. Urban mixed-
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income projects are, at the moment, the most ambitious form of residential
integration. The residents of these projects are in a unique position to
demonstrate that people of different economic and racial backgrounds can
live together in harmony. To the extent that design, marketing, and par-
ticipation provide opportunities for contact among residents and neighbors,
MI/MU projects might encourage the development of connections, even
friendships, among traditionally segregated people.
In the project management section of the analysis, the significance of
tenant participation to the success of MI/MU developments is stressed.
Mixed-income environments are distinct from other residential develop-
ments in that they propose a common home for people of very different
economic and racial backgrounds. Isolation is precisely what the mixed-
income environment seeks to avoid; rather, traditional barriers of fear and
prejudice are meant to be broken down. Beyond informal neighborly con-
tact, direct tenant involvement in management issues can enhance the resi-
dents' proprietary feeling toward the development. The transition to own-
ership interest in the development represents a significant accomplishment,
particularly for people of low-to-moderate income who frequently lack
opportunities to exercise control over their circumstances.
Yet it would be wrong to conclude from the analyses that either Tent
City or Fillmore Center exhibits the sort of tenant interaction described
above. Rather, it is more accurate to conclude that simply combining
mixed-income and mixed-use does not, of itself, foster the building of com-
munity. For all the faith in identity and integration, interaction is not ne-
cessarily the inevitable result.
In the description of Tent City, the divisiveness of the current tenant
council illustrates that convening a forum does not mean that everyone will
participate -- or that the forum itself will constitute the cornerstone of
community. Despite the original intentions, the council currently lacks
focus or direction and there are profound doubts as to how the ultimate
goal of purchasing the development might include the tenants in any
meaningful way. In addition, the frustration of many working parents with
the college students is a further indication that forming community is
elusive -- at least at the moment.
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This is not to say that interaction is not encouraged at Tent City.
Architecturally, the project's semi-private inner courts are open to all of
the residents and accessible to the project's neighbors. Similarly, as has
been described, the multi-purpose room serves a variety of resident func-
tions and is also made available to community-based organizations. In
contrast, at Fillmore Center, the orientation is toward security and privacy.
Despite its size and the extent of its open space, there are very few oppor-
tunities where residents are encouraged to share space or participate to-
gether in some activity. Segregated outdoor circulation and recreation
areas distance the project from its neighbors. Services and meeting rooms,
while provided in part because of the development, are physically removed
from it. Moreover, the proposed tenant organization will probably never
take on any substantive role in the development's management.
It is easy to claim that the MI/MU environment is not appropriate for
everyone and suggest that only those willing to participate be accepted as
tenants. But discretion in the tenant selection process is very limited in
practical terms. By accepting public money, of the project manager must
choose tenants on the basis of equity rather than responsiveness: meeting
income requirements supersedes any goals for tenant involvement.
Where the developer/manager does have more discretion, however,
is in marketing the project as a mixed-income development. At the Harbor
Point development, for example, the developers had initially tried to attract
market-rate tenants by highlighting the project's amenities and offering a
month's free rent for signing on. But the initially high turnover of market
rate units suggested that the mixed-income environment did not sit well
with many of those with other options. The developers decided to shift the
marketing strategy by explicitly advertising the development as a mixed-
income environment -- acknowledging it as a grand social experiment.3
Not only has the occupancy rate of the market-rate units stabilized,
but the new tenants are more willing to participate in many of the develop-
ment's community groups. For instance, in addition to an after-school tu-
toring session offered by teachers, there is now an evening tutoring team
comprised of market rate tenants. In addition to the Harbor Point Com-
munity Task Force (part of the original development team), there is now
an Outreach Committee, Partnership Committee, and Community Captains
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program which offer opportunities for various levels of involvement in the
management, security, and social services of the development. 4
The potential for such involvement exists at Tent City. Despite the
current problems with the Tenant Council, in its emphasis on families, the
project can forge a bond with the surrounding community. Informal inter-
action between Tent City children and their neighbors builds connections
that might eventually involve parents. On-site activities such as child care,
tutoring, and an art program, family cook-outs and neighborhood block
parties, provide structured opportunities to encourage the building of rela-
tionships.
Conclusion
Taken as a sum of components, from design and financing to tenant
selection and property management, MI/MU development can be a daunting
prospect. It is certainly more complicated than conventional one-dimen-
sional projects. In terms of complicated development costs and rental assis-
tance (either as a cross subsidy within the development or as a typical gov-
ernment subsidy), it is more expensive to build. Furthermore, it is clear
that simply merging mixed-income with mixed-use is not likely to result in
a dynamic, interactive community.
Exploiting the full potential of MI/MU developments requires a com-
mitment to building resident interaction through affirmative marketing
strategies and follow-through in the day-to-day livelihood of the develop-
ment. Long term goals of tenant management and ownership are impracti-
cal if not based on a foundation of modest goals such as participation
around social events and children-oriented services. To the extent that a
neighborhood context provides the impetus and momentum for such parti-
cipation, MI/ MU development can demonstrate the saliency of community
building.
At the same time, it is appropriate to question the wisdom of focus-
ing economic and racial integration only on inner city neighborhoods. It is
reasonable to expect that in suburban locations there are strategic areas of
overlap analogous to the seams of the city. Here too the qualities of iden-
tity, integration, and interaction are relevant, albeit on a different scale and
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density. However, steps toward residential integration, whether in cities or
suburbs, have been tentative considering the scope of the problems. The
case studies presented here have illuminated the criteria for building suc-
cessful MI/MU projects. There is no inherent magic in mixing uses and
income groups -- the qualification of success lies in the ability of people to
recognize the value of economic and racial integration and in the commit-
ment to making this integration work.
0
1 Posner, Joshua; Director of Housing Development -- The Community Builders; (inter-
view December, 1990).
2 Rumpf, William; Chief of Housing Production & Management -- SFRA; (interview
April, 1991).
3 Corcoran, Joseph E.; President -- Corcoran Jennison Companies (Harbor Point co-
developer); (interview May, 1991).
4 Corcoran, (interview May, 1991).
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POSTLUDE
American culture has long been marked by acute
ambivalence about the meshing of self-reliance
and community.
Habits of the Heart, Bellah et al,
By means of two recent examples I have tried to shed light on the
nature of design, financing, and management central to the success of MI/
MU development. Such development can be broadly defined; I have chosen
to focus on rental environments in inner city areas at the juncture of eco-
nomically and racially distinct neighborhoods. First and foremost, the
juncture itself offers an important opportunity for people of low-to-moder-
ate income to emerge from relative isolation and join in wider society.
Secondly, mixed-use, while not new to cities, takes on a special quality
when incorporated into mixed-income housing. Busy ground-floor retail
and commercial space, especially small, locally-based stores, not only
creates a sense of vitality and security on the sidewalk, they also are critical
to a district's identity. Mixed-use development, in serving the needs and
desires of a diverse population, is truly a vehicle by which the development
can be integrated into its surroundings.
Other mixed-income programs have been centered around improv-
ing home ownership opportunities, often beyond the city limits. By con-
trast, the tenancy environment in the central city offers a genuine oppor-
tunity to reach people in need. At the same time, home ownership itself
has become increasingly infeasible even for people making a market-rate
income, resulting in a greater demand for rental housing. This coincidence
of need and demand presents a unique opportunity to create a functionally
complex, integrated housing environment today. In the course of this final
section, I will attempt to clarify this link between the promise of MI/MU
development and the larger issue of equity in our society.
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Our Incoherent Goals
While we Americans cherish the idea of freedom and democratic
values, we are rarely clear about just what these ideas mean. Frequently
we end up trying to explain our values by casting them as negatives. For
example: "I don't care what they do as long as they don't bother me." It is
often easier for us to articulate just what is wrong with society -- just what
we're against -- than to articulate just what we are for.
This paradox is part of our identity as Americans. In our society,
for example, success is said to depend on personal choice and achieving
success stems directly from one's economic progress. In this system, jus-
tice becomes more procedural than truly distributional: we are content,
for instance, to let the so-called "free market" define who will live where.
If justice is all about establishing a floor below which no one will be
allowed to fall, how are the inordinate rewards to a privileged few re-
conciled with the genuine need of so many others?
For us, freedom commonly means being left alone by others, not
being forced to recognize, let alone adopt, the values and lifestyles of
others. This interpretation of freedom has disturbing implications for the
building of community that I hold out as the promise of MI/MU develop-
ment. We want to be "free" to live where we want, believe what we want,
and "free" to pursue our material goals. Yet despite the race toward eco-
nomic prosperity, it is almost too simplistic to conclude that for most of us
"it is easier to think about how to get what we want than to know exactly
what we should want."2
On a fundamental level, are wants are pragmatic. A person of low-
to-moderate income may simply want a better apartment in an environment
free from the isolation and danger of a public housing project -- and a
mixed-income environment can offer this. A person making a market-rate
income might enjoy the city and would prefer to live in an older neighbor-
hood with some charm -- and in an attractive apartment that's a good deal.
Each person, despite a difference in income, might appreciate not only the
convenience of stores and services at the street level, but also the sense of
vitality these stores bring to the neighborhood.
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But do people moving into Tent City or Fillmore Center necessarily
"want" to build a community? Should they have to? I have stated earlier
that MI/MU developments are not appropriate for everyone, implying that
for one who does not like to participate a MI/MU project is probably not
the right place. But under equal opportunity housing policy, one cannot be
denied entry solely because he/she does not want to attend Tenant Council
meetings every week. For some, "community" may simply be a matter of
a "hello" now and then, at minimum a sense of security.
A People of Contrast and Contradiction
We live with a great deal of fear in our society -- mostly of the un-
known. Yet with vaunted self-reliance we suppress the unknown, prefer-
ring to insulate -- or isolate -- ourselves from it. This is consistent with
our heritage. On one hand we have revered individualism from the very
start. Confidence and personal motivation are considered essential equip-
ment under the rules of our competitive free enterprise system. Success in
our society is all too often equated with economic gain at the expense of
others. In our isolation, it is not hard to mistake a lack of money for a lack
of personal worth. Hence the presumption of paternalistic role models.
On the other hand, in the more public dimension of our lives we
have celebrated "an enduring association of the different". 3 Our
republican tradition of civic virtue has been based on the premise that a
commitment to the broader public, the illusory "public good", shapes
character and establishes a web of trust.4 This need not be all virtuous and
idealistic, however. It is eminently practical to understand that one's
personal welfare is dependent on the general welfare -- but general welfare
varies by degrees. The neighborhood unit today is not necessarily the
mutually-supportive, holistic environment of mythical "small town"
America. While communities have been galvanized around fighting off
highway expansion, they have also, unfortunately, been known to vehe-
mently resist such integrative efforts as school desegregation and half-
way houses for the mentally disturbed.
Does this mean that notions like "neighborly conciliation" are cliche
and unrealistic today? I do not think so. Certainly the divisions within our
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society are great. The isolation of urban ghettos and wealthy suburbs alike
has had the effect of exacerbating the fear between people of different clas-
ses and cultures. Without occasions for even tentative interaction, the hope
of bridging the gap is unrealistic. The greatest fear of all may be that, in
purporting to uphold the values of equity and freedom while unable to re-
concile our contradictions, we may lose any hope at all of relating to those
who are different than us.
Breaking Down The Barriers
It is heterogeneity that has traditionally defined the American city as
a "melting pot". If today the city is less a mix of cultures than it is of clas-
ses, it is still, in the words of Charles Abrams, "the melting pot in which
ways of life are blended, the training ground of the poor in search of a
better life, the crucible in which will be tested our ability to endure the
fatigue which democracy exacts." 5
The occasions for integration in our society, even after the gains of
the Civil Rights Movement a quarter century ago, are not numerous. We
have learned that housing alone is not the answer. Changes in education,
health care, politics, and the business climate must also occur. But if
housing is not the solution, it is at least an appropriate place to begin. If
we cannot live together in the immediate sense, we cannot expect to be
united as a people, pretending to stand for something we are not.
MI/MU development is certainly not the panacea. It cannot work
everywhere; it is not appropriate for everyone. But in the right location,
developed according to community-oriented ideals and backed by enlight-
ened public policy, such projects can be important, if tentative, steps to-
ward breaking down the barriers that divide us. Integrated into their con-
texts, MI/MU developments can provide opportunities for people of diverse
economic and racial backgrounds to interact as neighbors rather than as
strangers. Such interaction can serve to demonstrate that true community
is not organized around our individual differences, but rather around our
mutual needs and common interests.
*e0
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1 Bellah, Robert et al; Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American
Life (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1985), p. 256.
2 Bellah, p. 21.
3 Bellah, p. 251.
4 Bellah, p. 251.
5 Abrams, Charles. The City is the Frontier (Harper & Row: New York, 1965), p. 16.
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Appendix

RENT SCHEDULES
&
MEDIAN INCOMES
for
TENT CITY & FILLMORE CENTER
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TENT CITY
MODERATE-INCOME RENT SCHEDULE (1989)
Moderate-Income Apartments (135)
Type of Apartment A o> B(2> C(3 D(4)
One-Bedroom $201 $302 $400 $624
Two-Bedroom 291 421 562 N/A
Three-Bedroom 333 424 645 N/A
Four-Bedroom 374 556 744 N/A
(1) for households with incomes between $7,700 (1-person in a 1-BR unit) and
$31,000 (eight people in a 4-bedroom unit);
(2) for households with incomes between $11,601 (1-person in a 1-BR) and $41,000
(eight people in a 4-bedroom unit);
(3) for households with incomes between $15,401 (1 person in a 1-BR unit) and
$50,200 (eight people in a 4-bedroom unit);
(4) for singles only with incomes between $19,000 and $25,000
CITY OF BOSTON MEDIAN INCOME
(1990) *
FAMILY SIZE
1 2 3 4
$31,250 $35,700 $40,200 $44,600
for the sake of comparison: Boston Area Median Income (1990) **
FAMILY SIZE
1 2 3 4
$32,400 $37,000 $41,700 $46,300
* derived from HUD's Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area designation: 2/16/90
** also determined by HUD for each major metropolitan area of the country (1990)
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FILLMORE CENTER
MODERATE-INCOME RENT SCHEDULE (1990)
Moderate-Income Apartments (334)
Type of Apartment
Studio
1,369
1,624
1,871
One-Bedroom
Two-Bedroom
Three-Bedroom
(1) rent based on 30% of maximum income, $47,850, for a one-person house-
hold and $54,750 for a two-person household;
(2) rent based on 30% of maximum income, $47,850, for a one-person house-
hold and $54,750 for a two-person household;
(3) rent based on 30% of maximum income, $54,750, for a two-person house-
hold and $68,400 for a four-person h ousehold;
(4) rent based on 30% of maximum income, $68,400, for a four-person house-
hold and $76,950 for a six-person household.
SAN FRANCISCO AREA MEDIAN INCOME
(1990) *
FAMILY SIZE
1 2 3 4
$31,900 $36,500 $41,000 $45,600
* derived from HUD's Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area designation: 2/16/90
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Firehock, Bob; Agency Counsel -- SFRA; (interview March, 1991).
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Gallagher, Susan; Assistant Property Manager -- Tent City; (interview February, 1991).
Jacobson, Bob; Executive Director -- Tent City Corporation; (interview December,
1991).
Joffrion, Wade -- Project Manager, and Kim Day -- Project Manager for Fillmore Center
Project; Daniel, Mann, Johnson, & Mendenhall -- Architects; (interview January,
1991).
Kane, Michael; original member Tent City Task Force; current member Tent City Corpo-
ration Board; (interview December, 1990).
King, Mel; Adjunct Professor and Director of Community Fellows Program, Depart-
ment of Urban Studies & Planning, MIT; co-founder Tent City Task Force; (in-
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Kruckemeyer, Ken; co-founder Tent City Task Force and former President TCC;
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Posner, Joshua; Director of Housing Development -- The Community Builders; (inter-
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Rumpf, William; Chief of Housing Production & Management -- SFRA; (interview
April, 1991).
Rush, Bob; Deputy Director Harbor & Waterfront Development -- BRA (formerly
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Seymour, Toni; Tenant Coordinator -- Tent City; (interview February, 1991).
Sullivan, Susan; Tent City resident (interview February, 1991).
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A-2 Project Director); (interview January, 1991)
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Tolin, Tina; Tent City resident (interview February, 1991).
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Associates -- Architects; (interview February, 1991).
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